Submitted by Brodsky on Wed, 05/21/2008 - 19:53
At first glance, it would appear that two important and positive developments took place in the Middle East in the span of 24 hours. First, the violence that erupted in Lebanon on May 7 when Shi'a Hizballah gunmen and their allies overran most of West Beirut ended with an agreement reached in Doha, Qatar. At least 67 people have been killed in the fighting. As part of the negotiated outcome, the 18-month political deadlock that began when opposition lawmakers resigned from the government in November 2006 will come to an end as an agreement was reached to elect army chief General Michel Suleiman as president this week. This will end the political deadlock that gripped Lebanon since late 2006 and more acutely, since pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud stepped down in November 2007.
The second important development falling on the heels of Lebanon’s reconciliation are the announcements in the Syrian and Israeli press that the two countries are ready to resume peace talks and that they’ve been engaged in discussions in Turkey for over a year with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s heavy involvement. The Syrian-Israeli peace process has been frozen since the March 2000 Geneva Summit between then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (current defense minister) and the late Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad. Since the Second Lebanon-Israel war in July 2006 that directly preceded the Lebanese political freeze, conventional wisdom focused on the possibilities of a Syrian-Israeli summer war more than the options for peace.
Lebanese politics are difficult to follow, sometimes requiring a flow chart with bisecting and intersecting lines of alliances and adversaries to remember who is supporting whom against what. The family, clan, and factional political leanings have lent instability to Lebanon’s political system as have outside actors who seek to influence the system.
Two examples: Druze leader Walid Jumblatt can be seen on television today speaking out against the Syrians. As the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, he is part of the March 14 coalition formed during the recent “Cedar Revolution” to protest Syria’s presence in Lebanon. However, in the past, he was pro-Syrian and at one time or another has been pro or anti-Palestinian and ally or foe of Hizballah. Today he is an ardent enemy of Hizballah.
Another example is Christian leader General Michel ‘Awn. He was an ally of Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and serious thorn in Syria’s side. After Syria joined the Madrid peace process in 1991, Asad was tacitly given Western approval to act against ‘Awn – a reward for Syria and punishment for Iraq. Syria kicked him to the sidelines, enabling the Asad regime to become entrenched in the Lebanese political system. After a 15-year exile in Paris, General ‘Awn has been reborn as Hizballah leader, Hassan Nasrallah’s Christian ally.
The immediate cause of this recent violent spat is that the pro-Western Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora made a series of security decisions against Hizballah on May 6. Among the decisions was that Hizballah’s private telecommunications network – which they regard as instrumental to their “resistance” against Israel – were “illegal” and an “attack on the state’s sovereignty.” Druze leader Walid Jumblatt first publicized the allegations that Hizballah was using the cameras at the airport to monitor the movement of anti-Syrian politicians and receive weapons shipments from Iran.
What happened to create this new agreement is important.
It only took Hizballah a few hours to take over West Beirut and they soon made great grains in Tripoli, and the Druze areas of Mount Lebanon, Aley, Shouf, and the Maten region. After over a week of fighting Hizballah again demonstrated the weakness of the Lebanese Army and the relative weakness of the other armed sectarian clans. Additionally, they handed Syria an impressive victory by altering the Druze balance of power and bolstering Talal Arsalan, another Druze leader and political rival of the Jumblatt clan.
Arsalan is a Syrian ally and is allied with General ‘Awn. He helped launder money the Syrians received from Saddam Hussein for the insurgency. This was accomplished through a Lebanese bank owned by the clan to which his wife belonged. When she learned that Arsalan was cheating on her with his chauffeur she asked for a divorce – certainly a problem from Syria’s perspective with so much of Hussein’s money in her coffers. The Syrians pressured her family to change her mind but despite the financial assistance, Arsalan lost the 2005 election to Walid Jumblatt in Choueifat. The tables now have turned. Jumblatt needed Arsalan to negotiate a cease-fire with Hizballah.
