Syria and the Inter-Arab System, 1990-2000
Before Iraq's takeover of Kuwait in 1990, Syria decided to upgrade their relations with Egypt as a means to improving their status in the inter-Arab system, neutralize the threat from Iraq, and improve relations with the West. In December 1989, Syria resumed their diplomatic ties with Egypt. They were frozen since Egypt signed the Camp David Accords a decade earlier. In April 1990, the two countries again exchanged ambassadors - a dramatic turnaround given Syria's previous statements that they would not renew relations as long as an Israeli flag flew over the Israeli embassy in Cairo. The Gulf crisis brought the two countries even closer as Asad apparently decided that the key to asserting themselves in the region laid in the development (or reconstitution of) the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi alliance.
Asad had hoped that the Syrian-Egyptian alliance would enable him to promote Syrian interests in the region and pave the way to warmer relations with Washington. Despite the development of a warm personal relationship between Asad and Mubarak, the Egyptian president proved unable to influence Asad on most issues throughout the decade.
During the 1990s, there were three primary areas of disagreement between Syria and Egypt. The first was the peace process. Although publicly Egypt supported Syrian moves, especially when it came to laying the blame for diplomatic impasses at Israel's feet, they refrained from backing Syrian efforts to force a freeze or retreat from normalization with Israel. Their diplomatic efforts in the peace process were focused on the Palestinian-Israeli process as opposed to the Syrian-Israeli process, much to the displeasure of Damascus. However, Syria held their negotiating cards with Israel very close to their chest and preferred not to share them with Egypt. Mubarak's preference for a mediating role between Israel and the Palestinians was a natural outgrowth of this and Asad's mistrust of the Arab world in general.
Once the details of the Oslo process became known in 1993, Egypt's role as a mediator in Arab-Israeli arena increased. Throughout the 1990s, this role meant they frequently would have to attempt to get Syria to soften their stance on the Arab-Israeli peace process and the bilateral nature they had become. Frequent presidential visits became the norm throughout the decade. Typically, these were Egyptian attempts on behalf of the US or Israel to ensure Syria's commitment to the peace process and pressure Syria to take a step forward or engage in confidence building measures. By 1999, Syrian-Egyptian relations grew tense over differences in their approach to the peace process.
Events in 1996 served to highlight these differences. The spat of suicide bombings in Israel led to the American sponsored "Summit of the Peacemakers" held in Egypt. Mubarak hoped that Syria would attend even though they had stood alone in refusing to condemn the bombings. Instead, Syria snubbed Egypt, Israel, and the United states and was noticeably absent from the summit. Syria explained their absence by saying that the summit lacked proper preparation and would only serve Israeli interests. After the summit, the government newspaper al-Thawra wrote that the most important absentee was peace itself.[12]
The second issue was the Israeli-Turkish alliance that came to light in 1996. Egypt refrained from supporting Syria's harsh opposition and preferred a low-key response.[13] Mubarak was catapulted to the forefront in this mediating arena in October 1998 when Turkey and Syria appeared to be posed on the brink of an armed confrontation (see below). Once the situation was diffused, Mubarak moved to upgrade his relations with Turkey - much to Syria's dissatisfaction.
The third issue was relations with Iran where Syria continued to play the role of mediator. Egypt however, continued to view Iran as a threat to the stability of the region and to Egypt's own stability. Syria's attempts to find a common ground with Iran and Egypt proved fruitless throughout the decade.
[12] Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. "Inter-Arab Relations." Middle East Contemporary Survey XX (1996). pp. 67-68.
[13] ---. "Inter-Arab Relations." Middle East Contemporary Survey XXI (1997). p. 120.
