From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology
Was the Palestinian position calling for Israel's acceptance of their interpretation of #194 a negotiating tactic - a card they held in a "nothing's agreed until everything is agreed upon" EOC debate that they would relinquish if satisfied on the other issues? Alternatively, was the implementation of #194 a core Palestinian red line that they had no intention of abandoning?
Israeli participants differ in their interpretations of Palestinian intentions. Gilead Sher believes that no Palestinian leader truly believed that refugees would be allowed to return to Israel and that all discussion to the contrary is "empty propaganda and negotiating maneuvers."[54] Yossi Beilin concurs, saying the "Palestinians will keep the Right of Return as their last card, waiting for the right time to play it."[55] Dan Meridor disagrees. He saw in Arafat and his negotiators "true dedication to this objective, much more than to many other subjects," and thus, the idea that it was merely a negotiating tactic was "not very likely."[56]
If it was merely a Palestinian negotiating card, it was one that they did not relinquish. Abu Mazen elaborated a few days after the summit, saying that he opposed any Israeli limitation on the ROR, "even if they offered us the return of three million refugees."[57] He was equally unambiguous in his report delivered to the PLO Central Council on 9 September 2000: "The Palestinians want Israel to take moral and legal responsibility for the refugee crisis. UN Resolution 194 must be accepted so that all refugees are guaranteed the right of return, and by return we mean to Israel."[58]
The Israeli and American delegations failed to understand that a full implementation of refugees' ROR to Israel was a non-negotiable strategic goal and Palestinian principle - not merely a tactical position. This represented the Palestinian perspective of justice. Clinton failed to understand this on the fourth day of the Camp David summit (14 July) when he admonished Abu Mazen and Nabil Sha'ath: "You cannot ask the Israelis to accept a principle that they see as threatening their existence without offering very specific guarantees on the limitations to ensure it is not a threat."[59] He also didn't understand this when he released his 23 December Parameters, where the preamble of the "Refugees" section reads: "The issue of Palestinian refugees is no less sensitive than Jerusalem. But here again my sense is that your differences are focused mostly on how to formulate your solution, not on what will happen on the practical level."[60]
The following was the Palestinian reply to Clinton's refugee formulation:
It is important to recall that Resolution 194, long regarded as the basis for a just settlement of the refugee problem, calls for the return of Palestinian refugees to "their homes," wherever located - not to their "homeland" or to "historic Palestine."
The essence of the right of return is choice: Palestinians should be given the option to choose where they wish to settle, including return to the homes from which they were driven. There is no historical precedent for a people abandoning their fundamental right to return to their homes whether they were forced to leave or fled in fear. We will not be the first people to do so. Recognition of the right of return and the provision of choice to refugees is a pre-requisite for the closure of the conflict.[61] At Taba, where a joint Israeli-Palestinian statement at the summit's conclusion stated the sides "have never been closer to reaching an agreement," the Palestinian 22 January 2001 proposal on refugees contained the following phrases:
All refugees who wish to return to their homes in Israel and live at peace with their neighbors have the right to do so...The returning refugees shall assume Israeli citizenship...Real [sic] property owned by a returning refugee at the time of his or her displacement shall be restored to the refugee...The State of Israel shall also compensate refugees for suffering and losses incurred as a result of the refugee's physical displacement...The State of Israel shall pay compensation to the state [sic] of Palestine for the Palestinian communal property existing within the internationally recognized borders of the State of Israel...The refugees host countries (i.e. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and the Palestinian Authority) shall receive compensation for the significant costs they bore in hosting the refugees...The full implementation of this Article shall constitute a complete resolution of the refugee problem and shall end all claims emanating from that problem.[62] There is little published evidence indicating any form of Palestinian moderation on their ROR demand. At Camp David on 14 July, Clinton asked Nabil Sha'ath how many refugees he envisioned returning to Israel. His answer was 10-20 percent. Clinton responded in shock: "Do you mean that 400,000 to 800,000 refugees would return to Israel?! 'We do not want to discuss numbers,' Abu Mazen silenced Sha'ath."[63] Another version of moderation was the apparent rumor regarding a Palestinian proposal allowing 150,000 refugees to return to Israel each year, for ten years, totaling 1.5 million refugees. Barak, however, denies that this was ever offered and had it been offered it would have been unacceptable.[64]
The belief held by some Israeli and American participants that the refugee issue was not at the core of the conflict is a strange conclusion to reach given the evidence. Shlomo Ben-Ami sarcastically recalled Israeli myth-conceptions on the refugee issue at Taba: "Only' two questions remained open for further discussion, reported Mr. Beilin later. These were the number of refugees that would be admitted to Israel and whether or not Israel would endorse the 'principle' of the right of return. These two 'minor' questions were exactly the same ones that had remained open since the Swedish [May 2000 Stockholm] secret track and they stayed so after Taba."[65]
The Palestinian delegation decided to pursue justice and legitimacy at the expense of concrete achievements. As Albright recalled, "They wouldn't yield a dime to make a dollar."[66] Instead, they explained that regardless of any final settlement reached, they would file an international lawsuit against Israel for damages caused by Israel's occupation since 1967.[67] Thus, Arafat sought to remove Palestinians from the stage of responsible actors, while expanding the clash of historical narratives from 1948 to 1967. Whereas Hanieh argues that "Barak came to Camp David dreaming of reaching a peace that was 100% Israeli,"[68] the evidence suggests that it was Arafat who treated the negotiations as a zero-sum proposition.