Among the Lebanese losers are Prime Minister Siniora, who now describes Hizballah as “insurrectionists,” and former president Amin Gemayel who is allied with Sa’ad Hariri (Rafiq Hariri’s son) and is part of the March 14 coalition with Jumblatt. Another is Samir Geagea, commander of the Christian Phalanges who declared on May 6 before the hostilites, "This is a serious and totally rejected stand ... We all decide jointly on our national security issues, and it is not permitted for one party to impose its concept of national security…The state, state institutions and civic order are a red line."
Hizballah proved that Lebanese political and military red lines are pink. Whereas the hostilities began with calls for Hizballah to lay down their weapons and a host of conditions for a ceasefire, former president Gemayel finally announced only one condition for resuming a national dialogue: Hizballah must verbally commit not to use their weapons against the Lebanese in Lebanon. Arsalan then announced that all of the weapons of the Sunni and Christian coalitions must be handed over to the army – those that demanded that Hizballah disarm are now themselves being asked to disarm.
The new deal reached in Doha gives Hizballah a one-third plus one vote in government matters – an ability to veto any decision. Nabih Berri, parliament speaker and member of the Shi’a Amal movement, announced an agreement was reached on army commander Michel Suleiman to fill the vacant post of president.
All are great gains for Hizballah and Syria. In this “peaceful” and “pacified” context, Asad announced that he his heading down the path of peace with Israel.
Asad wants to consolidate his gains and avoid external pressure. His best choice is to talk about peace with Israel and draw the world’s attention in that direction. It is easier to control Lebanon, launch a slew of political assassinations, and force an international blind eye to their cooperation with North Korea on building nuclear facilities, if they are talking the talk of peace with Israel. Who in the West doesn’t want to see Syria and Israel make peace or stand in the way of that achievement? Even better for Syria, the talks are being shepherded by Turkey, a country that almost went to war with them in 1998. By talking peace with Israel under Turkish auspices, regional relations begin to look brighter for Asad.
Lebanon comes to a draw – neither winning nor losing. Much depends on which faction, family, or clan one supports. Overall, this step avoids civil war in the short term, which was a distinct and rising possibility. It temporarily unfreezes the political process so the Lebanese people can feel good about that. However, it is far from certain that this current solution will not lead to more violence between factions in the near future.
Hizballah is a clear winner. By force of arms, they and their allies successfully defeated or otherwise punished their opponents, changed the balance of power in Lebanon, and can keep their weapons while the other factions must turn them over to the Lebanese army. In return for their military victory, they can keep their private telecommunications network in place and reinstate the current security chief at Beirut International Airport, Wafiq Shuqair. The airport is where many weapons shipments come through so now the fox will continue to guard the hen house. Additionally, Hizballah and their coalition now have veto power guaranteed in the Lebanese political system. They have made tremendous gains since invading Israel in July 2006 with Syrian and Iranian assistance, and at a tremendous cost to the Lebanese people.
Israel is the loser because Olmert seems to believe that Syria wants peace. He is walking toward a desert mirage and appears willing to engage in a long, drawn-out process with Syria because he feels he must talk about peace if the Syrians and Palestinians are. In the case of the Palestinians, a process of peace (even without peace) is in Israel’s interest; this is not the case with Syria and Olmert is providing cover for Asad's endeavors.
The United States appears to be riding the fence. They won’t obstruct a peace process publicly and hand democrats a campaign issue and don’t want to see Syria rewarded for being the biggest obstructionist and terrorist supporter in the Middle East. They have remained publicly silent over the events in Lebanon, however, the U.S. needs to be ready for the pro-Western Lebanese government to fall, for Fuad Siniora to be replaced, and pro-Syrian gains in the 2009 parliamentary elections.
Those that believe – such as those who support the Baker-Hamilton report – that the Syrians can be pulled out of the Iranian orbit and terror business by appeasement refuse to learn from the mistakes of the past. Simply put, for Bashar al-Asad, the Golan is not worth trading away all of the assets that keep his regime in power. This is all just smoke and mirrors.
