Back in June, when shortly after the secret talks between Syria and Israel became known, two contrasting opinions were shared on the prospects of peacemaking.  Since MEO seeks to foster debate on the Middle East, below the two articles are shared.  The first is by David Schenker, the Director of the Program on Arab Politics from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  Responding to his article is Joshua Landis, the Director of the Center for Peace Studies and host of the blog, Syria Comment.

Israel, Don't Undermine Beirut
By: David Schenker
Jerusalem Post
June 2, 2008

Developments in Lebanon are being viewed with great concern in Israel. In the aftermath of Hizbullah's recent military and ostensible political victories, many Israelis are saying that Beirut has gone the way of Gaza. Lebanon is now "Hizbullahstan" -- just like Gaza, only worse.

This assessment is alarmist, defeatist, and premature. No doubt, the events of early May were a setback. The militia's blitz on Beirut was a humiliation not only for the pro-West March 14 ruling coalition, but for Washington, which could do little to protect its ally in its time of need. Hizbullah emerged strengthened from its showdown with the government. Still, the government in Beirut is not finished -- yet.

 

Hizbullah's modest gains have come at a considerable price. By turning the "weapons of the resistance" against the Lebanese people, the Party of God undercut much of its local and regional legitimacy. Moreover, while the mediated agreement has provided Hizbullah with a "blocking third" of the cabinet, and thus the ability to veto major government decisions, this "gain" only formalized the militia's extant veto power, changing little in the status quo.

 

Today, in the aftermath of the Doha agreement, the future of the March 14 coalition lies in the balance. And its survival -- indeed, the future disposition of Lebanon -- depends at least in part on what Israel does. Israel, like its Arab neighbors, has a lot at stake on what happens in Lebanon. The struggle in Lebanon today is nothing short of a battle to shape regional trends, a fight between moderation and militancy.

 

While Washington has sided with the government of Lebanon against Hizbullah, it would be unseemly if not counterproductive for Israel -- technically still at war with its neighbor -- to publicly pick favorites in local Lebanese politics. Nevertheless, given its pro-Western stance, it's difficult to understand Israel's ambivalence toward the disposition of the Saniora government and the Cedar Revolution vis-a-vis Hizbullah.

 

Supporters of the Lebanese government have long claimed that Israel is actively protecting the Assad regime in Syria and, in the process, undercutting the Saniora government. The recent announcement of the resumption of Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations in Turkey -- coming so closely on the heels of the Syrian-backed Hizbullah military offensive -- has been yet another blow to the morale and survivability of the March 14 coalition.

 

In Beirut, it's widely feared that an Israeli-Syria deal would come at the expense of Lebanon. This view has merit: many current and former Israeli officials and academics make no secret of their belief that an agreement could be facilitated by recognizing a return of Syria to Lebanon and by ensuring somehow that the Assad regime be insulated from the sanctions which would accompany the regime's implication by the International Tribunal in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri.

 

Even if Israeli-Syrian talks don't come to fruition -- and there is little to indicate they will considering Damascus' repeated declarations that it will not undertake a strategic reorientation from Teheran to the West nor change its relationships with Hamas and Hizbullah -- peace talks with Damascus undercut those who oppose the agenda of Hizbullah and Syria in Lebanon. Negotiations alone stand to erode international support for the tribunal, one of the few real levers of pressure held by the majority. This is what the March 14 coalition fears, and of course, this is why the Syrians are so interested in talking with the Israelis now.

 

The ultimate nature of the government in Beirut -- whether pro-West or aligned with Teheran and Syria -- should be an important policy concern for the Israeli government. A Lebanon under Damascus means increased Hizbullah influence in Beirut and thousands of rockets permanently aimed at Israel. Israel should by all means make peace with its neighbors, but negotiations now prejudice the work of the Tribunal and only alleviate political and economic pressures on the Assad regime. By voluntarily taking steps to remove these pressures without extracting a single concession, Israel is effectively strengthening Damascus' hand at the negotiating table.

