From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology

 

            Given Akram Hanieh's Palestinian account, it rings clear that international legitimacy and justice were paramount - statehood involving compromise was secondary.  The Palestinian sense of national rights and justice differs from the American and Israeli perspective.  Past United Nations resolutions - which form the international basis of Palestinian legitimacy - are interpreted differently in Jerusalem and Washington.

            United Nations Security Council Resolution #242, adopted on 22 November 1967 in the wake of the June war, calls for the "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," ^[47] and "For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem."  America agrees with Israel's interpretation of the resolution - that in exchange for peace, Israel must withdraw from some territories, and not all territories.  Palestinians and the Arab states interpret the resolution as meaning Israel should withdraw from all of the territories.^[48] 

            Regardless of the Israeli and American interpretation, Israel already set the precedent for a complete withdrawal when they signed the 1978 Camp David Accords with Egypt, providing for the return of 100 percent of Egypt's conquered territory.  Israel again demonstrated this precedent during their withdrawal from Lebanon on 24 May 2000, and during the failed attempt at a Syrian-Israeli peace based on the 4 June 1967 borders.^[49]  Because America agreed with Israel's interpretation of #242 (regardless of the precedent already set), Arafat's Camp David cries - "We are demanding a peace based on the implementation of Resolution 242,"^[50] and "They [Israelis] are not being generous-they are not giving from their pockets but from our land.  I am only asking that UN Resolution 242 be implemented,"^[51] - fell on unsympathetic American ears.  Palestinians feel entitled to no less than their neighbors are.

            The constant Palestinian entrenchment behind their immovable red lines, coupled with their constant history lectures and bravado made most American participants and the whole Israeli Camp David delegation doubt Palestinian intentions.  In an understood clash of historical narratives at a summit designed to solve all remaining issues, it left a bad taste when Arafat  "gave lessons to some American team members who were infected by a sensitivity to mere mention of principles and rights...He gave lessons in the history of religions and the history of Palestine..."^[52] This Palestinian approach led Clinton to verbally explode at the Palestinian delegation, and Abu Ala specifically, on the fifth day of the summit - in front of the Israeli delegation.

            The Palestinian frame of reference for refugees' right to return (ROR) to Israel is United Nations General Assembly Resolution #194, released on 11 December 1948.  The important clause is the following:

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

            This resolution tabled during the 1948 war, did not take into account the expressed wish of the Arab states for "a second round" - a war of redemption.  It also provided no answer on what should occur if refugees who wished to return home had no intention of living at peace.  Since the release of  #194, there have been decades of Arab-Israeli wars.  If Israel accepted #194 as the basis for solving the refugee issue in 2000 - with estimates of Palestinian refugees and their descendents reaching 4.5 million - it would eventually spell the demographic destruction of the Jewish state of Israel.  America and Israel felt that 52 years after the original war, the solution to the conflict rested on the principle of two states for two peoples.  The influx of millions of Palestinian refugees to Israel undermines this very concept.

            This is the manner in which the core issue - the clash of historical narratives - manifested itself during negotiations.  Israel reads the phrase, "should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible" as meaning the Arab states and Palestinians who rejected UNSCOP's 1947 partition plan and launched the war of 1948.  Palestinians hold Israel responsible so expressing a desire "to return to their homes and live at peace" should facilitate the implementation of the resolution.  It is apparent that the international community felt that the refugee issue had changed in the 19 years between the war in 1948 and 1967.  #242 calls for "a just settlement of the refugee problem" and not for the automatic and unlimited return of all Palestinian refugees from 1948 and 1967, including their descendents. 

            America and Israel thought a reasonable compromise solution could be reached based roughly on #242.   The Palestinians felt that the key to internal unity and the path to statehood lay in the assurance of international legitimacy.  Malley and Agha argue that the Palestinians did not accept the Clinton Parameters because "they would be left with principles that were detailed enough to supercede international (UN) resolutions yet too fuzzy to constitute an agreement."^[53]  Therefore, instead of engaging on the details of specific Israeli or American proposals, or offering a tit-for-tat package of responses to each proposal, the Palestinian delegation was by and large content to say that the offer wasn't good enough, to ask for a better offer without presenting a counter-proposal, and when all else failed and the situation grew tense, to opt to lecture about and point to UN resolutions.