Over the years, the game in Gaza has had a familiar ring to it: Hamas launches rockets toward Israeli population centers and Israel responds with a pinpoint strike of its own. Every so often, civilians are killed on both sides. The outside world, meanwhile, yawns with indifference.

No longer. The expiration of its six-month ceasefire with Israel earlier in December prompted Hamas to resume large-scale hostilities, launching hundreds of rockets against Israeli civilian population centers. However, over the past week, Israel’s government has demonstrated unequivocally that it is no longer prepared to simply implement piecemeal responses, as it has done for years against the de facto Islamist government in Gaza.  Instead, it has launched a major offensive, Operation Cast Lead, that Defense Minister Ehud Barak has announced could last weeks if not months. So, what can Israel now hope to achieve politically by using its military?

Surprisingly, the answer is that if Israel pursues realistic goals and uses its military wisely, they can achieve more for the advancement of peace than any other plan currently being considered in diplomatic circles.  But Israel’s success will largely depend on the lessons it has learned from its last war: the month-long 2006 showdown with Hizballah in Lebanon.

By the time the dust settled after that conflict, Israel had shifted its objectives from forcing the release of captive soldiers and breaking Hizballah’s back to fundamentally changing the rules of the game in its relationship with the Lebanese terrorist group. Realistically, that was all they could have hoped to achieve with Hizballah then, and it is precisely the objective they should pursue with Hamas now.

Despite Hizballah’s claim that they won a “divine victory” in the 2006 war, the fact remains that not since the 1960s – before the PLO entered Lebanon – has Israel’s northern border been so quiet.  It is also instructive to note that, largely as a result of Israel’s application of force in Lebanon back then, Hizballah is deciding to sit out this fight. This inaction is very likely a function of fears that its domestic support could be further eroded if it wades into the hostilities.

After all, although Lebanese solidarity was strong during the 2006 war, many have since questioned the costs incurred because of Hizballah’s adventurism. Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s Secretary-General, even admitted that had he known Israel would respond with such force, his organization would have not precipitated the conflict by abducting two Israeli soldiers. Such an admission is proof positive that the perceived amount of force Israel is prepared to use affects the decisionmaking calculus of Hizballah and other militants. 

Does this mean that Hizballah is incapable of launching a major offensive? Clearly, the answer is no. However, it does mean that Hizballah’s room for maneuver within the Lebanese context has been curtailed. And Israel’s game plan should be to affect Hamas’ calculus the same way. Israel may not be able to stop all rockets from being smuggled into Gaza, but it can make Hamas consider the consequences before launching one, or make the population of the Gaza Strip ask whether living under Hamas’s rule is bringing them closer to statehood, or actually taking them further from it.

The goal of the new game in Gaza, then, should be to weaken Hamas, both militarily and politically. Israeli politicians are now talking about toppling the terrorist group outright, but as a practical matter such a step, however deserved, is likely to be untenable—and quite possibly unattainable. For better or worse, Hamas’ future role will be determined by the Palestinians, much as that of Hizballah will be determined by the Lebanese. The most Israel can hope to achieve is to weaken Hamas sufficiently to create the conditions for the group’s secular counterpart, Fatah, to re-establish itself in Gaza and bring all Palestinians under one rule. The success of the current offensive, then, will be measured less by air strikes and damage inflicted on the ground, and more by the shift that takes place in Hamas’ calculus – and the degree to which the group is weakened relative to its political rivals.