After the 1991 Gulf War there was a unique opportunity to forge peace in the Middle East. The United States facilitated the peace process and focused on the Syrian-Israeli conflict. From the 1991 Madrid Conference through the Geneva Summit in March 2000, there were several points where the three protagonists felt that peace was within reach; however, those forecasts turned out to be too optimistic and the process ultimately failed. This thesis examines the rise and fall of the peace process by analyzing the negotiations, motives, offers, public diplomacy, and red lines of the three participants. This work explains the rationale behind the choices made by focusing on the first-hand accounts of the participants and it answers the question: Why did Syria and Israel fail to make peace during the decade?
            Syria made a “strategic choice” to explore the peace process because of their poor regional standing, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and a fear of external threats to the stability of the regime. President Hafiz al-Asad never decided to make peace if it required any real concession or dramatic change in policy or worldview. Israel was involved in several bilateral peace tracks during the 1990s and had to weigh the costs and benefits of concentrating on one process at the expense of another. Syria wanted more than either Egypt or Jordan received in their agreements with Israel while offering less and priced themselves out of the market by 2000.
            The Syrian-Israeli peace process was more than a disagreement over security, borders, and a few meters near the Sea of Galilee. It was a battle over perceptions of justice, narratives, and mythology. Without a fundamental change in either side’s red lines or a change in Syrian behavior and policy, peace will remain out of reach.