 

For Israel, peace with Syria no doubt has some allure. Given current regional dynamics, however, it is all but guaranteed that the collateral damage of these peace talks will be the March 14 coalition. If the democracy argument does not sway the Israeli government, national interests should. While the weak government in Beirut is not by any means optimal, the alternative -- a Syrian and Iranian-backed Hizbullah-dominated state -- is even less appealing. And when the talks with Syria eventually break down - as they undoubtedly will when the topic of strategic realignment is broached -- this is what waits in the wings.

 

The US and Israel do not see eye to eye on Lebanon. Washington sees real value in preserving the only democratically-elected pro-west Arab Government. If Israel doesn't start to recognize the significant, but fleeting moment of March 14 soon, this fragile bulwark against Iranian hegemony in the Levant may disappear.

 

Although it is a bitter pill for peacemakers in the Jewish state to swallow, by trucking with Syria now, Israel risks inadvertently contributing to the eventual establishment of Hizbullahstan on its northern border.

 

Joshua Landis on "Israel, Don't Undermine Beirut"
By: Joshua Landis
Syria Comment
June 4, 2008

 

David Schenker advises Israel to stop its talks with Syria, lest it undermine the Cedar Revolution. He argues that talking to Syria undermines Saad Hariri's March 14 coalition. Somehow, he believes that with US and Israeli support, the March 14 coalition can disarm Hizbullah. Presumably, this will help bring regime change to Syria and eventually spearhead a democratic revolution in the Middle East. This is a lovely notion and one that the Neocons have been pushing for the last decade. But it is not a dream that most Israelis share, and for good reason. Events of the last few years have demonstrated that such reveries produce nightmares.

 

Israelis must appreciate that only diplomacy can resolve their Hizbullah problem. The other alternatives have failed. Military might failed to destroy Hizbullah in 2006. Gobs of money failed to transform the Lebanese army or the March 14th coalition into instruments for disarming Hizbullah. Diplomacy is the third and remaining way forward. That is what Hizbullah's occupation of West Beirut with the close cooperation of the Lebanese army taught us. It is what Doha is all about. (Somehow Schenker holds to the belief that more money for the Lebanese Army will convince it to turn against Hizbullah. Nothing indicates this. President and Chief of Staff Michel Suleiman has stated many times that he will not use the army against Hizbullah or any Lebanese party for that mater.)

 

Claiming that Hizbullah wants to conquer Lebanon's other sects or rule over them in some sort of "Hizbullahstan" has no merit. It is simply fear mongering. The vice president of the Higher Shiite Council, Sheikh Abdel- Amir Qabalan, said on Monday that Lebanese Shiites were not in favor of Iran-style "rule of the jurisprudent." "Shiites don't want to change the regime in Lebanon, and we also don't favor a rule of the jurisprudent in Lebanon," Qabalan said. "We hide nothing from the Lebanese, we love Iran, but the rule of the jurisprudent cannot be applied in Lebanon." Nasrallah has reiterated the same thing many times and for many years now. The Grand Sunni Mufti Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Qabbani has accepted these reassurances in calling for "erasing the painful scars and failures of the past." Even Jumblat's Druze forces are signing peace agreements with Amal, the Shiite party that is its closest neighbor. Assad has unequivocally said that Syria can and will stop arming Hizbullah if Israel returns the Golan. It will help transform the regional security equation as soon as Israel signs a peace to return occupied territory.

 

Israel is testing this possibility. It should be. It is its only remaining option short of going back to war, which would be lunacy and most likely fail.

 

The Doha agreement, of which Syria and Hizbullah were architects, should go a long way to reassuring Israelis that Hizbullah is willing to move toward accommodation and eventual decommissioning, as did the IRA, if it is met half way. Lebanon's Shiites will want a larger share of constitutional power in Lebanon. Syria wants the Golan and to ensure that its allies gain a share of authority in Lebanon. The Doha agreement has already fulfilled most of these demands. The result is that Lebanon is once again moving forward and has a much brighter future than it did only weeks ago.

 

Israel wants peace with its Arab neighbors. This is achievable with hard diplomacy. Israel will not get it through war. It has invaded Lebanon three times and failed to bring peace to its north. Assad is offering peace for land. Far from being repugnant to Israelis and American Jews, this should bring hope.