From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000

The Year of Barak: From Hope to Collapse

By: Matthew RJ Brodsky

At 57 years old, Labor's Ehud Barak, Israel's most decorated war hero defeated Likud's Netanyahu with 56 percent of the vote in the May 1999 elections.  Hope in Israel and Washington rose sharply because he was seen as someone who would continue Rabin's legacy and embrace the path to peace while focusing on Israel's security.  During his election campaign, he pledged to remove Israel from their self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon, with or without a deal with Syria.  He also promised to reduce America's role in the negotiations.  The former pledge he kept, but the role of the U.S. dramatically increased during his prime ministership.
 
Barak's decision to pursue a Syria-first strategy upon assuming office and relegating the Palestinian track to the backburner was against the advice of most of his ministers as well as a significant portion of Israel's foreign policy and security establishment.[220]  Robert Malley and Aaron Miller, both key members of America's peace team were also against pursuing Syria first.  However, the Syria-first strategy was in line with Rabin's approach, who felt that dealing with the surrounding Arab states would make dealing with the Palestinians (and the threats from the east) easier.  This was also inline with U.S. objectives during the first Clinton administration.  However, since 1996 - Clinton's re-election and Netanyahu's victory over Peres - Syria sat on America's sidelines.
 
 
Barak wanted to swoop into peace-making by first sealing a deal with Asad and then completing a final peace agreement with Arafat.  He also was aware of the ticking American electoral clock.  His plan was very ambitious and he was convinced that he knew best how to proceed.  His sense of urgency raised everyone's expectations that peace was within reach.  Ross explains his view of Barak:  "If there was one trait that characterized Barak as Prime Minister it was his instinct for the ambitious or grandiose move.  He always wanted to know whether such moves were possible, whether a grand leap forward could be made...But his constant search for clarity - when he was not always prepared to live with the wrong answers - created a certain urgent, even manic, quality to his policy, hardly the way to build one's leverage in negotiations."[221]  Elsewhere he described the Israeli leader as a fine strategic thinker, and courageous, "But he alienated everybody around him, basically because he didn't trust anybody.  He is someone who felt he knew best, that if he thought something was reasonable, ipso facto it was."[222]  Perhaps the most concise characterization of Barak's disposition after he was elected was provided by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: "Ehud Barak entered office like a rooster at dawn."[223] 
 
The initial reaction in Damascus to Barak's victory was significant.  Asad never said something publicly positive about Rabin or Peres while they were in office.  When he did, it was only in a comparative context when Netanyahu was the prime minister.  With Barak's victory, Asad declared that "Barak is a strong and honest leader interested in peace."[224]  Given that the regional reaction in the Arab press praised the election results and the hope it brought more dramatically, Asad's comments were seen as insignificant by the Israeli public.  However, in Syrian terms it reflected a certain awakening and change in public diplomacy not seen before.
 

The Washington Talks: December 1999

Albright, Ross, Indyk, Malley, and Miller arrived in Damascus on 7 December 1999 hoping to find the magic formula to continue the negotiations.  They were in for a surprise.  Indyk was struck by two things: "(1) he [Asad] was frail and suffering from dementia, evidenced by the fact that he kept confusing Barak and Clinton; and (2) for the first time in his life, he was in a hurry."[225]  Asad's declining health was acute by 1999.  He was no longer the man that Baker saw in 1991 whose "stamina was phenomenal," or whose negotiating sessions were "always the ultimate endurance contest."[226]
 
Asad said he would not impose conditions for negotiations to resume.  In order to find the formula to announce the resumption of the talks, Asad suggested the phrase, "Negotiations would resume where they had left off."  When asked if he was ready to have the discussions take place at a higher political level, he offered his foreign minister, Faruq al-Shar'.  For eight years Asad had resisted this step; al-Shar' had not participated directly with an Israeli since the accusatory 1991 Madrid Conference.  He now told the American peace team, "Barak is serious; he wants to reach an agreement quickly and so do I."[227]  In his conversation with Albright, Martin Indyk stressed that Asad repeated his one condition for resuming the negotiations three times: "We have to finish them quickly."[228]  The next day President Clinton announced the resumption of the negotiations, scheduled at the Blair House in Washington on 15-16 December with talks to continue in January after the holidays.[229]
 
