Opinions on the Middle East notoriously include public opinon polls, however, be wary of the information they provide.

 

    In April 2008, David Pollack, a Visiting Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy released a Policy Focus entitled:

 

   The 74-page study is available here for free download at the Washington Institute's website.  The following is the Executive Summary:

 

 

 

    A close examination suggests major problems exist with the pervasive overreliance on Arab public opinion polls. Although a few of these polls are fairly credible, most are methodologically suspect, so their numbers are unreliable—even apart from the numerous instances of loaded questions, selective presentations, and biased analyses.
    Almost always, these poll numbers sound alarmingly bad—even if their relation to reality is open to serious question. Their primary focus is on how low the American image has sunk. Even to the extent that any of these polls
are true, however, this focus is at most only half the truth. The better and much-lessremarked half is a dramatic rise in the level of popular opposition to anti-American terrorism in every Arab society polled on this question over the past four years. Nevertheless, almost no one points out what this clear new trend must mean: attitudes toward the United States and attitudes toward terrorism in the societies where it supposedly incubates are hardly related to each other at all. 

    At the most down-to-earth methodological level, unusually severe demographic and, especially, social and political constraints restrict polling in Arab countries. In most cases, Arab governments must approve any polling, which raises serious questions about possible censorship (or self-censorship), surveillance, intimidation, or outright falsification, particularly on even mildly controversial questions.
    Although polling is somewhat more commonin the region today than it was until just a few years ago, that could actually increase rather than decrease the level of official concern and interference with survey activities
and results. Experience and expert personal observation suggest that is indeed the case today in several major Arab states. Social controls are also quite onerous in many places, leading an unknown, but probably relatively high, proportion of respondents to offer socially acceptable but disingenuous responses.

    Even if these problems could somehow be solved, or at least finessed, the equally serious problem would remain of possible bias in developing and presenting such findings. To be sure, a few pollsters strive to avoid such bias;
but given the highly politicized nature of Mideast issues, they rarely succeed. More to the point, consumers of their polling product rarely have the time or the training to pick apart all the more subtle biases that regularly seep into the process of collecting, analyzing, and presenting Arab survey data.
    The first step in fixing these problems is to insist on full disclosure of all methodological and other details; without them, any poll is automatically suspect. If that information is provided, the reader can make further judgments about the adequacy or inadequacy of the product. Sampling methods, questionnaire design, integrity of reporting, objectivity of
interpretation, and any other relevant factors—especially the sponsorship of every poll and the nature of Arab government supervision or interference, real or perceived—must all be subjected to serious scrutiny.
    Second, even if the numbers do not lie, they tell us almost nothing about actual popular behavior, let alone about the interactions (either at home or abroad) among key segments of Arab societies: the business or educational
community, the clergy, the military, the media, the village or neighborhood power brokers, or the technical elite—or, for that matter, the violent elements on the margins.
    Third, these numbers tell us almost nothing about the policies or the longer-term political prospects of the governments in any of these countries, which are without exception autocratic and only dimly or indirectly attuned
to public opinion.

    In short, even with the best of intentions, many “Arab world” surveys suffer from severe and mutually reinforcing problems of sample design and execution, social controls, government surveillance, dearth of credibility

checks, and most of all, absence of any clear links to events on the ground. At best, these polls are just imperfect snapshots of what people are willing to say to strangers, quite possibly with only a tenuous connection to actual behavior at either the popular or the policy level. At worst, they are so fatally flawed as to verge on the fraudulent.

    In between those two poles lie the “average” Arab polls, which are usually merely misleading as a tool for analyzing, predicting, or influencing interactions with the United States. The only findings worth taking seriously (and even then with a grain of salt) are those confirmed over and over again by different credible pollsters, in response to relatively unbiased questions, with a consistent trend over several years.

    The most important such finding, examined in detail in part II of this essay, is precisely the one that is least often acknowledged: Popular sympathy for terrorism, including terrorism against Americans, has declined drastically inevery Arab society polled—even though popular attitudes toward the United States have improved only slightly and unevenly in those countries since their sharp decline right after the occupation of Iraq in 2003.  Since 2004, the most striking new trend in regional opinion is the steady surge toward greater popular opposition to terrorism.  This trend specifically includes growing opposition to any attacks on American civilians anywhere

among all Arab publics polled on such questions by different pollsters, many times over. These findings are all the more remarkable because the same polls show little improvement in popular views of the United States or of American policies during that period.

