The May 26, 2008 edition of "The Nation" dedicates the cover to "Reflections on the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of Israel." Here, again, one of the masters of selective focus, Avi Shlaim, penned his article, "A Somber Anniversary."Like Benny Morris, Shlaim became famous as one of the founding fathers of the New Historians and Revisionist authors. However, their journeys of late have been mirror opposites. Morris began on the left and has now fallen off the deep end on the right with his political views; Shlaim began on the left and has continued his race to the margins of the left.
The May 26, 2008 edition of "The Nation" dedicates the cover to "Reflections on the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of Israel." Here, again, one of the masters of selective focus, Avi Shlaim, penned his article, "A Somber Anniversary."Like Benny Morris, Shlaim became famous as one of the founding fathers of the New Historians and Revisionist authors. However, their journeys of late have been mirror opposites. Morris began on the left and has now fallen off the deep end on the right with his political views; Shlaim began on the left and has continued his race to the margins of the left.
Here are several examples in his article of the selective focus that leads him to his interesting conclusions. Although not as bad as Fedwa Wazwaz's piece, they both drink the same koolaid:
But it was the overall success, not the failure, of the Oslo peace process that provoked a right-wing backlash in Israel and the assassination of Rabin by a Jewish religious fanatic in November 1995. The assassination acheived its purpose: it crippled the peace process.
The assassination did not actually cripple the peace process, although it was horrible to realize that insane right-wing settlers could assassinate their prime minister. Shimon Peres took over as prime minister and continued the peace process with the Palestinians and Syria unabated and his poll numbers were far ahead of Netanyahu. What crippled the peace process was Peres's decision to renew his mandate and call for early elections and the unforeseen Hizballah action in Lebanon coupled with a rash of Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombings in Israel over the course of a week. These sent Peres's numbers into a nose-dive and Netanyahu rode to victory on the promise of security.
Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad crippled the peace process. The right-wing freak Jewish settler tried to break the process but failed. You might think these facts were worth mentioning but Shlaim elected not to.
As far back as 1988, the Palestinians had made their choice. They offered Israel recognition and peace in return for minimal restitution of what had been taken away from them by force.
In 1988, in order to gain an audience with the U.S., the PLO decided to give in to the public demands:
- Recognition of Israel's right to exist
- Acceptance of UNSC Resolution #242
- Renouncement of terrorism
However, this turned out to be window dressing and words meant for the Western audience. They recognized Israel's right to exist but demanded the return of all Palestinian refugees to Israel. They renounced terrorism but glorified it in Arabic. The "minimal restitution" that Shlaim speaks of is a bizarre choice of languange given that until Arafat accepted UNSC Res 242, the PLO's official position was to destroy Israel through armed struggle. Why would Israel pay restitution to people that want to kill them?
It should be noted that now that it's 20 years later, it is a contentious issue in Palestinian society to discuss whether they could accept the above three demands. Hamas has rejected all three.
Part of the problem was Barak's clear preference for a peace deal with Syria first in order to weaken the Palestinians...the most fundamental obstacle to peace with the Palestinians was settlement expansion on the West Bank.
The Syria-First strategy was a staple throughout Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, and Barak's prime ministerships and it was endorsed by at least half of the American participants. To say that it was designed "to weaken the Palestinians" is quite cynical. Syria was a state and by 1999-2000, Israel had peace with Egypt and Jordan. Peace with Syria, it was assumed, would bring peace with Lebanon and end Syrian support for Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. That would make peace easier with the Palestinians.
The fundamental obstacle to peace was not Israel's continuous settlement expansion although it was a policy bereft of sense.
The package offered by Barak was not enough to persuade the Palestinian negotiators to give him what he wanted.
There was no "package" offered at Camp David; Shlaim is a historian and should know this. The summit broke up over the issue of Jerusalem and because the Palestinian side failed to adequatley engage in negotiations. In short, it was not their intention to end the conflict in July 2000.
A package was offered by the Americans (not Barak) called the Clinton Parameters or Ideas on December 23, 2000 - in the midst of the new Palestinian-Israeli war of attrition. This time Arafat had the backing of nearly every Arab leader. Saudi Prince Bandar bin-Sultan recalled in 2003 that Arafat's decision not to accept the Clinton Parameters was not only a tragedy for the Palestinians and the region, but a crime. Palestinian historian Yezid Sayigh explained that "Arafat is guilty of strategic misjudgement, with consequences for the Palestinians of potentially historic proportions."
Arafat thought launching a new war of attrition would bring Israel to its knees and deliver an even greater deal. He was right. Three months later he received and rejected the Clinton Parameters.
He accepted the parameters a year later after overplaying his hand; decimating the peace camp in Israel; after Ariel Sharon came to office with a security (not peace and concession) mandate; and after Clinton left office. Sorry Arafat - no longer on the table.
During the past forty-one years Israel has tried every conceivable method of ending the conflict with the Palestinians except the obvious one: ending the occupation.
Wrong again. Israel left Lebanon and Gaza and receive rocket attacks and kidnappings instead of even a small inch towards peace. In fact, it is Hamas and Hizballah that changed the overall Israeli readiness to end the occupation (as evidenced by Kadimah's election victory) by convincing them that the occupation isn't the real problem - it's their existence that their neighbors don't accept. If the Israelis don't like the book in Gaza, why would they pay to see the movie in the West Bank?
Shlaim is a master at employing the selective focus and removing context. For his article on why Israelis should feel miserable on their 60th anniversary to have an affect, he has to concentrate on bending the truth.
hamas in west bank
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