Submitted by Brodsky on Wed, 05/28/2008 - 16:51
Estimates vary on how long it will take Iran to develop nuclear weapons. They seem to center on the belief that it could be within one to three years. While the world and the United Nations stand united in rhetoric alone, nothing effective is being done to curtail the Iranian nuclear program. Even in the United States, there is a great disagreement on the proper path forward with no agreement on the facts and their interpretation.
In order to create and implement an effective policy and plan for contingencies, we must first dispel the myths, focus attention on uncomfortable truths, and finally, devise a strategy and coherent policy.
In order to create and implement an effective policy and plan for contingencies, we must first dispel the myths, focus attention on uncomfortable truths, and finally, devise a strategy and coherent policy.
From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
Rabin's assassination on 4 November 1995 by a Jewish extremist opposed to the peace process dealt a heavy blow to the peace process. It was an obvious moment for Asad to reach out to the Israeli people, however, any gesture, no matter how small proved beyond his notion of making peace. Given Asad's policy and negotiating perspective, it was not surprising that no Syrian official attended the funeral in Israel. Nevertheless, Rabin's assassination and the implications for the peace process prompted a substantial number of Arab leaders to either send condolences or attend the funeral. Asad could not even bring himself to express a personal condolence to Yitzhak Rabin's wife, Leah, after several conversations with Warren Christopher. Asad's only reaction came in a phone call with the U.S. Secretary of State where he said that contrary to what some might think, "there will be no rejoicing in Syria."[139] Rabinovich thought, "Syria's direct response to Rabin's assassination was, at best, heartless."[140]
The Pocket was so secretive in 1995 that Peres was surprised to learn of Rabin's exercise. Rabinovich briefed Peres on the Syrian track and stressed that he should avoid using the term "commitment." He knew Clinton wanted to hear it. It was one thing to commit to continuing Rabin's policies, but quite another if Peres literally committed to withdraw from the Golan to the 4 June 1967 line without Israel's needs being satisfied.[141] When Clinton met Peres, the president assured the new prime minister that he intended to remain involved until July 1996. Clinton would then concentrate on his re-election campaign.
From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
Little progress was achieved in the "ambassador's channel" in Maryland that began on 29 July. During these informal meetings away from the State Department and the media, Ambassadors Rabinovich and Mu'allim met together and separately with Ross, Indyk, and later Mark Parris. Syria agreed to allow Israel one year to withdraw - up from their previous demand of six months. In August, Rabin agreed that the timetable for withdrawal could be less than five years and took Barak's four categories of territory in relation to military force deployment off the table.
The two main issues discussed in the ambassador's channel in Maryland was the extent of normalization and security arrangements. If Israel received more assurances on the depth of normalization, they would require less in terms of security arrangements. Syria did not commit to the kind of relations that would have helped Rabin convince the Israeli public that withdrawing from the Golan would prove beneficial. Asad maintained that the security arrangement must be on "equal footing" with both sides mirroring the other in DMZs and force deployment. Mu'allim argued that Damascus was closer to the border than Tel Aviv and therefore, zones of limited deployment were far more threatening to Syria than to Israel. With the focus shifting to security arrangements, Rabinovich suggested meetings between the military leaders but Asad rejected this.
By October, the process again ground to a halt. It was decided that while Clinton was in the Middle East for the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement, he would meet with Rabin and then travel to Damascus to meet with Asad. Clinton hoped that seeing Asad in Damascus would enable him to press the Syrian leader for a move either on substance or procedure given his desire for closer relations with Washington.
From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
With two new administrations in Israel and Washington, the stage was set for progress. Rabin's vision of Israel's future included accommodation with Syria as one of his policy cornerstones. He also saw the rising threat of Islamic fundamentalists and knew that the trend needed to be reversed by engaging on the Palestinian issue. Rabin saw the Islamist threat as something that not only threatened Israel, but also the stability of the secular Arab regimes. His major policy thrust was therefore geared toward reconciliation with all of Israel's old foes in order to create a united front against their common fundamentalist enemy.[68] Regarding Israel's security and the idea of land-for peace, Rabin explained:
I am unwilling to give up a single inch of Israeli security, but I am willing to give up many inches of settlements and territory, as well as 1,700,000 Arab inhabitants, for the sake of peace. We seek a territorial compromise that will bring peace and security; a lot of security.[69]
Shortly after Rabin became prime minister, he replaced Yossi Ben-Aharon as the head of the Israeli delegation with Itamar Rabinovich. Rabin reversed Shamir's policy of offering Syria peace-for-peace and said that 242 did apply to the Golan. This contributed to a slight softening in Syria's stance during the sixth round of talks since Madrid - from 24 August through 2 September 1992. After Syria was unable to extract from Israel a more explicit statement regarding the depth of the withdrawal, they presented Israel with a "Draft Declaration of Principles" on 31 August.
