Adopted: August 11, 2006

The Security Council,

PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17) of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

Consider the following:  17 United Nations resolutions were passed against Iraq during the decade before the U.S.-led invasion.  Each failed to alter Hussein's behavior.  In fact, calls increased for sanctions to be lifted with Syria and France leading the world in undermining the UN resolutions.  Over a decade of efforts failed to alter Iraqi behavior.  Arguably, if Saddam had respected the UN weapons inspectors, there would have been no cause for an American invasion.

If one begins with the premise that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, and one hopes to achieve this without a military option, then a decade of feckless and unimplemented resolutions will guarantee Iran nuclear weapons.

In fact, the Iranian regime is counting on it.


Adopted: March 2008


            “The Security Council,


Recalling the statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and reaffirming their provisions,


Adopted: March 2007
 
            “The Security Council,


Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions,


Adopted: December 2006

            “The Security Council,


Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,


Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973


        The Security Council

        1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

        2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementationof Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

        3.  Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

Estimates vary on how long it will take Iran to develop nuclear weapons.  They seem to center on the belief that it could be within one to three years.  While the world and the United Nations stand united in rhetoric alone, nothing effective is being done to curtail the Iranian nuclear program.  Even in the United States, there is a great disagreement on the proper path forward with no agreement on the facts and their interpretation.

In order to create and implement an effective policy and plan for contingencies, we must first dispel the myths, focus attention on uncomfortable truths, and finally, devise a strategy and coherent policy.
 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state. It was approved on November 29, 1947 with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, 10 abstentions and one absent (see list).

The resolution was accepted by the Jews in Palestine, yet rejected by the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab states.


The General Assembly,

The General Assembly,

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

 
            Given Akram Hanieh's Palestinian account, it rings clear that international legitimacy and justice were paramount - statehood involving compromise was secondary.  The Palestinian sense of national rights and justice differs from the American and Israeli perspective.  Past United Nations resolutions - which form the international basis of Palestinian legitimacy - are interpreted differently in Jerusalem and Washington.
            United Nations Security Council Resolution #242, adopted on 22 November 1967 in the wake of the June war, calls for the "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," [47] and "For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem."  America agrees with Israel's interpretation of the resolution - that in exchange for peace, Israel must withdraw from some territories, and not all territories.  Palestinians and the Arab states interpret the resolution as meaning Israel should withdraw from all of the territories.[48] 
Syndicate content