It was not, as many in the orthodox camp claim, that Arafat erred in rejecting the Camp David proposals. After all, as Malley correctly observed, Arafat would have been "guilty of diplomatic malfeasance"[69] if he simply accepted any of the proposals because each rejected offer led to a better proposal. The problem was that the Palestinians failed to engage or adequately respond to most proposals. This should not be surprising given Arafat's instructions to his delegation at the start of the summit: "Listen and discuss, and if you see a door ajar, try to open it. If you see a small opening, try to widen it."[70] This was what the Israelis feared. The Palestinians were not at Camp David to propose solutions or respond to proposals, they were there to see how much they could gain, pocket any concession, and then say, "it's not good enough; give me more." In short, they were not there to resolve the conflict.
This strategy could have played out brilliantly if Arafat understood any of Israel's key concerns, had a general idea of Israel's red lines, or understood the American and Israeli political time constraints. It also could have been a strategic success if he was able to count the cards he held in his hand. Arafat was able to either launch or ride the wave of the Palestinian-Israeli war of attrition and for a time he was able to extract further Israeli concessions. But he failed completely to understand how far the envelope could be pushed and how internationally isolated he would become because of his actions.[71]
It is true, as the revisionists claim, that there wasn't an actual package offered to the Palestinians at Camp David. The main issue at the summit was Jerusalem - not as many claim, the refugees. It's not that the Palestinians didn't accept a vague formulation on the city; it was that they didn't even acknowledge that Israel made a concession. The delegations met in separate teams to discuss the five final status issues - territory, borders, security, Jerusalem, and refugees. This was the formula employed throughout the Oslo process. At the end of the summit they had not agreed on any single issue. Clinton pulled the plug after fourteen days because the Israelis moved and the Palestinians did not.
Barak agreed to divide Jerusalem and give control of the Temple Mount to Palestinians. Arafat's response was that he would not accept "anything less than Palestinian sovereignty on all areas of Jerusalem occupied in 1967."[72] It would be one thing if he held this as sacred while compromising on other issues, but this was not the case.
In the maximal Israeli or Palestinian position, neither side had anything to do with what happened to the other - it simply happened to them as a result of the other. This is what Aaron David Miller dubbed, "the power of the weak."[73] As Miller explained, the power of the weak absolved Palestinians from any responsibility in any part of the conflict. "It is the capacity to say that this is not my responsibility. I am under occupation, my rights are being denied, and therefore I can abdicate in all kinds of behavior and I can take away from you, the other side, what you need most, which is a reliable partner...When you marry the power of the strong to the power of the weak, you get a truly dysfunctional environment for negotiations."[74]
Arafat, who would introduce himself as "a general who had never lost a war,"[75] and spent his life avoiding "unnecessary battles, unless they were imposed on him,"[76] deserved all he desired because he and his people were the victims. Arafat demonstrated to most Israeli and American participants his inability to make the transition from revolutionary victim to leader or statesman. The role of victim removed the necessity for a coherent, strategic plan beyond reflexive reactions and excused the need to understand the interests of others involved.[77] As such, convincing the world of the Palestinian narrative became the goal and foundation upon which they would gain statehood at some point in the future, without compromising their mythology. This rationale helps to explain why Arafat received a hero's welcome when he returned from Camp David. They withstood the test of compromise, and adhered to their national rights and principles.
