For years Qatar has energetically sought to pursue autonomous regional policies, balancing their friendly relations with Iran while hosting America’s regional headquarters and cooperating with other Gulf states.  In 1995, they opened low-level diplomatic relations with Israel during the Oslo peace process, becoming one of the first Arab states to do so without a peace agreement with Israel.

Qatar’s renewed quest for a stronger regional role began to take shape in 2006 during the summer war between Israel and Hezbollah. The war served to highlight the differences between the moderate and radical camps led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and Iran and Syria respectively. Following the crisis, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jasim made camp with the moderates and even called on Lebanon to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel.  This move, needless to say, did not sit well with Iran and Syria.

Iran and Syria, for their part, were searching for an Arab state that could act as a regional moderator and megaphone for their positions.  Given Syria’s regional isolation from 2005 – 2009, Damascus was unable to host such a summit or forge any accord that would be recognized regionally, let alone favored internationally. When Hezbollah turned their arms on their fellow citizens and overran Beirut in May 2008, the quest for an Arab state to provide cover for an agreement in Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria’s favor took on a new urgency.

Enter Qatar.  Surely if Syria and Iran were deemed unworthy to solve regional disputes, the small Gulf Emirate of Qatar would face no such problem.  To be sure, Qatar’s rise as a regional power-broker could not have taken place without the context of the new Arab cold war and the ineffectiveness of the traditional moderate conflict regulators, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  Nevertheless, they were perfectly positioned and previously primed by Iran when the Lebanese crisis reached a nadir.  In May 2008, they brokered the agreement that ended the crisis to Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria’s advantage, beginning the Emirate’s steady march toward the radical camp.

A half year later, the month-long Gaza crisis that ended in January 2009 provided Qatar another opportunity to demonstrate their diplomatic weight.  Bolstered by their success and new friendships in the radical camp, they convened a summit in mid-January 2009 that greatly exacerbated the tensions between the two moderate and radical camps.  Afterall, the meeting in Doha was called just days before the scheduled Arab League economic meeting in Kuwait in which the moderate camp, including the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas, were set to lead.  The conflict sparked by these conferences was titled “the war of the summits” (harb al-qimmam).

Among Qatar’s invitees were Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hamas’ Damascus-based leader, Khalid Mashaal – against the will of several Arab countries who decided to boycott the proceedings.  The summit’s pro-Iranian and anti-Saudi orientation was further underscored by the fact that it called on Egypt to revoke its peace agreement with Israel and for Saudi Arabia to withdraw its peace initiative.  Egypt’s government daily, Al-Akhbar, characterized the Doha summit as “a conference in support of the Persian [expansionist] ambitions” and called Qatar “a Trojan horse designed to pave the way for the Shi’a Persian invasion of [the lands belonging to] Muhammad’s nation and the Sunnis.”

But Qatar remained in the limelight and they were scheduled to host the annual Arab summit in Doha at the end of March 2009.  Saudi Arabia and Egypt conditioned their participation on no invitations being extended to the Iranian president and Hamas representatives.  While Qatar succumbed to Arab pressure and avoided issuing the invitations, the prime minister and foreign minister explained that Iran’s viewpoints must be heard during the gathering.  The summit’s proceedings and the resolutions it carried demonstrated that the Iranian position was well-represented.  Indeed, in its review of the Doha summit, the Iranian daily, Kayhan, stated that Saudi Arabia had been forced to take a conciliatory stance towards Syria and Qatar and to accept these two countries as a rising Arab axis.

Nevertheless, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani enjoyed the greater regional role bestowed upon his country and he continued to pursue an independent foreign policy.  Although his recent initiatives on the Palestinian and Lebanese fronts aggravated Saudi Arabia and Egypt, he refrained from inviting both Iran and Hamas to the annual Arab gathering, while going to great lengths to expound on their positions.  Therefore, the war of the summits and Qatar’s rise should be seen as an opening act in what will likely be an elaborate diplomatic dance that will further inter-Arab mediation efforts.  It is bound to affect regional developments in the coming months.