Prepared remarks delivered by Matthew RJ Brodsky at the Juneau World Affair Council's Middle East Forum on November 2, 2009. For local coverage courtesy of the Juneau Empire, click Here and Here:

Engagement has been the centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s policy in the Middle East. In its broadest sense, it represents a new willingness to listen and cooperate, and take other countries into account when forming our foreign policy. This engagement is meant to convince our adversaries through diplomacy that there is an alternative path available to them in terms of their relationship with Washington if they change certain behaviors that are of critical concern to the United States.  President Obama articulated that our relationships abroad will be “based on mutual respect and mutual interests.”  It is the second part that I will concentrate on tonight.

The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy
Council.  It was originally published by The American Spectator.

When President Obama delivers his long-awaited speech in Egypt on Thursday, he will be fulfilling his inaugural pledge to "seek a new way forward" with the Muslim world. But finding areas of mutual interest may prove far more difficult than the president imagines. That is because, in recent years, the Middle East has seen the crystallization of regional politics around two distinct ideologies. Call it the new bipolarity.

For years Qatar has energetically sought to pursue autonomous regional policies, balancing their friendly relations with Iran while hosting America’s regional headquarters and cooperating with other Gulf states.  In 1995, they opened low-level diplomatic relations with Israel during the Oslo peace process, becoming one of the first Arab states to do so without a peace agreement with Israel.

Qatar’s renewed quest for a stronger regional role began to take shape in 2006 during the summer war between Israel and Hezbollah. The war served to highlight the differences between the moderate and radical camps led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and Iran and Syria respectively. Following the crisis, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jasim made camp with the moderates and even called on Lebanon to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel.  This move, needless to say, did not sit well with Iran and Syria.

The following is an article and book review I wrote for The Journal of International Security Affairs.

Reviewed Book: Barry Rubin, The Truth About Syria (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 304 pp. $14.95.

Forty years ago, in assessing the foreign policy direction of the regime of Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency concluded that “[t]he question in regard to Syria’s future… is not whether it will be moderate or radical, but what will be the kind and intensity of its radicalism.” Four decades later, the new U.S. administration finds itself struggling with the same question as it works to craft a new policy toward Syria.

The following is an article I wrote for the inFocus Quarterly Journal.  It was originally published here.

Several myths lie at the core of the arguments in favor of resuming the Syrian-Israeli peace process. The first is that the two parties were close to completing a peace deal in 2000, but diplomacy faltered over final borders—and that it would be relatively simple to solve this territorial dispute. The second is that the return of the Golan Heights is a priority for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is not only capable of making peace with Israel, but could deliver the warm relations that Jerusalem seeks in return. Lastly, there is the myth that if the West sufficiently sweetened a Syrian-Israeli peace deal, Damascus could undergo a strategic shift and even reorient itself toward the West.

The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council.  It was originally published here at the Washington Times.

The Obama administration appears to have set its sights on Syria as part of its efforts to turn over a new leaf on Middle East policy. Recent days have seen a spate of diplomatic overtures by Washington to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.

These initiatives have ranged from an administration authorization of spare parts for Syrian aircraft to the very public visit to Damascus of Sen. John Kerry, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council.  It was originally published here at the Jerusalem Post.

As the new president-elect begins to weigh the carrots and sticks he can employ when dealing with the Middle East, he will run into the question of how to handle Syria.  Bashar al-Asad was the first to reach out with a telegram to Mr. Obama on November 7 that “expressed hope for constructive dialogue so that the difficulties can be overcome which have hampered the advance of peace, stability and progress in the Middle East.”

The list of these “difficulties” is indeed long.  The regime in Damascus supports terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, continues to destabilize Lebanon, strives to become a nuclear power, and is politically and tactically wedded to Iran – and this is just the tip of the iceberg.

The following is a blog I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council.  The original is available here on their website.

“Terrorist aggression” is what Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu’allim termed the U.S. raid into Syria that either captured or killed Abu Ghadiya. The daylight attack took place five miles inside Syria in the town of Sukkariya near Abu Kamal. Syrian television claimed nine people were killed and 14 were wounded in the operation. A native of Mosul, Iraq, the 32-year old Ghadiya has been in charge of al-Qaeda’s extensive Syria network since 2005, when the organization declared an Islamic Emirate in Al Qaim along the Iraqi border. In February, U.S. intelligence sources named Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih (a.k.a. Abu Ghadiya) as al-Qaeda in Iraq’s top operative in Syria, tasked with funneling foreign fighters, weapons, and cash into Iraq.

Back in June, when shortly after the secret talks between Syria and Israel became known, two contrasting opinions were shared on the prospects of peacemaking.  Since MEO seeks to foster debate on the Middle East, below the two articles are shared.  The first is by David Schenker, the Director of the Program on Arab Politics from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  Responding to his article is Joshua Landis, the Director of the Center for Peace Studies and host of the blog, Syria Comment.