Submitted by Brodsky on Thu, 11/12/2009 - 02:00
Prepared remarks delivered by Matthew RJ Brodsky at the Juneau World Affair Council's Middle East Forum on November 2, 2009. For local coverage courtesy of the Juneau Empire, click Here and Here:
Engagement has been the centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s policy in the Middle East. In its broadest sense, it represents a new willingness to listen and cooperate, and take other countries into account when forming our foreign policy. This engagement is meant to convince our adversaries through diplomacy that there is an alternative path available to them in terms of their relationship with Washington if they change certain behaviors that are of critical concern to the United States. President Obama articulated that our relationships abroad will be “based on mutual respect and mutual interests.” It is the second part that I will concentrate on tonight.
Submitted by Brodsky on Tue, 04/14/2009 - 10:51
The following is an article and book review I wrote for The Journal of International Security Affairs.
Reviewed Book: Barry Rubin, The Truth About Syria (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 304 pp. $14.95.
Forty years ago, in assessing the foreign policy direction of the regime of Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency concluded that “[t]he question in regard to Syria’s future… is not whether it will be moderate or radical, but what will be the kind and intensity of its radicalism.” Four decades later, the new U.S. administration finds itself struggling with the same question as it works to craft a new policy toward Syria.
Reviewed Book: Barry Rubin, The Truth About Syria (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 304 pp. $14.95.Forty years ago, in assessing the foreign policy direction of the regime of Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency concluded that “[t]he question in regard to Syria’s future… is not whether it will be moderate or radical, but what will be the kind and intensity of its radicalism.” Four decades later, the new U.S. administration finds itself struggling with the same question as it works to craft a new policy toward Syria.
Submitted by Brodsky on Fri, 02/27/2009 - 12:24
The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council. It was originally published here at the Washington Times.
The Obama administration appears to have set its sights on Syria as part of its efforts to turn over a new leaf on Middle East policy. Recent days have seen a spate of diplomatic overtures by Washington to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.
These initiatives have ranged from an administration authorization of spare parts for Syrian aircraft to the very public visit to Damascus of Sen. John Kerry, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Submitted by Brodsky on Wed, 05/21/2008 - 19:53
At first glance, it would appear that two important and positive developments took place in the Middle East in the span of 24 hours. First, the violence that erupted in Lebanon on May 7 when Shi'a Hizballah gunmen and their allies overran most of West Beirut ended with an agreement reached in Doha, Qatar. At least 67 people have been killed in the fighting. As part of the negotiated outcome, the 18-month political deadlock that began when opposition lawmakers resigned from the government in November 2006 will come to an end as an agreement was reached to elect army chief General Michel Suleiman as president this week. This will end the political deadlock that gripped Lebanon since late 2006 and more acutely, since pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud stepped down in November 2007.
Lebanese civilian flashing the victory sign while holding a poster of Rafiq al-Hariri (Photo: AP)
Submitted by Brodsky on Tue, 05/20/2008 - 14:59
I couldn't resist publishing this fantastic story of Western lunacy when dealing with Bashar al-Asad, Syria, and Hizballah.
Arlen Specter meets Syrian President Bashar al-Asad in Damascus (Reuters)
There is no doubt it is funny - but too bad that it is true.
It comes from Barry Rubin in his book, "The Truth About Syria 
," pp. 240-41
," pp. 240-41
Submitted by Brodsky on Sun, 05/18/2008 - 15:35
The Lebanese civil war that ended in the 1990s was more a product of tensions along the Muslim-Christian divide. Today, the tension is turning out to be Sunni versus Shi'a.
“We cannot go back to how we lived with them before,” Mr. Obaid, a Sunni Muslim told the New York Times in Lebanon in reference to t
he Shi'a Hizballah. “The blood is boiling here. Every boy here, his blood is boiling. They push us, they push us, they push us.”
he Shi'a Hizballah. “The blood is boiling here. Every boy here, his blood is boiling. They push us, they push us, they push us.”The Lebanese civil war that ended in the 1990s was more a product of tensions along the Muslim-Christian divide. Today, the tension is turning out to be Sunni versus Shi'a.
Make no mistake: Hizballah wants to control Lebanon on behalf of their Iranian and Syrian hosts. Unlike Hamas, who probably would have been happier if the Palestinian elections saw them make gains rather than win, Hizballah wants total victory - through the ballot or through arms.
From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
The United States emerged as the world's sole superpower in the aftermath of the Gulf War in March 1991 with unprecedented prestige in the Middle East. The first Bush administration, eager to proceed with its 'new world order' seized the proverbial 'window of opportunity' to forge a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. This presented Syria, Israel, and the United States with a series of both challenges and opportunities.From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State
Those who were hoping for dramatic economic reform in Syria's predominantly state-controlled and centralized economy were to be disappointed. The 2006 report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) characterized it as a "stable but stagnant economy."[37] Dr. Nabil Sukkar, one of Syria's leading economists and a former World Bank economist explained that the leadership in Damascus was "afraid to take the plunge" and Syria's introduction into the global economy would mean that the ruling elite "could loosen its grip on power and threaten its privileges."[38] After 50 years of Ba'th Party rule, the Syrian economy has remained inefficient, old-fashioned, and heavily regulated, with large-scale corruption at the highest levels of government. The three revenue streams that Syria relies on are oil production, taxes from government services, and the government-owned industrial companies, which are widely politicized, greatly inefficient, and often loose money. The only exceptions are the three monopolies: tobacco, telecommunications, and banking.
From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State
Bashar sought to maintain and further develop his father's system, as he stated in his inaugural address.[30] He selected a personal staff of younger men from his generation who shared his worldview. Three came from the Syrian Computer Society and headed the tourism, communications, and higher education portfolios, however, lacking their own power bases, they proved unable to exercise significant influence in government circles. With the patriarch of the family gone, Bashar also proved unable to control his immediate family. Confrontations between his younger impulsive brother Mahir and his older sister, Bushra and her husband Asaf Shawkat were widely reported. For the most part, the military elite of Hafiz's era remained in place during Bashar's first years. The only exception were some changes in the 'Alawi officers and their replacement by younger officers.[31] This face-lift, however, was designed more to create a support base for Bashar moving forward.
From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State
Syrian politics were highly unstable from their April 1946 independence until November 1970, when Hafiz al-Asad came to power. During the two decades following the 1948 war in Palestine, Syria experienced 20 military-backed coups or attempted coups, including the state's brief dissolution into the United Arab Republic with Egypt from 1958-1961. In 1963, the Ba'th Party came to power yet intense infighting among Syria's ruling elite and various leadership factions persisted. While Asad - an 'Alawi of the Kalbiyya tribe - was a Ba'th Party member who participated in the 1963 coup and served as Defense Minister during the 1967 war, he favored a more pragmatic approach and seized power in the 1970 Corrective Revolution (al-Thawra al-Tashihiyya). Unlike the previous military coups that saw army units and their commanders fighting each other, the Corrective Revolution was a kind of victory of the army over itself. For the next three decades until Asad's death in June 2000, he brought Syria something they had never experienced before: stability - his regime's greatest accomplishment. Asad's biographer, Patrick Seale, summed up the two phases of the struggle in the titles of two separate books, The Struggle for Syria, 1945-1958,[3] and Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East,[4] thereby drawing the distinction between the initial internal struggle and subsequent quest to dominate the region. 