From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
The Madrid peace conference was far from conciliatory with no country taking the high road in their remarks. Shamir launched into a lengthy history of Arab rejection of Israel, accusing the Arab states of passing resolutions that "perverted history, paraded fiction as fact, and made a travesty of the UN and its charter." He took credit for the conference saying it was "a result of a sustained American effort based on our own peace plan of May 1989" and labeled the conference "ceremonial" as it was merely an opening to direct, bilateral negotiations. He railed that in Israel there was a consensus to forge peace with differences only in the best way to achieve it while "In most Arab countries, the opposite seems to be true. The only differences are over the ways to push Israel into a defenseless position and, ultimately to destruction." Shamir further admonished the Arab participants: "Above all, we hope you finally realize that you could have been at this table long ago, soon after the Camp David Accords were first concluded, had you chosen dialogue instead of violence, coexistence instead of terrorism." In driving his point home, he made clear that "an examination of the conflict's long history makes clear, its nature is not territorial...the issue is not territory, but our existence. It will be regrettable if the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory. It is the quickest way to an impasse."[45
From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
The Madrid conference that opened on 30 October 1991 was the product of four principal developments:
- The decline and dissolution of the Soviet Union, which left Asad looking for a substitute for aid, namely from Washington
- The arrival of nearly a million Soviet immigrants to Israel, which was seen as a demographic threat in the Arab world as it related to their settling in the West Bank
- The diminished position of the PLO and Arafat in specific, after supporting Iraq in the Gulf War
- The intifada and the 1991 Gulf War's success in affecting the Israeli psyche.
Finding an agreeable framework to convene the conference proved to be a difficult task. Secretary of State James A. Baker III spent months, including nine trips to the Middle East to find an amenable formula. He pursued a two-track approach - the first was negotiations between Israel and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza; the second was negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. America's goal was a regional meeting or conference cosponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union designed to comprehensively settle the Arab-Israeli dispute based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338.[26]
From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
The United States emerged as the world's sole superpower in the aftermath of the Gulf War in March 1991 with unprecedented prestige in the Middle East. The first Bush administration, eager to proceed with its 'new world order' seized the proverbial 'window of opportunity' to forge a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. This presented Syria, Israel, and the United States with a series of both challenges and opportunities.Iran and the United States: Foreign Policy during the Khomeini Years
Two weeks after Khomeini’s return to Tehran, on 14 February 1979, 150 members of the Marxist, leftist, Feda’iyan-e Khalq overran the American embassy. Khomeini quickly denounced the attack and dispatched Ibrahim Yazidi, who rounded up hundreds of students from Tehran University and led a counter-attack to free the Americans. Khomeini and his band of mullahs leveled their criticism at the leftists. That same year on 4 November, three hundred Islamic students overran the embassy and took 66 Americans hostage. This time Khomeini gave his approval within two days. Why did he react in the opposite manner to a seemingly similar scenario? On 22 October the United States admitted the Shah for medical treatment for his advanced cancer. While this was perceived as a slap at revolutionary Iran, it alone does not explain Khomeini’s rationale. At the time of the hostage crisis, the admission of the Shah was usually tagged onto the end of listed Iranian grievances – and the hostages were not released when the Shah was forced out of America after completing his treatment on 15 December, nor were they released when he died in Egypt on 27 July 1980.17
Iran and the United States: Foreign Policy during the Khomeini Years
Iran and the United States share a relatively brief but troubled history. America’s involvement in Iran began in the aftermath of the Second World War and intensified as the American-Soviet Cold War smoldered during the later half of the 20th Century. Iran never loomed large upon the horizon of the American public’s list of foreign concerns. For the United States, the defining moment in their relationship came on 4 November 1979, when on the heals of the Iranian Revolution, 66 Americans were seized from their embassy in Iran and held hostage for 444 days.1 Americans saw this as a blatant and undeserved attack and felt powerless as the hostage crisis dragged on. This left a terrible scar on the American psyche and has colored foreign policy decisions towards Iran ever since. Americans today, for the most part, remain cloaked in a shroud of ignorance, ever asking, ‘Why do they hate us?’ For Iranians, America’s 1953 bloodless coup d’état that toppled Mosaddeq was a pivotal moment, creating a legacy etched into the Iranian consciousness. While Mosaddeq’s strategy for oil nationalization relied heavily upon American economic aid, in Iran he is remembered as the man who stood up to the West. The coup brought the Shah back. Iranians who looked to the United States to rid themselves of Britain’s yoke woke up to the new reality that they had merely replaced the British with the Americans. The Iranian sense that other nations have constantly meddled in their internal affairs has remained a driving force behind foreign policy decisions since the 1979 revolution.
A new generation of Iranian intellectuals emerged in the 1960s, reversing previously held convictions and espousing the view that the West was the cause of Iran’s problems.2 By 1977, Iran had become a tinderbox due to economic conditions, the Iranian people’s dissatisfaction with the Shah’s modernization efforts, and disenchantment with the influence of Western values penetrating the country. With nearly all segments of society rising to challenge the Shah, many sought to mold and control the revolutionary explosion.
From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology
Given Akram Hanieh's Palestinian account, it rings clear that international legitimacy and justice were paramount - statehood involving compromise was secondary. The Palestinian sense of national rights and justice differs from the American and Israeli perspective. Past United Nations resolutions - which form the international basis of Palestinian legitimacy - are interpreted differently in Jerusalem and Washington.
United Nations Security Council Resolution #242, adopted on 22 November 1967 in the wake of the June war, calls for the "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," [47] and "For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." America agrees with Israel's interpretation of the resolution - that in exchange for peace, Israel must withdraw from some territories, and not all territories. Palestinians and the Arab states interpret the resolution as meaning Israel should withdraw from all of the territories.[48]
