With the expiration of the six-month lull in Hamas rocket fire into Israel, the IDF is set to invade Gaza and attack Hamas’s terrorist infrastructure.  There are several reasons for the timing of Israel’s operation.  Firstly, many in Israel’s security establishment never signed on to the purpose of the cease-fire to begin with.  It merely granted Hamas a respite from Israeli attacks while giving them the opportunity rearm and better train themselves.  For two years, since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, they have been working hard to develop their military power with Iranian assistance using Hizballah as a model.  The new rockets they have smuggled in pieces through tunnels from Egypt now have the capacity to strike the outskirts Beersheba.  Since more fighting is inevitable given Hamas’s pledge to destroy the Jewish state, it is better to attack when they have fewer weapons at their disposal.  A ceasefire only works in Hamas’s favor.

A second reason for Israel’s choice in timing is the holiday season.  Western nations that typically scream for restraint and condemn Israel with knee-jerk recriminations have their attention focused elsewhere.  Lastly, with President Bush’s term in office fast running out, Israel is afforded more freedom to act and maneuver in a military campaign in Gaza than it would if Obama were in office and contemplating major peace initiatives.  Israeli domestic politics may also be playing into this decision with elections scheduled in February and the leading parties wanting to assure their constituents that they can bring security to Israel’s south.

The operations have one overarching objective:  Restore Israel’s power of deterrence and change the cost involved in attacking Israeli civilians.  What has become immediately clear is that rather than seeking to target fast-moving Kassam rocket-launching crews who fire from residential neighborhoods and quickly melt away into the general population, Israel is focusing on Hamas’s infrastructure.  Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak and other Israeli officials have been preparing the Israeli public for what is likely to be “a difficult period ahead.”

Israel’s response to Hizballah in Lebanon in 2006 immediately springs to mind and provides a sober score card with which to gauge the lessons Israel learned.  How well will the coordination be between the military and political establishment?  Are the goals for the use of military force realistic or will the proverbial goalposts keep moving?  What efforts will Israel take to insulate themselves from the complex regional and global context they find themselves in?  Retaking Gaza with ground forces may indeed be possible but what will Israel’s exit strategy be?  What will happen when the IDF finds themselves in control of large areas that it doesn’t want and constantly in friction with a terrorist and civilian population?

It will soon become clear whether Israel made parallel diplomatic preparations
amid their military preparations.  Will Israel be able to articulate to a world audience the untenable situation in southern Israel where Hamas has fired missiles at civilian targets for over eight years – and stepped up the pace of attacks following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005?

These are just some of the questions that one should ask as Israel again tries to deliver a decisive blow to the terrorist groups within its borders.