Perhaps no other event in recent history has been as contested on all fronts as what happened from Camp David in July 2000 through Taba in January 2001. It is not only debated between the three protagonists, but also debated among them. In question are the various conclusions reached following the summit, as are the interpretations of the facts used to guide the many accounts. It should be a straightforward question: Why did the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts in 2000-01 fail to end the conflict and achieve peace? Each commentator, whether a participant or historian, brings their own frames of reference to bear on the above question. As a result, the commentaries that spring forth are skewed, reflecting their origins. Yet, neither Camp David nor the beginning of the Oslo years mark the starting point of disagreement. It rests in each commentator's understanding of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from its very beginning.
The United States emerged as the world's sole superpower in the aftermath of the Gulf War in March 1991 with unprecedented prestige in the Middle East. The first Bush administration, eager to proceed with its 'new world order' seized the proverbial 'window of opportunity' to forge a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. This presented Syria, Israel, and the United States with a series of both challenges and opportunities.