Below is a blog that I thought was worth posting from my colleague, James Robbins, Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council.  It covers the absurd notions of proportionality that have been buzzing around newsrooms with Israel's offensive in Gaza.  The original is posted here.

By: James Robbins

Criticism of Israel for using excessive force in combating Hamas in Gaza fails to make several critical distinctions between the contesting parties. Hamas chose not to renew the six-month ceasefire that had created a modicum of peace ("state of calm," officially) in the area. Hamas then resumed indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets in Israel. Israel’s response, by way of contrast, seeks to target only Hamas and its infrastructure, and any civilian casualties are unintended, unwanted, and usually the result of Hamas placing its weapons and command posts in civilian neighborhoods.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

With the expiration of the six-month lull in Hamas rocket fire into Israel, the IDF is set to invade Gaza and attack Hamas’s terrorist infrastructure.  There are several reasons for the timing of Israel’s operation.  Firstly, many in Israel’s security establishment never signed on to the purpose of the cease-fire to begin with.  It merely granted Hamas a respite from Israeli attacks while giving them the opportunity rearm and better train themselves.  For two years, since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, they have been working hard to develop their military power with Iranian assistance using Hizballah as a model.  The new rockets they have smuggled in pieces through tunnels from Egypt now have the capacity to strike the outskirts Beersheba.  Since more fighting is inevitable given Hamas’s pledge to destroy the Jewish state, it is better to attack when they have fewer weapons at their disposal.  A ceasefire only works in Hamas’s favor.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council.  It was originally published here at the Jerusalem Post.

As the new president-elect begins to weigh the carrots and sticks he can employ when dealing with the Middle East, he will run into the question of how to handle Syria.  Bashar al-Asad was the first to reach out with a telegram to Mr. Obama on November 7 that “expressed hope for constructive dialogue so that the difficulties can be overcome which have hampered the advance of peace, stability and progress in the Middle East.”

The list of these “difficulties” is indeed long.  The regime in Damascus supports terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, continues to destabilize Lebanon, strives to become a nuclear power, and is politically and tactically wedded to Iran – and this is just the tip of the iceberg.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The following is a blog I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council.  The original is available here on their website.

Although the last Syrian troops left Lebanon on April 26, 2005, Syria still has countless horses in the Lebanese race. The Syrian regime - along with Iran - supports Hezbollah and Amal, and it backs various secular Sunni groups, in addition to the largely Christian Free Patriotic Movement headed by General Michel Aoun. Along with the Syrian Ba’ath Party, Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Nasserite Popular Movement, these groups form the nucleus of Lebanon’s March 8 coalition.

Together, they have posed a serious challenge to the pro-Western, anti-Syrian March 14 coalition. That group includes the Future Movement headed by Sa’ad Hariri, the son and political heir of the slain nationalist politician Rafiq Hariri; Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party; the Democratic Gathering Bloc, and; Samir Ja’ja’s Lebanese Forces.

Adding to this unstable political mix are over 400,000 Palestinians confined to refugee camps throughout Lebanon, who remain largely outside of state authority. There are currently some 15 active Palestinian factions, which range politically from the Marxist far left to the Islamist and jihadist far right - many of whom operate with the support and encouragement of Damascus.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The following is a blog I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council.  The original is available here on their website.

“Terrorist aggression” is what Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu’allim termed the U.S. raid into Syria that either captured or killed Abu Ghadiya. The daylight attack took place five miles inside Syria in the town of Sukkariya near Abu Kamal. Syrian television claimed nine people were killed and 14 were wounded in the operation. A native of Mosul, Iraq, the 32-year old Ghadiya has been in charge of al-Qaeda’s extensive Syria network since 2005, when the organization declared an Islamic Emirate in Al Qaim along the Iraqi border. In February, U.S. intelligence sources named Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih (a.k.a. Abu Ghadiya) as al-Qaeda in Iraq’s top operative in Syria, tasked with funneling foreign fighters, weapons, and cash into Iraq.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The war on terror may never be the same.

On June 12, the court rewrote the rules for the Guantanamo detainees in the landmark case known as Boumediene v. Bush. The 5-4 majority opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded that the foreigners held at the U.S. Navy's Guantanamo Bay facility were protected by the U.S. Constitution's habeas corpus protections.

     For over a century, the powers of the world have sought to help establish, forge, or impose peace on the Middle East.  This section takes a detailed look at the history of the peace processes.
 
Read about the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and discover the truth behind its descent into chaos from 2000-01 in From Camp David to Taba: Narratives, Redlines, Justice, and Mythology.







Learn about the Syrian-Israeli peace process from 1991-2000 in From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process.

 

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