Barak, who had been eager to pursue Syria as fast as possible despite all obstacles began to hit the brakes the day before he arrived in Washington.  This pattern of behavior led Ross to later ascribe to him the motto of "Hurry up and Wait" in his approach to the peace process.[230]  He told the peace team that the two days of meetings should be primarily concerned with process, not substance and that he did not want to meet with al-Shar' privately because "He will expect me to say that I confirm June 4 in a one-on-one meeting and I don't want to do that now."  Barak wanted to avoid discussing substance because after the two days they would break for a few weeks and details could leak, weakening his domestic support.  Instead, he wanted to use the two meetings to set up the process where all issues would be solved in a one final push at Shepherdstown beginning on 3 January 2000.  At the same time, al-Shar' was eager to gain the Pocket directly from Israel, but he was unaware that Barak had a different plan.  
 
Adding to the gathering clouds were the statements made to the press moments before the official talks resumed in Washington.  Clinton, al-Shar', and Barak were to appear together in the Rose Garden outside the White House on the morning of 15 December.  Given al-Shar's propensity for negative rhetoric in Western media - such as his 1994 interview on Israeli TV and his tirade at the Madrid Conference - Ross insisted that the three appear together but only Clinton would make a brief, positive statement.  However, in the Oval Office, just before the event, Barak suggested that they each make a short and positive statement.  Barak hoped this would help him domestically.  Unfortunately, Clinton agreed.[231]  Clinton and Barak made a brief and positive statement; al-Shar' drew on at length with Syria's standard dour assessment of Israel.  Then he refused to shake Barak's hand in front of the media: 
It goes without saying that peace for Syria means the return of all its occupied land; while, for Israel, peace will mean the end of the psychological fear which the Israelis have been living in as a result of the existence of occupation, which is undoubtedly the source of all adversities and wars...

Those who reject to return the occupied territories to their original owners in the framework of international legitimacy send a message to the Arabs that the conflict between Israel and Arabs is a conflict of existence in which bloodshed can never stop, and not a conflict about borders which can be ended as soon as parties get their rights, as President Assad has stressed at these meetings more than once before, and after Madrid peace conference...

Peace will certainly pose new questions to all sides, especially for the Arab side, who will wonder after reviewing the past 50 years, whether the Arab-Israeli conflict was the one who solely defied the Arab unity, or the one which frustrated it...

The image formulated in the minds of Western people and which formulated in public opinion was that Syria was the aggressor, and Syria was the one who shelled settlements from the Golan prior to the 1967 war. These claims carry no grain of truth in them - as Moshe Dayan, himself, has explained in his memoirs, that it was the other side who insisted on provoking the Syrians until they clashed together and then claimed that the Syrians are the aggressors...

President Assad has announced many years ago that peace is the strategic option of Syria. And we hope that peace has become the strategic option for others today, in order to have or to leave future generations a region that is not torn with wars, a region whose sky is not polluted by the smell of blood and destruction.[232]
These remarks angered Clinton and provided Barak with the needed pretext to decline a private meeting with al-Shar'.  Nevertheless, progress was made behind closed doors.  Barak still avoided directly committing to the Pocket but created a new formulation: "While my government has made no commitment on territory, we don't erase history."[233]  Faruq al-Shar' still wanted more to take back to Asad, but Ross suggested it would be better to "focus on preparing the process for when we go to the intensive round [on 3 January in Shepherdstown]."  A disagreement ensued over creating a demarcation or delineation group for the 4 June border.  Barak was hesitant because he did not want it look like he was giving away too much without Syria satisfying Israel's needs.  Moreover, since the meetings were only to last two days in December, such an agreement followed by a two-week break would give rise to serious domestic bickering in Israel before going to Shepherdstown.  Al-Shar', by contrast was eager to begin with the border group as soon as possible.  It was significant that he acknowledged that the 4 June 1967 line did not exist in any map or in any book because it indicated that the line could be negotiated.  He was alright with Barak's verbal formulation for the border but expected that the commitment would be explicit in the upcoming, January discussions.  Albright expected the same.  At the end of the Washington talks, all agreed that Clinton would decide when each group would be formed and when they would begin.[234]