Lebanese civilian flashing the victory sign while holding a poster of Rafiq al-Hariri (Photo: AP)
The second important development falling on the heels of Lebanon’s reconciliation are the announcements in the Syrian and Israeli press that the two countries are ready to resume peace talks and that they’ve been engaged in discussions in Turkey for over a year with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s heavy involvement. The Syrian-Israeli peace process has been frozen since the March 2000 Geneva Summit between then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (current defense minister) and the late Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad. Since the Second Lebanon-Israel war in July 2006 that directly preceded the Lebanese political freeze, conventional wisdom focused on the possibilities of a Syrian-Israeli summer war more than the options for peace.
Behind the Headlines
Lebanese politics are difficult to follow, sometimes requiring a flow chart with bisecting and intersecting lines of alliances and adversaries to remember who is supporting whom against what. The family, clan, and factional political leanings have lent instability to Lebanon’s political system as have outside actors who seek to influence the system. Two examples: Druze leader Walid Jumblatt can be seen on television today speaking out against the Syrians. As the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, he is part of the March 14 coalition formed during the recent “Cedar Revolution” to protest Syria’s presence in Lebanon. However, in the past, he was pro-Syrian and at one time or another has been pro or anti-Palestinian and ally or foe of Hizballah. Today he is an ardent enemy of Hizballah.
Another example is Christian leader General Michel ‘Awn. He was an ally of Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and serious thorn in Syria’s side. After Syria joined the Madrid peace process in 1991, Asad was tacitly given Western approval to act against ‘Awn – a reward for Syria and punishment for Iraq. Syria kicked him to the sidelines, enabling the Asad regime to become entrenched in the Lebanese political system. After a 15-year exile in Paris, General ‘Awn has been reborn as Hizballah leader, Hassan Nasrallah’s Christian ally.
The immediate cause of this recent violent spat is that the pro-Western Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora made a series of security decisions against Hizballah on May 6. Among the decisions was that Hizballah’s private telecommunications network – which they regard as instrumental to their “resistance” against Israel – were “illegal” and an “attack on the state’s sovereignty.” Druze leader Walid Jumblatt first publicized the allegations that Hizballah was using the cameras at the airport to monitor the movement of anti-Syrian politicians and receive weapons shipments from Iran.
What happened to create this new agreement is important.
It only took Hizballah a few hours to take over West Beirut and they soon made great grains in Tripoli, and the Druze areas of Mount Lebanon, Aley, Shouf, and the Maten region. After over a week of fighting Hizballah again demonstrated the weakness of the Lebanese Army and the relative weakness of the other armed sectarian clans. Additionally, they handed Syria an impressive victory by altering the Druze balance of power and bolstering Talal Arsalan, another Druze leader and political rival of the Jumblatt clan.
Arsalan is a Syrian ally and is allied with General ‘Awn. He helped launder money the Syrians received from Saddam Hussein for the insurgency. This was accomplished through a Lebanese bank owned by the clan to which his wife belonged. When she learned that Arsalan was cheating on her with his chauffeur she asked for a divorce – certainly a problem from Syria’s perspective with so much of Hussein’s money in her coffers. The Syrians pressured her family to change her mind but despite the financial assistance, Arsalan lost the 2005 election to Walid Jumblatt in Choueifat. The tables now have turned. Jumblatt needed Arsalan to negotiate a cease-fire with Hizballah.
Among the Lebanese losers are Prime Minister Siniora, who now describes Hizballah as “insurrectionists,” and former president Amin Gemayel who is allied with Sa’ad Hariri (Rafiq Hariri’s son) and is part of the March 14 coalition with Jumblatt. Another is Samir Geagea, commander of the Christian Phalanges who declared on May 6 before the hostilites, "This is a serious and totally rejected stand ... We all decide jointly on our national security issues, and it is not permitted for one party to impose its concept of national security…The state, state institutions and civic order are a red line."
