Given Akram Hanieh's Palestinian account, it rings clear that international legitimacy and justice were paramount - statehood involving compromise was secondary.  The Palestinian sense of national rights and justice differs from the American and Israeli perspective.  Past United Nations resolutions - which form the international basis of Palestinian legitimacy - are interpreted differently in Jerusalem and Washington.

            United Nations Security Council Resolution #242, adopted on 22 November 1967 in the wake of the June war, calls for the "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," ^[47] and "For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem."  America agrees with Israel's interpretation of the resolution - that in exchange for peace, Israel must withdraw from some territories, and not all territories.  Palestinians and the Arab states interpret the resolution as meaning Israel should withdraw from all of the territories.^[48] 

            What would the contours of an acceptable deal look like to Palestinians?  During the Camp David summit, Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi said on PBS television,  "It very much depends on what Barak is offering.  You say 90 percent of the West Bank.  If that includes sovereign access to the West Bank...real sovereignty in almost all of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian capital in Jerusalem, some implementation of the right of return or compensation, then Palestinians will say, yes, this was an historic moment, and Arafat should have seized it."^[35]  If Khalidi represented Palestinian aspirations, they should have accepted either the Camp David proposals or the Clinton Parameters.  Regardless, Arafat turned down all Camp David offers and received a hero's welcome on the Palestinian street upon his return home.  At the time, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were not saying, "Arafat should have seized it."

 

            Perhaps no other event in recent history has been as contested on all fronts as what happened from Camp David in July 2000 through Taba in January 2001.  It is not only debated between the three protagonists, but also debated among them.  In question are the various conclusions reached following the summit, as are the interpretations of the facts used to guide the many accounts.   It should be a straightforward question:  Why did the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts in 2000-01 fail to end the conflict and achieve peace?  Each commentator, whether a participant or historian, brings their own frames of reference to bear on the above question.  As a result, the commentaries that spring forth are skewed, reflecting their origins.   Yet, neither Camp David nor the beginning of the Oslo years mark the starting point of disagreement.  It rests in each commentator's understanding of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from its very beginning.