From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000

The peace process for Syria was intended to secure and improve their status domestically, regionally, and internationally - it was not intended to conclude a peace agreement with Israel if it required any significant concession.  Syria's "strategic choice" for peace was only a choice to explore the possibility of achieving peace, however at no point did Asad decide to make peace.  He made no irreversible move, such as Sadat's journey to Jerusalem, and he failed to engage in the bare minimum of public diplomacy.  Asad's preference was to adapt to the new challenges presented in the late 1980s and 1990s by adopting strategies that maintained the status quo.  This required no significant change in his worldview or dramatic overhaul of his policies.  Maintaining the status quo while concluding a peace agreement with Israel was impossible given Israel's red lines and America's expectations.  Furthermore, by 2000 Asad's lack of public diplomacy led most Israelis to conclude that Syria's vision of peace was not worth the return of all the Golan.

 

Asad proved unable to reconcile his old worldview that rejects Israel's legitimacy with a new, developing world and regional view that favored a political settlement and degrees of normalization with Israel.  He was interested in the process and gains he could reap as a result of Syria's participation and therefore needed the process, not the peace.  In the end, after employing a policy of tactical rejectionism in the 1980s, he sought to extract more from Israel than either Egypt or Jordan were able to, while offering substantially less in return.      

 

Several other factors contributed to the failure of the process, however taken together, they do not add up to the fundamental reason the process failed to conclude with peace.  There were psychological barriers, mutual mistrust, suspicion, animosity, and a lack of understanding of each other's red lines.  In Syria's eyes, Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan was equivocal, only given as a deposit in America's pocket, and only if all of Israel's needs were met.  Asad felt that Israel's engagement in the process was designed more to prevent them from blocking progress on other bilateral tracks (Jordan, the Palestinians, Turkey, regional normalization, etc.) rather than making peace.  Israel's strategic partnership with Turkey that came to light in 1996 was also seen in Damascus as a direct threat to Syria and contrary to the aim of making peace.  Israel's decision to hold a national referendum on any peace agreement was also viewed with suspicion and seen as a way to extract Syrian concessions while not sealing the deal in the end, leaving Asad exposed.

 

While Israel's decision to hold a national referendum was designed, in part, to increase the pressure on Damascus for public diplomacy, Syria's efforts, while significant by Syrian standards, failed to meet the minimum Israeli standards as reflected in polls throughout the decade.  Syrian confidence-building-measures were very few:

Yet, these minimal efforts were overshadowed by Asad's disastrous press conference with Clinton in Damascus in October 1994 where while standing next to the American President, he essentially explained that terrorism was Israel's fault because of its occupation.  Other issues that nullified even his smallest public gestures were his refusal to express any condolences after Rabin's assassination in 1995 and his refusal to condemn terrorism, publicly express any regret, or show any sign of warmth after the series of devastating suicide bombings in Israel in February and March 1996 that jeopardized the peace process.  This was followed by Asad's refusal to participate in the March 1996 Summit of the Peacemakers in Egypt, designed by Clinton to rescue the peace process, and his tacit support for militant action by Hizballah and other Palestinian rejectionist groups hosted in Damascus.

 

While Syria's lack of confidence-building-measures poisoned any chance of achieving peace, Israel's view of normalization and economic cooperation, and its importance in any final agreement were unrealistic at best and impossible at worst.  Israel's economic plan, especially under Peres's prime ministership would undermine Syria's fragile economy and present a threat to the regime.  The detailed discussion about the depth of normalization failed to comprehend that no such Western concept of  "normal, peaceful relations" exists between Syria and any other Arab state.  Israel was asking Syria not only to make peace but also to create a web of economic relations that have never before existed in the region.

 

Israel failed to understand that peace would not undo perceptions of history and lead to friendly acceptance.  A Syrian-Israeli peace would mean that Syria could tolerate their existence in return for a pledge not to go to war and minimal security arrangements.  Al-Shar' explained in 2000 that peace would transform the conflict from one between militaries, to a political, economic, commercial, and cultural competition in all dimensions.  Security, borders, and water should have been Israel's primary concerns, not the trappings of skin-deep normalization.

 

America's role in the negotiations presented another issue.  Both Syria and Israel joined the process under heavy American pressure brought by George Bush and James Baker.  At that time, Syria was fearful of Washington, especially the prospect of a U.S. forced settlement that they could not live with.  This fear evaporated during the Clinton administration.  The expected carrots that could be gained by a relationship with Washington, such as economic investment or Syria's removal from the State Department's list of terrorist-supporting states, failed to materialize given congressional opposition and Asad's failure to convince Washington that it was a new day in Syria.  Even Clinton's decision to meet Asad in Damascus in October 1994 proved to be controversial in the U.S. and the resulting fallout from the press conference meant Clinton would not officially meet Asad again until March 2000 in Geneva. 

 

America's role from 1993-1996 was that of facilitator and mediator; it was a passive role that avoided applying pressure unlike Bush and Baker's previous role as the chief extractors of concessions.  This led to an erosion of America's status in Asad's eyes, which became manifest with Syria strengthening ties with Iran from 1996 onward and their slow rapprochement with Iraq in 1998.  By 1999 and 2000, neither American carrot nor stick could press Syria into a peace agreement.  Asad no longer possessed a fear of isolation if he said "no" to Washington, nor did he have an incentive to make peace.

 

There were several points during the 1990s where members of the three delegations felt that a peace agreement was in reach.  They were wrong.  There may have been one very small window of opportunity to conclude a peace deal from December 1999-January 2000 (specifically, at Shepherdstown).  In December, Asad told the American peace team that he wanted to complete a peace deal and that he was in a hurry.  However, after raising everyone's expectations and pressing for a high-level political meeting, Barak got cold feet and was not ready to adequately engage, leaving al-Shar' to return to Damascus exposed and empty-handed.  This coupled with the draft agreement's leak in the Israeli press squashed any level of trust Asad may have had for Barak.  Asad lost any interest in a deal with Israel by the Geneva Summit in March.

 

America and Israel failed to adequately appreciate that by 1994, Basil's death forced Asad to increase his focus on the succession question.  The priority attached to ensuring a smooth transition to his other son, Bashar, increased as Hafiz's health decreased, reaching a peak in 1999-2000.  At first, his deteriorating health led him to press for a quick conclusion to an agreement.  A few months later, he was absorbed with succession issues and his own mortality.  During this small window, Barak equivocated, and America became enveloped in issues of process and procedure, instead of substance.  Only during this small window of time can an argument be made that peace was within reach. 

 

It is more likely that in Geneva, Asad sought to pocket Israel's concessions and extend the process.  Likewise, it is possible that Asad wanted to gain Israel's red line and leave his son in a stronger position to conclude the process later.  This is in line with al-Shar's request during the meeting for the U.S. to put Barak's offer in writing while offering nothing in return.  This would give Syria the ultimate leak, embarrass Barak, and secure a starting point for Bashar.  With Hafiz al-Asad's death on 10 June 2000, this answer will remain elusive.

 

A simple truth in peacemaking remains.  The parties involved in making peace need to want peace more than the mediator does.  Successful Middle East peace initiatives are the result of regional actors who define their red lines, weigh the costs, and decide that peace is in their interest.  The U.S. can help negotiate and seal a process but it cannot manufacture desire in the parties to make peace or dictate their red lines.  Egypt and Jordan decided that they wanted peace.  The Oslo process with the Palestinians was the result of secret meetings between the parties themselves.  Peace in the Middle East is only possible when the parties to the conflict decide that they want it and make difficult concessions to achieve it.