From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology

 

            Perhaps no other event in recent history has been as contested on all fronts as what happened from Camp David in July 2000 through Taba in January 2001.  It is not only debated between the three protagonists, but also debated among them.  In question are the various conclusions reached following the summit, as are the interpretations of the facts used to guide the many accounts.   It should be a straightforward question:  Why did the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts in 2000-01 fail to end the conflict and achieve peace?  Each commentator, whether a participant or historian, brings their own frames of reference to bear on the above question.  As a result, the commentaries that spring forth are skewed, reflecting their origins.   Yet, neither Camp David nor the beginning of the Oslo years mark the starting point of disagreement.  It rests in each commentator's understanding of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from its very beginning.

            If, on the other hand, one regards the Zionist enterprise and Israel's establishment as fundamentally just, one may claim there are no Palestinians, there has never been a Palestinian state, and it is no concession if Palestinians have resigned themselves to 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine after struggling for decades to destroy the Jewish State.   Danny Yatom recalled:  "We understood very well the Palestinian argument that they had already made all the possible concessions when they agreed to the borders of June 4, 1967.  We understood this, but did not accept it.  It was not a matter of misunderstanding, but of disagreement."^[7]

            Through a prism where a Palestinian acquiescence in 22 percent is not an "extremely generous compromise,"^[8] one can claim that "at Camp David, it was Yasser Arafat who critically failed,"^[9] and that he "did not negotiate in good faith; indeed, he did not negotiate at all."^[10]  Therefore, as Clinton explained, not only had Arafat "said no to everything,"^[11] but "all he did at Camp David was to repeat old mythologies and invent new ones."^[12]  Subscribing to either of the above broad narratives will certainly lead to vastly different interpretations of the events of 2000-01.

            The central thesis is that the negotiations failed because the time was not ripe to resolve the conflict.  When moving from war to peace, there are three kinds of ripeness:  negotiations, de-escalations, and conflict resolution.^[13]  A situation is ripe for negotiation when two sides are ready to talk instead of using force; a de-escalation occurs when the two are not ready to solve the conflict but to alleviate it.  In this stage, violence can stop and security arrangements can be made.  A situation is only ripe for conflict resolution when the parties realize that resolving the conflict is the only way to achieve some of their goals, and that it will necessitate painful concessions.  The Oslo process represented a readiness for negotiations and at times a ripeness for de-escalation, but certainly never for conflict resolution.

            Arafat never abandoned the armed struggle.  He sought to use the violence of the new Palestinian-Israeli war of attrition or "Intifada" (29 September 2000) to gain additional compromises from Israel.^[14]  Yezid Sayigh described Arafat's purpose, "to incur casualties and intensify the crisis, thus solidifying his domestic backing on the one hand, and raising the profile of outside diplomatic intervention on the other."^[15]  Therefore, the time was not ripe for de-escalation talks, let alone conflict resolution.  As Nabil Sha'ath said on 7 October 2000: "The option is not either armed struggle or negotiations.  We can fight and negotiate at the same time, just as the Algerians and the Vietnamese had done."^[16]

            The corollary thesis is that a fundamental clash of historical narratives exists between the two parties.  This issue was exacerbated by Israel's demand to end the conflict with an end-of-all-claims agreement.  In order to end all future claims, everything from the beginning of the conflict was brought into the negotiations.  This goes beyond negotiating over a rational balance of interests, such as borders, security, and land percentages, as was the case in agreements achieved between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan.  An end-of-claims agreement shifted the quest for Palestinian-Israeli peace from 1967 (territory, borders, and security) to 1948 (Palestinian refugees' right of return to Israel and diametrically opposed narratives). 

            Asking Palestinians to end their claims is the same as asking them to abandon their historical narrative.  It not only asks that they accept Israel's narrative - it asks them to like it.  Likewise, asking Jews to abandon their claim to Biblical Israel is like asking them to rewrite the Old Testament.

            The writing of history is a task left to each nation, to be discussed, challenged, and revised over the course of generations.  Political negotiations and summits cannot solve a clash of historical or religious narratives.  Israelis who celebrate their independence day will never be convinced that it is al-Nakba (the catastrophe), just as the Palestinians will never rejoice in Israel's independence.  Likewise, Israel will not likely take responsibility for Palestinians who became refugees in a war Palestinians initiated, just as Palestinian refugees will never blame their homelessness on any country other than Israel.  A final status agreement failed to materialize because the Israeli and Palestinian frames of reference are the exact opposite - because it is impossible to negotiate one's history and religion with a second or third party.^[17]

            The clash of historical narratives gave rise to mythologies on both sides.  The result was that the disparity between Israel's biggest concession and the Palestinian sense of justice and national rights was unbridgeable in 2000-01.  Without a fundamental shift in the principles of either side, a final settlement will remain out of reach.  It is therefore incorrect to claim that the parties were close to an agreement at any time from Camp David to Taba.  Between the two protagonists, the two most important issues - the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees - remained light years apart, with only the Jerusalem gap shrinking by the end of January 2001.