    The validity and significance of this major paradox, which very few if any other analysts have yet explored, are key to any policy recommendations based on Arab public opinion. In particular, this research reveals that views
on this top-priority concern depend on local circumstances—especially an enduring backlash against local terrorism—much more than on responses to the U.S. image, policies, or values.

    Next, part II examines recent survey findings about those values, beginning with perceptions of democracy among Arab publics and moving on to other broad political, social, and religious concepts. On closer examination, loose talk about “shared values” actually turns out to obscure many ambiguities and even contradictions in these attitudes, along with sharp differences even on matters of fact.

    For example, majorities of both Egyptians and Jordanians still deny that Arabs carried out the attacks of September 11, 2001. Most Arabs polled say they want democracy—but also sharia (Islamic) law and clerical influence

on government. Surprisingly, those who value democracy more seem to be slightly more, not less, inclined to support anti-American terrorism. And most Arabs polled, contrary to common misconception, have negative views both of the United Nations and of the role of religion in the West.

    Third, on the basis of criteria previously defined for best polling practices, part II examines country case studies. Again, many surprises, including a few pleasant ones, are in store for those who dissect the data carefully. 

    Among the Palestinians, conventional wisdom notwithstanding, polls did predict the overall 2006 vote fairly accurately. But they missed the Hamas victory, because they neglected to factor in a hybrid electoral system that greatly magnified the Hamas plurality. Two years later, however, Hamas missteps in power have produced clear erosion in its popular support.

    In Iraq, despite the violence, polling is also among the best in the region, in great part because more people now feel free to speak their minds. The latest results suggest some convergence of views among the major feuding communities, although the larger picture remains both mixed and volatile. Sunni and Shiite Arabs now agree, along with Kurds, that both al-Qaeda and attacks on Iraqi forces are wrong. They also tend to agree that both Syrian

and Iranian policies toward Iraq are wrong as well.

    In Jordan, the only other country for which detailed five-year trends are publicly available, popular satisfaction with overall domestic conditions rose markedly from 2002 to 2007. This trend was accompanied by a sharp turn not only against terrorism but also, although to a lesser extent, against Islamist parties and movements. One uncertainty, however, is the personal popularity of the ruler; as in most Arab states, direct questions about that subject are forbidden.

    In Lebanon, attitudes are again sharply polarized along sectarian lines. But new divisions exist within the major groups—even among the Shiites, who are under greater pressure for conformity. As usual, questions about rankings rather than simple yes/no dichotomies yield more meaningful answers: as time passes since the 2006 war with Israel, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah and his Hizballah movement are losing some of their luster to others or to “none of the above,” even inside their own community.

    Last in this series of case studies is a comparison of Egypt and Morocco, where the data is not as reliable but is still suggestive. Egyptians are markedly more anti-American—despite, or perhaps even because of, the many billions of dollars they have received in American aid. Other factors behind this unexpected contrast might be wider overall disgruntlement in Egypt along with sustained government and media criticism of the United States.

    The fourth major section of part II of this study moves on to the “so what” question: How much does public opinion matter in Arab societies? Comparing political attitudes with actions reveals little apparent connection between them. Pervasive anti-American attitudes have not been matched over the past five years by sustained anti-American popular behavior. Arab governments have not demonstrably changed their foreign policies, in response to public opinion, in more than cosmetic ways. And popular pressures have had only a modestly greater effect on internal politics, on either political stability or reform.

    Finally, several new policy recommendations emerge from these findings.

    With respect to policy formulation, the United States should be always alert, but also always skeptical, about opinion polls from Arab countries. The tests identified here should be applied to determine which of those polls are simply misguided, which are merely misleading, and which ones are worth taking into account. But even the best of this lot must be used with considerable caution, as just one piece of an intricate and shifting policy puzzle.