The Outcome
Hizballah proved that Lebanese political and military red lines are pink. Whereas the hostilities began with calls for Hizballah to lay down their weapons and a host of conditions for a ceasefire, former president Gemayel finally announced only one condition for resuming a national dialogue: Hizballah must verbally commit not to use their weapons against the Lebanese in Lebanon. Arsalan then announced that all of the weapons of the Sunni and Christian coalitions must be handed over to the army – those that demanded that Hizballah disarm are now themselves being asked to disarm.The new deal reached in Doha gives Hizballah a one-third plus one vote in government matters – an ability to veto any decision. Nabih Berri, parliament speaker and member of the Shi’a Amal movement, announced an agreement was reached on army commander Michel Suleiman to fill the vacant post of president.
All are great gains for Hizballah and Syria. In this “peaceful” and “pacified” context, Asad announced that he his heading down the path of peace with Israel.
Winners and Losers
Syria wins in Lebanon because Hizballah’s position is strengthened and it brings Lebanon back under Syrian influence. Bashar al-Asad has learned through the initial international reaction to Rafiq al-Hariri’s murder in February 2005 that the United States and France can come together with Europe to temporarily apply pressure on Syria – as they did by forcing Syria to withdraw their some 20,000 troops from Lebanon.Asad wants to consolidate his gains and avoid external pressure. His best choice is to talk about peace with Israel and draw the world’s attention in that direction. It is easier to control Lebanon, launch a slew of political assassinations, and force an international blind eye to their cooperation with North Korea on building nuclear facilities, if they are talking the talk of peace with Israel. Who in the West doesn’t want to see Syria and Israel make peace or stand in the way of that achievement? Even better for Syria, the talks are being shepherded by Turkey, a country that almost went to war with them in 1998. By talking peace with Israel under Turkish auspices, regional relations begin to look brighter for Asad.
Lebanon comes to a draw – neither winning nor losing. Much depends on which faction, family, or clan one supports. Overall, this step avoids civil war in the short term, which was a distinct and rising possibility. It temporarily unfreezes the political process so the Lebanese people can feel good about that. However, it is far from certain that this current solution will not lead to more violence between factions in the near future.
Hizballah is a clear winner. By force of arms, they and their allies successfully defeated or otherwise punished their opponents, changed the balance of power in Lebanon, and can keep their weapons while the other factions must turn them over to the Lebanese army. In return for their military victory, they can keep their private telecommunications network in place and reinstate the current security chief at Beirut International Airport, Wafiq Shuqair. The airport is where many weapons shipments come through so now the fox will continue to guard the hen house. Additionally, Hizballah and their coalition now have veto power guaranteed in the Lebanese political system. They have made tremendous gains since invading Israel in July 2006 with Syrian and Iranian assistance, and at a tremendous cost to the Lebanese people.
Israel is the loser because Olmert seems to believe that Syria wants peace. He is walking toward a desert mirage and appears willing to engage in a long, drawn-out process with Syria because he feels he must talk about peace if the Syrians and Palestinians are. In the case of the Palestinians, a process of peace (even without peace) is in Israel’s interest; this is not the case with Syria and Olmert is providing cover for Asad's endeavors.
The United States appears to be riding the fence. They won’t obstruct a peace process publicly and hand democrats a campaign issue and don’t want to see Syria rewarded for being the biggest obstructionist and terrorist supporter in the Middle East. They have remained publicly silent over the events in Lebanon, however, the U.S. needs to be ready for the pro-Western Lebanese government to fall, for Fuad Siniora to be replaced, and pro-Syrian gains in the 2009 parliamentary elections.
Those that believe – such as those who support the Baker-Hamilton report – that the Syrians can be pulled out of the Iranian orbit and terror business by appeasement refuse to learn from the mistakes of the past. Simply put, for Bashar al-Asad, the Golan is not worth trading away all of the assets that keep his regime in power. This is all just smoke and mirrors.

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