It is not surprising that the three protagonists viewed Camp David differently. A Palestinian account holds that the summit "provided the Palestinians with an unprecedented forum to present the Palestinian narrative in its entirety, and to present the Palestinian position in a definitive, unambiguous manner. At the end, this position had forced respect."[78]
The fact that Palestinians were at Camp David to force global respect for their narrative and increase their international legitimacy rather than solve the conflict was viewed differently in Washington. Albright recalled: "Instead the Palestinians have their legalisms, their misery, and their terror."[79]
The 23 December Clinton Parameters was an actual offer containing the contours of a final agreement. It was the roof; not the ceiling, as Ross made sure all were aware. Israel accepted them with reservations within the parameters and Arafat accepted with reservations that were "deal-killers, involving the actual rejection of the Western Wall part of the formula on the Haram [Temple Mount], his rejection of the most basic elements of the Israeli security needs, and his dismissal of our refugee formula. All were deal-killers."[80] Clinton called Arafat's rejection of his parameters "an error of historic proportions,"[81] and that he couldn't believe that Arafat would make "such a colossal mistake."[82]
Arafat rejected 97 percent of the West Bank (including land swaps), a Jerusalem formula where what was Jewish would be Israeli and what was Arab would be Palestinian (Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif), and a refugee formula with massive international, financial compensation and resettlement in the Palestinian state or in other countries.
At Camp David, Clinton was late in calling Arab leaders to support his proposals. This Palestinian need for international Islamic legitimacy became clear at the summit when Arafat argued, "Jerusalem is not only a Palestinian city, it is also an Arab, Islamic, and Christian city. If I am going to make a decision on Jerusalem, I have to consult with the Sunnis and Shi'a and all Arab countries. I have to consult with many countries starting with Iran and Pakistan, passing by Indonesia and Bangladesh, and ending with Nigeria. Do you really believe that any of these countries or groups would agree to give legitimacy to Israel's pretensions, to give up Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif?"[83]
In contrast to Camp David, when Arafat met the president in the Oval Office on 2 January to discuss the Palestinian view on the Clinton Parameters, he had "the backing for accepting the Clinton proposal from nearly every significant Arab leader, President Mubarak of Egypt, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah of Jordan, President Ben Ali of Tunisia, and King Mohammad of Morocco."[84] The Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, met with Arafat a few hours before the White House meeting. Bandar asked Arafat, "Since 1948, every time we've had something on the table we say no. Then we say yes. When we say yes, it's not on the table anymore. Then we have to deal with something less. Isn't it about time we said yes?"[85]
A year later, after Arafat had fallen from the precarious board carrying him over the waves of the new "intifada;" after the Israeli peace camp was discredited and decimated; after Barak and his delegation were replaced by Sharon and right-wing hawks; after Clinton and his team departed and Bush sat upon the American throne with no desire to solve the unsolvable; Arafat called out from his hollowed-out Ramallah compound and accepted Clinton's Parameters.
On the sixth day of the Camp David summit, Ben-Ami told Ross, "If we had behaved in 1948 the way they do here, we would never have had a state."[86] According to Ross, during the summit a Palestinian negotiator told him, "We needed David Ben-Gurion, and we got Yasser Arafat."[87] In reviewing Arafat's performance during the negotiations and the subsequent Palestinian-Israeli war of attrition, Sayigh believes that, "Arafat is guilty of strategic misjudgment, with consequences for the Palestinians of potentially historic proportions."[88] He went on to explain that, "At Best, Arafat's choices since autumn 2001 rank beside the two most important strategic mistakes of his previous, long political career: confronting Syria in Lebanon in 1976, and siding with Saddam Hussein in 1990."[89]
The American delegation continued to believe until the very end that Arafat would do the deal at the last possible moment. In retrospect, American participants used to wonder if Arafat's clock ever kept time. During the ten days between Clinton's parameters and Arafat's response, Ross reminded the president that Arafat always waited "until one minute to midnight" and it was three in the morning.[90] According to Albright, "Arafat's watch was set wrong."[91] Clinton simply states, "His watch had been broken a long time."[92]
[54] Sher. "Lessons from the Camp David Experience." The Camp David Summit - What Went Wrong?. p. 67.
[55] Beilin, Yossi. "Past, Present and Future - A Political Debate." in Ibid. p. 238.
[56] Meridor, Dan. "Past, Present and Future - A Political Debate." in Ibid. pp. 240-241.
