Submitted by Brodsky on Tue, 04/14/2009 - 10:51
The following is an article and book review I wrote for The Journal of International Security Affairs.
Reviewed Book: Barry Rubin, The Truth About Syria (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 304 pp. $14.95.
Forty years ago, in assessing the foreign policy direction of the regime of Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency concluded that “[t]he question in regard to Syria’s future… is not whether it will be moderate or radical, but what will be the kind and intensity of its radicalism.” Four decades later, the new U.S. administration finds itself struggling with the same question as it works to craft a new policy toward Syria.
Reviewed Book: Barry Rubin, The Truth About Syria (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 304 pp. $14.95.Forty years ago, in assessing the foreign policy direction of the regime of Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency concluded that “[t]he question in regard to Syria’s future… is not whether it will be moderate or radical, but what will be the kind and intensity of its radicalism.” Four decades later, the new U.S. administration finds itself struggling with the same question as it works to craft a new policy toward Syria.
Submitted by Brodsky on Fri, 02/27/2009 - 12:24
The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council. It was originally published here at the Washington Times.
The Obama administration appears to have set its sights on Syria as part of its efforts to turn over a new leaf on Middle East policy. Recent days have seen a spate of diplomatic overtures by Washington to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.
These initiatives have ranged from an administration authorization of spare parts for Syrian aircraft to the very public visit to Damascus of Sen. John Kerry, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Submitted by Brodsky on Fri, 06/27/2008 - 15:03
A faintly hopeful aspect of the current frost between Syria and Israel is that Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems determined to bring the two countries to the negotiating table. Turkey has emerged over the past year as the principle, indeed the only serious, broker between these bitter enemies.
Patrick Seale, author and biographer of the late Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad recently shared his views on the prospects of a Syrian-Israeli peace. The original article can be read at Middle East Online.
The Prospects for a Syrian-Israeli Peace
The Prospects for a Syrian-Israeli Peace
By, Patrick Seale
May 2, 2008A faintly hopeful aspect of the current frost between Syria and Israel is that Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems determined to bring the two countries to the negotiating table. Turkey has emerged over the past year as the principle, indeed the only serious, broker between these bitter enemies.
Submitted by Brodsky on Wed, 05/21/2008 - 11:29
Israel's Haaretz newspaper reported today that Israel and Syria have officially confirmed indirect peace talks.
Israel's Haaretz newspaper reported today that Israel and Syria have officially confirmed indirect peace talks.Ehud Olmert's decision to engage with Syria while the rest of the Arab world has them isolated, is questionable. It is bad for Israel and Lebanon. In fact, only Syria will gain by the process and the peace that will again prove elusive.
Submitted by Brodsky on Tue, 05/20/2008 - 14:59
I couldn't resist publishing this fantastic story of Western lunacy when dealing with Bashar al-Asad, Syria, and Hizballah.
Arlen Specter meets Syrian President Bashar al-Asad in Damascus (Reuters)
There is no doubt it is funny - but too bad that it is true.
It comes from Barry Rubin in his book, "The Truth About Syria ," pp. 240-41
From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State
Those who were hoping for dramatic economic reform in Syria's predominantly state-controlled and centralized economy were to be disappointed. The 2006 report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) characterized it as a "stable but stagnant economy."[37] Dr. Nabil Sukkar, one of Syria's leading economists and a former World Bank economist explained that the leadership in Damascus was "afraid to take the plunge" and Syria's introduction into the global economy would mean that the ruling elite "could loosen its grip on power and threaten its privileges."[38] After 50 years of Ba'th Party rule, the Syrian economy has remained inefficient, old-fashioned, and heavily regulated, with large-scale corruption at the highest levels of government. The three revenue streams that Syria relies on are oil production, taxes from government services, and the government-owned industrial companies, which are widely politicized, greatly inefficient, and often loose money. The only exceptions are the three monopolies: tobacco, telecommunications, and banking.
From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State
Bashar sought to maintain and further develop his father's system, as he stated in his inaugural address.[30] He selected a personal staff of younger men from his generation who shared his worldview. Three came from the Syrian Computer Society and headed the tourism, communications, and higher education portfolios, however, lacking their own power bases, they proved unable to exercise significant influence in government circles. With the patriarch of the family gone, Bashar also proved unable to control his immediate family. Confrontations between his younger impulsive brother Mahir and his older sister, Bushra and her husband Asaf Shawkat were widely reported. For the most part, the military elite of Hafiz's era remained in place during Bashar's first years. The only exception were some changes in the 'Alawi officers and their replacement by younger officers.[31] This face-lift, however, was designed more to create a support base for Bashar moving forward.
From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State
Syrian politics were highly unstable from their April 1946 independence until November 1970, when Hafiz al-Asad came to power. During the two decades following the 1948 war in Palestine, Syria experienced 20 military-backed coups or attempted coups, including the state's brief dissolution into the United Arab Republic with Egypt from 1958-1961. In 1963, the Ba'th Party came to power yet intense infighting among Syria's ruling elite and various leadership factions persisted. While Asad - an 'Alawi of the Kalbiyya tribe - was a Ba'th Party member who participated in the 1963 coup and served as Defense Minister during the 1967 war, he favored a more pragmatic approach and seized power in the 1970 Corrective Revolution (al-Thawra al-Tashihiyya). Unlike the previous military coups that saw army units and their commanders fighting each other, the Corrective Revolution was a kind of victory of the army over itself. For the next three decades until Asad's death in June 2000, he brought Syria something they had never experienced before: stability - his regime's greatest accomplishment. Asad's biographer, Patrick Seale, summed up the two phases of the struggle in the titles of two separate books, The Struggle for Syria, 1945-1958,[3] and Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East,[4] thereby drawing the distinction between the initial internal struggle and subsequent quest to dominate the region. From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State
Friday 21 January 1994 should have been a normal day for Dr. Bashar al-Asad, the son of Hafiz, president of the Syrian Arab Republic. He was in London practicing ophthalmology when his world was shaken with the news of the death of his older brother, Basil, who was killed in a car accident in Syria. His father Hafiz al-Asad also wanted to be a doctor when he was young but his family could not afford to finance his education so he settled for a military career instead. In many aspects, Bashar was fulfilling his father's dreams much like his older sister, Bushra, who was studying pharmacology. Since Hafiz's heart attack in 1983, questions about succession in Syria became an important topic. Basil had been groomed to take his father's place; with his death, Hafiz's eyes turned to Bashar.[1] With Hafiz al-Asad's death on 10 June 2000 and the transfer of power to Bashar, many wondered what Syria would like in the 21st century after three decades of stable rule under Asad Sr. Flynt Leverett described three conflicting images of Bashar that dominated analytic debates and policy arguments about Syria:
