From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State

            Syrian politics were highly unstable from their April 1946 independence until November 1970, when Hafiz al-Asad came to power.  During the two decades following the 1948 war in Palestine, Syria experienced 20 military-backed coups or attempted coups, including the state's brief dissolution into the United Arab Republic with Egypt from 1958-1961.  In 1963, the Ba'th Party came to power yet intense infighting among Syria's ruling elite and various leadership factions persisted.  While Asad - an 'Alawi of the Kalbiyya tribe - was a Ba'th Party member who participated in the 1963 coup and served as Defense Minister during the 1967 war, he favored a more pragmatic approach and seized power in the 1970 Corrective Revolution (al-Thawra al-Tashihiyya).  Unlike the previous military coups that saw army units and their commanders fighting each other, the Corrective Revolution was a kind of victory of the army over itself.  For the next three decades until Asad's death in June 2000, he brought Syria something they had never experienced before: stability - his regime's greatest accomplishment.  Asad's biographer, Patrick Seale, summed up the two phases of the struggle in the titles of two separate books, The Struggle for Syria, 1945-1958,^[3] and Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East,^[4] thereby drawing the distinction between the initial internal struggle and subsequent quest to dominate the region.           

            Aside from the opportunity presented by Syria's longstanding instability, the crucial difference was that Asad exploited the situation to his advantage and converted the Ba'th Party, intelligence and security apparatus, and armed forces into his personal instruments.^[6]  As such, the domestic stability Hafiz al-Asad brought to Syria rested on three pillars.  (1) Asad's ability to consolidate and exercise control over the key bases of power; (2) His consolidation of social elements sufficiently broad to maintain his hold on power in a patchwork demography of ethnic interests and; (3) Asad's creation of a centralized and personalized presidency and rule.^[7]

            He incorporated - if not created - many of the state's mass organizations, popular unions, and professional associations into a lever of the Ba'th Party, and used the party to establish authority over the state apparatus.  By using state agencies and public sector enterprises, he created a new stratum of state-dependent bourgeoisie.  He also Ba'thafied the army and designed an "army-party symbiosis" to guarantee the support of the armed forces.^[8]  In addition, he cultivated a coercive police state apparatus to quell any perceived threat to the regime.  Most importantly, Asad managed to maintain stability by operating in three interlocking orbits that shaped his regime: the 'Alawi; Syrian; and Arab orbit.  As Eyal Zisser explained, "Asad was 'Alawi by background and origin, Syrian without, and Arab in his soul."^[9]  Asad's political and personal record demonstrated that pan-Arabism rather pan-Syrianism lied at the core of his and his party's ideological commitment and Ba'thism revolved around the idea of comprehensive Arab unity.

            The cohesion of the coalition underpinning the regime rested on Asad's ability to make the various components of the coalition experience a sense of belonging and partnership in the running of the state and to satisfy, at least in part, their social and economic needs.  He handpicked his inner circle, including a dozen or so senior diplomatic, military, and intelligence officials, many with family or tribal ties to Asad and often sharing a long personal history with the President.  Their individual reliability was ensured through lavish personal perquisites and lucrative opportunities for corruption.  Reflecting the 'Alawi-rural Sunni alliance and the army that generally reflected the demographic situation in Syria, Asad selected three Sunnis to the most important posts in his regime:  Vice President 'Abd al-Halim al-Khaddam, Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar', and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas.^[10]

            Controlling an ethnically diverse collection of population centers was no simple task.  Syria's population was 60 percent Sunni Muslim with half living in urban centers and the other half spread out in rural communities.  13 percent were Christians and 12 percent were 'Alawi living in their own region in the north.  The Druze constituted roughly 5 percent, mostly living on Mount Druze; Kurds and Turkomans constituted 10 percent living in the Jazira region and the Isma'ili community accounted for less than 1 percent of the population.  Asad created a secretarian regime that relied on the support of the 'Alawi community - which had previously been at the bottom of the political and economic system.  Many became active in the officer corps and they rose to preeminence after the 1966 neo-Ba'th revolution.  They became the binding agent for the rest of Asad's components.  When he became president, he appointed fellow 'Alawis to key leadership positions, while maintaining senior positions for key Sunnis.^[11]  Approximately 60 percent of the cabinet ministers, the members of the People's Assembly, and the deputies to the Party Congress are Sunnis - much like their percentage of Syria's overall population.^[12]

            Despite its initial weakness, the regime Asad formed was more firmly rooted in the reality of the country than its predecessors had been.  Once in power, he drew on additional sectors of society who were unrepresented by the regime.  He focused on the urban Sunnis and the Islamic elements.^[13]  He also invested considerable efforts in creating governmental institutions, namely the People's Assembly that acted as an umbrella organization for all political parties allowed to operate in Syria - the National Progressive Front.^[14]  Asad created a dual power system with well-ordered institutions of state each having its place in a hierarchy laid down by the constitution (or sometimes by the statutes of the Ba'th party).  These institutions included the presidency, the People's Assembly (parliament), and the cabinet. The party has its own institutions and its own hierarchy.  In addition, a number of so-called "popular organizations" represented distinct sectors of the population; among them were trade unions, professional associations, and the farmers and the students associations.

            Contrasting with this structure, a hidden side of the regime existed: the informal power exercised mainly by the heads of the security services and by senior army officers - in short, the men on whom the regime depends for its stability and its future.  These officers had their place (some overtly, most covertly) in the ruling hierarchy.  Their positions of power may not be recognized by the constitution, but they are indicative of the political weight and the intrinsic (rather than numerical) strength of the elements of the coalition.  These informal ruling cadres, by contrast, attest to the real power and predominance of the 'Alawis:  Close to 90 percent of the military officers are 'Alawis as are most of the top echelons in the various security services.^[15]  

            Despite all appearances, however, Asad's role became clear:  As Zisser explained, Asad headed the groups of both the formal and the informal power-holders and acted as the real strongman of both.  As president, he was in charge of the formal state apparatus; as secretary-general of both the Regional and National Commands, he led the party hierarchy.  Under the constitution, as president he was also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which gave him complete control over the informal elite of the officers.  Nevertheless, his status was not secured because of the constitution; it was his authority as a strong, skillful, and effectual leader.^[16]

            Although Hafiz al-Asad brought stability to the state, by the 1980s and 1990s several factors combined to threaten the regime's viability.  The president's health began to deteriorate leading to his self-imposed seclusion.  He avoided confronting the emerging issues facing the country and making the decisions necessary, thus creating an untenable burden for Syria.  The leadership remained unchanged and by the 1990s, most were in their 70s and in declining health.  They failed to comprehend the changing world, specifically the process of globalization, and its affect on Syria.  The leadership also maintained their grip on irrelevant worldviews, such as the Ba'th version of Arab nationalism, socialism, and communism.  Specifically, in the socio-economic sphere, they remain wedded to the failed Eastern European socialist model.  The regime thus became merely "a bureaucratic body drained of content."^[17]

            Syria's population grew from 6 million in 1970 to 11.5 million in 1988,^[18] and swelled to nearly 20 million by 2006, giving the country the dubious distinction of having one of the highest rates of natural increase in the world.^[19]  This led to extensive urbanization in Damascus, Aleppo, and other larger cities where slums developed with millions of residents who were economically marginalized, and alienated from the state and its institutions.  A result of the growing poverty and distress was a growing Islamic sentiment and fervor, periodically leading violent outbursts and social protests that threatened the regime's stability.

            Syria's foreign policy of "tactical rejectionism"^[20] in the 1980s isolated the state.  Worse still, Asad's quest for 'strategic parity' (at-tawazun al-istratiji) vis-à-vis Israel was dashed in April 1987 when on a visit with Gorbachev in Moscow, he was told that rather than striving for 'strategic parity,' Syria should make do with 'defensive sufficiency.'^[21]  This coupled with the Soviet Union's decline and dissolution by 1991 presented a threat to Asad's regime because Syria's defense perception was based on the bipolar world order and their reliance on the Soviet umbrella to counter any threat from Israel or the United States. 

            The 'new world order' affected Syria's standing both regionally and internationally.  Syrian policy was the natural outgrowth and extension of the regime's character and in particular, Hafiz al-Asad.  His policy was designed to provide himself with the maximum amount of decision-making operating room and his foreign policy and worldview were guided by an overall resistance to change.  His preference for the status quo grew directly from Syria's political culture and Asad's own suspicion of the outside world.^[22]

            Although a dramatic change in policy was needed to cope with the changing world, Asad clung to the status quo in the 1990s.  Although two different camps in the ruling elite emerged during the decade - one preferring the status quo and the other small group advocating comprehensive reform - Asad only chose cosmetic and tactical changes designed to preserve what already existed.^[23]  Seale argued that only if peace were reached between Syria and Israel would the latter be able to find the political will to solve their domestic problems.^[24]  However Asad only half-heartedly joined the peace process with Israel and failed to engage in peace and the public diplomacy necessary for President Clinton to urge Congress to allow investment in the country, which in turn would have led to more foreign investment.^[25]  He joined the Gulf coalition to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in order to improve Syria's regional position and it paid off in terms financial rewards from the Gulf states ($2-3 billion) and carte blanche to act in Lebanon.  Yet, he avoided committing to any drastic change in worldview or policy.^[26]  Maintaining his regime's stability at all costs and for as long as possible was Asad's primary interest and he therefore did the minimum necessary to affect real change.