[57] Al-Ayyam. 30 July 2000. Quoted in: Carmon, Yigal, and Aluma Solnik. "Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement, Part I: Israeli, Palestinian, and American Positions Unveiled." Inquiry and Analysis Series. Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 2000. Available at: http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA3500 Accessed: 21 November 2005.
[58]Abu Mazen, Report on the Camp David Summit, Gaza, 9 September 2000. Quoted in: "Documents and Source Material." Journal of Palestine Studies 30.2 (2001): 157-90. p. 169.
[59] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 664-665
[60] "President Clinton's Parameters as Presented by Him to the Israeli and Palestinian Negotiators on December 23, 2000." Quoted in: Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 801-805; For a similar interpretation of the Clinton Parameters, See: "The Clinton Parameters." The Camp David Summit - What Went Wrong? pp. 251-255. For a Palestinian version of the Parameters, See: "Documents and Source Material." Journal of Palestine Studies 30.3 (2001): 155-59.
[61] "Remarks and Questions from the Palestinian Negotiating Team Regarding the United States Proposal." Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department - PLO Official Website, 1 January 2001. Available at: http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=nego_nego_clinton_nclinton2p Accessed: 8 April 2006. The formula of "their homeland" or "Historic Palestine" was an American attempt to expand upon their belief, as stated, that the issue was not about practical implementation but formulation in the Clinton Parameters.
[62] "Palestinian Proposal on Palestinian Refugees: January 22, 2001, Taba." Palestinian National Authority - The Official Web Site of Key Documents. Available at: http://www.pna.gov.ps/key_documents/proposal_refugees.asp Accessed: 23 November 2005.
[63] Sher. Within Reach. p. 103; Shlomo Ben-Ami records the same numbers and similar dialogue in: Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 249.
[64] Barak, Ehud. "The Myths Spread About Camp David Are Baseless." The Camp David Summit - What Went Wrong? p. 145.
[65] Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 275. Yossi Beilin, who was instrumental in hatching the Oslo process, has never missed an opportunity to misunderstand the Palestinian refugee issue. Two years after the Taba talks his "Geneva Accords" again demonstrated his illusions, See: Susser, Asher. "A Shaky Foundation." Haaretz 15 December 2003.
[66] Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 632.
[67] Sher. Within Reach. p. 73; Shavit, Ari. "End of a Journey (Interview with Shlomo Ben-Ami)." Haaretz Magazine 14 September 2001.
[68] Hanieh. "The Camp David Papers." p. 13.
[69] Malley. "American Mistakes and Israeli Misconceptions." The Camp David Summit - What Went Wrong? p. 112.
[70] Hanieh. "The Camp David Papers." p. 17.
[71] Sayigh. "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt."
[72] Hanieh. "The Camp David Papers." p. 34.
[73] Miller, Aaron David. "The Effects of the 'Syria-First' Strategy." The Camp David Summit - What Went Wrong? p. 97. Miller's many accounts straddle the revisionist-orthodox fence. This viewpoint in this article was buried in a thesis that explains that the real reason for failure was Barak's decision to pursue a Syrian-Israeli peace before placing the Palestinians on the fast track. Alternatively, this argument took center stage in a speech he delivered a year later in the same venue: Miller, Aaron David. "The Pursuit of Arab-Israeli Peace 1993-2000: Where Did the U.S. Go Wrong?" Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2004.
[74] Miller. "The Pursuit of Arab-Israeli Peace 1993-2000."
[75] Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 277.
[76] Hanieh. "The Camp David Papers." p. 18.
[77] Sayigh. "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt."
[78] Hanieh. "The Camp David Papers." p. 29.
[79] Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 632.
[80] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 756. For Israel's reservations See: Sher. Within Reach. pp. 206-207.
[81] Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Random House, 2005. pp. 944-945.
[82] Ibid. p. 938.
[83] Hanieh. "The Camp David Papers." JPS. p. 86. The Israeli delegation decided to split Jerusalem at Camp David without seeking approval from the leaders of Jewish communities around the world. As the sole legitimate representative of the Jewish State, Israel decided that this was a national issue that fell within their mandate to solve.
[84] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 5.
[85] Interview with Bandar in: Walsh. "The Prince: How the Saudi Ambassador Became Washington's Indispensable Operator."
[86] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 675.
[87] Ibid, p. 767.
[88] Sayigh. "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt." p. 48.
[89] Ibid. p. 57.
[90] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 5.
[91] Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 622.
[92] Clinton. My Life. p. 944.