An Interview with Dr. Asher Susser
By: Matt Gordner
Egypt’s failure to broker an effective reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah makes it a strong probability that the January elections will be considered illegitimate by the Palestinian people – that is, if they happen at all. Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) recently declared that the elections will be postponed pending more suitable national conditions. This, of course, renders the possibility of a virtual three state arrangement a viable reality for Israelis and Palestinians in the near future.
For a number of reasons, the speeches delivered this summer by Obama, Netanyahu, and Fayyad promised to bear fruit. Instead, they withered on the vine.
Engagement has been the centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s policy in the Middle East. In its broadest sense, it represents a new willingness to listen and cooperate, and take other countries into account when forming our foreign policy. This engagement is meant to convince our adversaries through diplomacy that there is an alternative path available to them in terms of their relationship with Washington if they change certain behaviors that are of critical concern to the United States. President Obama articulated that our relationships abroad will be “based on mutual respect and mutual interests.” It is the second part that I will concentrate on tonight.
Several myths lie at the core of the arguments in favor of resuming the Syrian-Israeli peace process. The first is that the two parties were close to completing a peace deal in 2000, but diplomacy faltered over final borders—and that it would be relatively simple to solve this territorial dispute. The second is that the return of the Golan Heights is a priority for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is not only capable of making peace with Israel, but could deliver the warm relations that Jerusalem seeks in return. Lastly, there is the myth that if the West sufficiently sweetened a Syrian-Israeli peace deal, Damascus could undergo a strategic shift and even reorient itself toward the West.
Few places can stir such deep emotions as the New Jersey-sized state of Israel. Whether or not one has visited the Jewish homeland, all have strong opinions on how it should behave. For many in the West, Israel is a country that exists in either dreams or nightmares so the state is either above rapprochement or is evil. Many Jews come from abroad to visit the land they read about in the Torah; the city of Jerusalem to which they face in prayer; where for centuries the Passover meal concludes with the phrase, “Next year in Jerusalem.” They stay in fancy West Jerusalem hotels, tour the Old City, kiss the Wailing Wall, and walk through Mea Sharim and marvel at the near replica of a nineteenth century Polish shtetl recreated in a Jerusalem suburb. They return home with hundreds of pictures testifying to their visits, secure that Israel and the Jewish people are thriving and need think no further.
The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council. The original is available here on their website.
Israel’s nearly three week-long offensive against the Hamas terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip ended days before the inauguration of Barack Obama as president in Washington. Now, attention in the U.S. and Israeli governments turns to the thorny questions of how to create a durable ceasefire, keep Hamas isolated, and ensure that it cannot rearm. And, as policymakers in Washington are beginning to find out, doing so requires solving the issue of the smuggling tunnels that run from Egypt to Gaza.
Recalling the steadfast commitment of the United States to Israel's security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats;
Reaffirming that such commitment is reflected in the security, military and intelligence cooperation between the United States and Israel, the Strategic Dialogue between them, and the level and kind of assistance provided by the United States to Israel;
Over the years, the game in Gaza has had a familiar ring to it: Hamas launches rockets toward Israeli population centers and Israel responds with a pinpoint strike of its own. Every so often, civilians are killed on both sides. The outside world, meanwhile, yawns with indifference. No longer. The expiration of its six-month ceasefire with Israel earlier in December prompted Hamas to resume large-scale hostilities, launching hundreds of rockets against Israeli civilian population centers. However, over the past week, Israel’s government has demonstrated unequivocally that it is no longer prepared to simply implement piecemeal responses, as it has done for years against the de facto Islamist government in Gaza. Instead, it has launched a major offensive, Operation Cast Lead, that Defense Minister Ehud Barak has announced could last weeks if not months. So, what can Israel now hope to achieve politically by using its military?
Below is a blog that I thought was worth posting from my colleague, James Robbins, Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council. It covers the absurd notions of proportionality that have been buzzing around newsrooms with Israel's offensive in Gaza. The original is posted here.
By: James Robbins
Criticism of Israel for using excessive force in combating Hamas in Gaza fails to make several critical distinctions between the contesting parties. Hamas chose not to renew the six-month ceasefire that had created a modicum of peace ("state of calm," officially) in the area. Hamas then resumed indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets in Israel. Israel’s response, by way of contrast, seeks to target only Hamas and its infrastructure, and any civilian casualties are unintended, unwanted, and usually the result of Hamas placing its weapons and command posts in civilian neighborhoods.
With the expiration of the six-month lull in Hamas rocket fire into Israel, the IDF is set to invade Gaza and attack Hamas’s terrorist infrastructure. There are several reasons for the timing of Israel’s operation. Firstly, many in Israel’s security establishment never signed on to the purpose of the cease-fire to begin with. It merely granted Hamas a respite from Israeli attacks while giving them the opportunity rearm and better train themselves. For two years, since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, they have been working hard to develop their military power with Iranian assistance using Hizballah as a model. The new rockets they have smuggled in pieces through tunnels from Egypt now have the capacity to strike the outskirts Beersheba. Since more fighting is inevitable given Hamas’s pledge to destroy the Jewish state, it is better to attack when they have fewer weapons at their disposal. A ceasefire only works in Hamas’s favor.
As the new president-elect begins to weigh the carrots and sticks he can employ when dealing with the Middle East, he will run into the question of how to handle Syria. Bashar al-Asad was the first to reach out with a telegram to Mr. Obama on November 7 that “expressed hope for constructive dialogue so that the difficulties can be overcome which have hampered the advance of peace, stability and progress in the Middle East.” The list of these “difficulties” is indeed long. The regime in Damascus supports terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, continues to destabilize Lebanon, strives to become a nuclear power, and is politically and tactically wedded to Iran – and this is just the tip of the iceberg.
