By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

Prepared remarks delivered by Matthew RJ Brodsky at the Juneau World Affair Council's Middle East Forum on November 2, 2009. For local coverage courtesy of the Juneau Empire, click Here and Here:


Engagement has been the centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s policy in the Middle East. In its broadest sense, it represents a new willingness to listen and cooperate, and take other countries into account when forming our foreign policy. This engagement is meant to convince our adversaries through diplomacy that there is an alternative path available to them in terms of their relationship with Washington if they change certain behaviors that are of critical concern to the United States.  President Obama articulated that our relationships abroad will be “based on mutual respect and mutual interests.”  It is the second part that I will concentrate on tonight.

By: Michael Sharnoff


On July 21,
United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow went to Qatar to discuss methods of advancing U.S.-Qatar cooperation. In the past decade, the tiny, oil-rich Gulf Arab state of Qatar has emerged as a valuable United States ally for three reasons: it possesses the third biggest natural gas reserve in the world (after Russia and Iran); it quarters the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East; and it has served as a force for Middle East stability, mediating between warring factions in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Sudan.

However, while Qatar has demonstrated its value as a U.S. ally, it has also undermined Washington by supporting Iran and its allies. In addition, Qatar controls the Al Jazeera satellite television network that often vilifies the U.S. The curious dichotomy of Qatar raises questions about its long-term potential as a friend of the U.S.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy
Council.  It was originally published by The American Spectator.


When President Obama delivers his long-awaited speech in Egypt on Thursday, he will be fulfilling his inaugural pledge to "seek a new way forward" with the Muslim world. But finding areas of mutual interest may prove far more difficult than the president imagines. That is because, in recent years, the Middle East has seen the crystallization of regional politics around two distinct ideologies. Call it the new bipolarity.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The following is an article I wrote for the inFocus Quarterly Journal.  It was originally published here.

Several myths lie at the core of the arguments in favor of resuming the Syrian-Israeli peace process. The first is that the two parties were close to completing a peace deal in 2000, but diplomacy faltered over final borders—and that it would be relatively simple to solve this territorial dispute. The second is that the return of the Golan Heights is a priority for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is not only capable of making peace with Israel, but could deliver the warm relations that Jerusalem seeks in return. Lastly, there is the myth that if the West sufficiently sweetened a Syrian-Israeli peace deal, Damascus could undergo a strategic shift and even reorient itself toward the West.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The following is an article I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council.  It was originally published here at the Jerusalem Post.

As the new president-elect begins to weigh the carrots and sticks he can employ when dealing with the Middle East, he will run into the question of how to handle Syria.  Bashar al-Asad was the first to reach out with a telegram to Mr. Obama on November 7 that “expressed hope for constructive dialogue so that the difficulties can be overcome which have hampered the advance of peace, stability and progress in the Middle East.”

The list of these “difficulties” is indeed long.  The regime in Damascus supports terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, continues to destabilize Lebanon, strives to become a nuclear power, and is politically and tactically wedded to Iran – and this is just the tip of the iceberg.

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

The following is a blog I wrote for the American Foreign Policy Council.  The original is available here on their website.

Although the last Syrian troops left Lebanon on April 26, 2005, Syria still has countless horses in the Lebanese race. The Syrian regime - along with Iran - supports Hezbollah and Amal, and it backs various secular Sunni groups, in addition to the largely Christian Free Patriotic Movement headed by General Michel Aoun. Along with the Syrian Ba’ath Party, Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Nasserite Popular Movement, these groups form the nucleus of Lebanon’s March 8 coalition.

Together, they have posed a serious challenge to the pro-Western, anti-Syrian March 14 coalition. That group includes the Future Movement headed by Sa’ad Hariri, the son and political heir of the slain nationalist politician Rafiq Hariri; Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party; the Democratic Gathering Bloc, and; Samir Ja’ja’s Lebanese Forces.

Adding to this unstable political mix are over 400,000 Palestinians confined to refugee camps throughout Lebanon, who remain largely outside of state authority. There are currently some 15 active Palestinian factions, which range politically from the Marxist far left to the Islamist and jihadist far right - many of whom operate with the support and encouragement of Damascus.

Haaretz reports on another glarring example of UNFIL's inability to stop Hizballah from re-arming.  It would be an understatement to say that UNSC Resolution 1701, adopted on August 11, 2006 in order to end the Second Lebanon War, has been yet another unimplemented United Nations resolution:

The following is Haaretz's article:

Adopted: August 11, 2006

The Security Council,

PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17) of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

Back in June, when shortly after the secret talks between Syria and Israel became known, two contrasting opinions were shared on the prospects of peacemaking.  Since MEO seeks to foster debate on the Middle East, below the two articles are shared.  The first is by David Schenker, the Director of the Program on Arab Politics from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  Responding to his article is Joshua Landis, the Director of the Center for Peace Studies and host of the blog, Syria Comment.
Few people can grasp Israeli society and emotions better than Daniel Gordis . His website entitled, "Dispatches from an Anxious State," brings the Israeli experience to the lay-person.  Rather than raw political analysis, the reader is engaged in a real story from Gordis's life and that of his family since moving to Israel in 1998.  While the Web is abuzz with different interpretations of the political meaning of the prisoner swap between Israel and Hizballah - did Hizballah win; did Olmert cave; was the return of the remains of two kidnapped and killed Israeli soldiers worth the release of the notorious Samir Kuntar?
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