 

Shepherdstown: January 2000

Barak tried for months to force Clinton to gain Asad's agreement on a sustained, make-or-break summit in which everything would be discussed and where all parties would remain until a final agreement was reached.  While at times when it made little sense to Clinton, Albright, or Ross to push ahead, Barak remained convinced of his approach and pushed even harder.  While al-Shar' was recovering from his surgery in October, he suggested "shock treatment" by having Clinton "drop by Damascus" to pressure and "stun" Asad.[235]  Barak raised everyone's expectations and finally, on 7 December, his wish came true when Asad agreed to the highest level political meeting ever and emphasized that he was in a rush.  If one could claim that during the decade a genuine window of opportunity existed to seal a final deal, it was at Shepherdstown.
 
At the same time, Barak had domestic issues he needed to square.[236]  He was late in realizing the political costs if he received his wish for a high-stakes summit.  He also began to understand that he could not stand so far in front of Israeli public opinion, the Knesset's opinion, and the opinions of the majority of his Cabinet and ministers.  Most Israeli polls showed that the public did not trust the Syrians or favor a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for Syria's presence on the Sea of Galilee.[237]  Even before Barak left for the Washington talks in December, the 120-seat Knesset only endorsed negotiations with Syria by a vote of 47-31 - the third of the Knesset that abstained included many of Barak's putative supporters.[238]  Ben-Ami recalled that not only was Barak isolated in his own Cabinet on the Syria issue but he was also out of touch with country's mood regarding a possible peace agreement whose price would be far beyond what Israel paid with Jordan and Egypt.  The security establishment also did not agree with Barak's rush towards Syria and both Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz and Head of the General Security Service (Shabak) Ami Ayalon openly questioned Barak's dedication to the Syrian track at the expense of the Palestinians in Cabinet meetings.[239]
 
Despite the previous consensus giving Clinton the authority to decide the sequence and timing of the groups on borders, security, normalization, and water, the first and second day at Shepherdstown was devoted to arguments over which groups would convene and when.  Barak insisted that the security and normalization groups meet first for several days before the border and water groups convene.  Al-Shar' argued that all groups must begin together or not at all.  The compromise was that the security and normalization groups would meet directly with the U.S. present and then later that evening the borders and water groups would meet indirectly through the American team.  However, no one moved forward.  Ross wrote a draft with the U.S. understanding of each side's positions on all of the issues.  Where there existed differences of opinions, the U.S. inserted brackets containing each side's position.  He presented the following to Barak and al-Shar':[240]
 
Border and Time Frame for Withdrawal
  • Israel: Full withdrawal from the Golan except for a narrow strip along the northeastern edge of the lake and a similar narrow strip along the Jordan River above the lake; three years to withdraw.
  • Syria:  Full withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 line, with the northeastern section of the lake defined as 10 meters off the shoreline; 18 months to withdraw.
Security
  • Israel:  Limited Israeli presence in a Mount Hermon early warning site for a period of time after completing their withdrawal; three zones of demilitarized or limited deployment for Syrian forces extending at least to the environs of Damascus; Israel could accept limited deployment on their side but not demilitarized zones.
  • Syria:  No presence in a Mount Hermon early warning site after Israel's withdrawal; demilitarized zones on both sides of the border; no limited deployment for zones extending to Damascus.
Normalization and Peace
  • Israel:  Establishment of full diplomatic relations to be implemented in the first phase of withdrawal with embassies; an infrastructure making full economic, tourist, commercial, banking, communications, aviation, postal, and other relations possible.
  • Syria:  Embassies exchanged only after Israel completes their withdrawal; a limited Israeli diplomatic presence four to six months before the completion of the withdrawal; a simple and short agreement stating that only diplomatic, trade, and tourist relations would be established.

