From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The United States emerged as the world's sole superpower in the aftermath of the Gulf War in March 1991 with unprecedented prestige in the Middle East.  The first Bush administration, eager to proceed with its 'new world order' seized the proverbial 'window of opportunity' to forge a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.  This presented Syria, Israel, and the United States with a series of both challenges and opportunities.
 

From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

 
            What would the contours of an acceptable deal look like to Palestinians?  During the Camp David summit, Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi said on PBS television,  "It very much depends on what Barak is offering.  You say 90 percent of the West Bank.  If that includes sovereign access to the West Bank...real sovereignty in almost all of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian capital in Jerusalem, some implementation of the right of return or compensation, then Palestinians will say, yes, this was an historic moment, and Arafat should have seized it."[35]  If Khalidi represented Palestinian aspirations, they should have accepted either the Camp David proposals or the Clinton Parameters.  Regardless, Arafat turned down all Camp David offers and received a hero's welcome on the Palestinian street upon his return home.  At the time, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were not saying, "Arafat should have seized it."
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