From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology

 

      "If ever there was a regional conflict that has been sustained by mythologies, by avoiding the unpleasantness of reality, by ignoring to see the world as it is, it is the Middle East."[23]

            Dennis Ross, U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator, 1988-2000

 

            The clash of historical narratives is both a byproduct of, and has given rise to mythologies - a set of beliefs within each society that are held as sacred, whether or not the specific myth is true.  Mythology regarding what happened - either in antiquity or recently - and mythology regarding past promises and future possibilities helped to ensure the failure of any attempt to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 2000-01.  Yet, here there is a sharp contrast between the Israeli and Palestinian approach to their own history and mythology.

            In Israel, the "Revisionists" came out in the 1980s and challenged Israeli mythology.  These historians and authors - the "New Historians," as they liked to be called (Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappè, and others) - sought to challenge the established Israeli narrative and the ensuing debate broadened our understanding of Israel's modern history.^[24]  It was this challenge from within Israeli society that adjusted Israel's understanding of their modern history.  There were no Palestinian voices questioning the Palestinian narrative in 2000.  Perhaps for the sake of internal unity and the lack of an independent state, Palestinians coalesced around new and unshakable mythologies; perhaps the challenge of revisionism was digestible in Israel because they had a state with a strong sense of nationalism.  This disparity had a detrimental effect on the negotiations.

            Slogans and rallying cries keep masses united.  In Israel, this mythology was expressed in their belief that the key to their security in the east rested on their retention of the Jordan Valley, and that the key to Jewish unity meant that all of Jerusalem should remain undivided under Israeli control.  Israel did not address their mythology in either a timely or a complete fashion.  Shlomo Ben-Ami recalled that before the summit, "There were no detailed talks at all about Jerusalem... Barak wasn't willing.  I think that was a mistake.  If we had discussed Jerusalem, we would have come to Camp David better prepared."^[25]  Amnon Lipkin-Shahak explained:  "We have not clarified ourselves what is Jerusalem for us?  Qalandiya, Shoafat, the Temple Mount, is it really all the same?  Are we fighting for everything until the end?  In 1973, if we had made an agreement, we would not have the 'Talmonim No. 29' settlement that was built a year and a half ago...I'm not willing to fight for that...We are not even close to a discussion amongst ourselves on our red lines."^[26]

            It wasn't until 17 July (the seventh day at Camp David) that Barak initiated an internal, Israeli delegation discussion on Jerusalem and Israeli red lines that would "mark the beginning of public [Israeli] debate and the adjustment of public opinion to ideas that had not been discussed seriously over the past three decades, since the [1967] Six Day War."^[27]  At Camp David the Israelis broke both taboos and agreed to divide East Jerusalem (the Old City and Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif) and the Jordan Valley.  In Israel, this red-line-revision did not cause their society to crumble and the IDF proved as capable as ever in defending Israel from conventional threats.  This process of self-examination did not take place on the Palestinian side.  Sayigh explains:

Indeed, this is consistent with the PA leadership's reluctance throughout the negotiations (up to, and including the Camp David and Taba peace talks) to engage in debate, whether publicly or even internally, about the substance of what would constitute an acceptable deal.  The close-lipped manner in which Arafat led the process and discrepancy of substantive views relayed by different members of the senior negotiating echelon gave a distinct impression of embarrassment and left the Palestinian public unprepared for necessary compromises and trade-offs, even when the balance of evidence suggests that the public correctly anticipated these and was willing to entertain them, if properly approached and as part of a package deal.[28]