Water
  • Israel:  A control mechanism to oversee the flow of water through the Golan ensuring an unchanged quality of water entering the Sea of Galilee.
  • Syria:  A verbal assurance on what Israel requested, with the U.S. working to produce a similar agreement from Turkey on water flowing into Syria.
Syria's most significant move since 1991 came when Faruq al-Shar' suggested to the following to Ross:
On the question of whose sovereignty applied where, he [al-Shar'] was straightforward and unequivocal:

The Israelis would have sovereignty over the lake; the Syrians would have sovereignty over the land, at least all the land to the east of the 10 meters off the shoreline.
He also corrected the section on Syria's position on security, saying he did not object to a presence at an early warning station - as long as the presence was not Israeli.  He would accept an American presence there for five years after the Israeli withdrawal.  Barak later told Albright and Ross that while it appeared that al-Shar' had some authority to negotiate, he did not have enough "to make a difference."  Ross recalled that while the meeting with al-Shar' lifted their hopes of being able to make significant progress now, "The Barak response deflated us."[241]  Indeed, Barak's thinking was affected by yet another Israeli poll carried out by Haaretz while he was in Shepherdstown showing that Syria's insistence on the 4 June line prevented most Israelis from supporting a peace agreement.[242]
           
On 7 January, the fifth day of the meetings, the U.S. tabled their "Draft Peace Treaty" based on the U.S. presentation from a few days earlier and the subsequent meetings.  While Barak and al-Shar' studied the draft, more progress was made in meetings with the four groups the next day.  Syria moved closer to Israel's positions, with General Omar suggesting that the security zones could be created on the basis of a 10:5 ratio - down from 10:6 as Shihabi suggested during the Wye talks, and he accepted Israel's proposal for extensive passive and active monitoring of Syrian and Israeli ground forces, logistic support units, and weapons depots.  More significantly, General Omar suggested in the presence of the Israeli delegation that the border could be adjusted as much as 50 meters (instead of 10) to meet mutual needs and concerns, implying that this principle could apply throughout the length of the border.  Syria also moved toward Barak's position on water and normalization.  Daoudi accepted a water management board to ensure the quality and quantity of water flowing into the Galilee, and Mu'allim introduced a series of steps designed to build confidence.  These Syrian moves would be authorized only if Israel was prepared to acknowledge that 4 June 1967 was the basis for discussing the border, but even at this stage, Barak refused - he would only accept 1967 as the basis if Syria agreed to allow negotiations with Lebanon to resume.[243]
           
Instead of responding to the draft agreement, agreeing on the border, or replying to any Syrian move, Barak suggested that the delegations end the talks for a few days to study the proposals, make some preliminary comments and then reconvene for a second round.  Clinton accepted Barak's decision but warned him that "half-finished peace agreements are not like cheeses that grow better with age; they were more like bananas that rot."[244]  On 10 January, U.S. State Department Spokesman James Rubin announced, "We have decided to recess the talks for a short break.  Prime Minister Barak and Foreign Minister Shara have agreed to return to the discussions and negotiations on January the 19th, to continue the negotiations and work further towards a peace agreement."[245]
 
The failure of the talks produced many critical assessments of Barak's performance.  President Clinton recalled:
The Syrians came to Shepherdstown in a positive and flexible frame of mind, eager to make an agreement.  By contrast, Barak, who had pushed hard for the talks, decided, apparently on the basis of polling data, that he needed to slow-walk the process for a few days in order to convince the Israeli public that he was being a tough negotiator.  He wanted to use my good relationship with Shara and Assad to keep the Syrians happy while he said as little as possible during his self-imposed waiting period.

I was, to put it mildly, disappointed.  If Barak had dealt with the Syrians before or if he had given us some advance notice, it might have been manageable... Barak had not been in politics long, and I thought he had gotten some very bad advice.  In foreign affairs, polls are often useless; people hire leaders to win for them, and it's the results that matter...As hard as I tried, I couldn't change Barak's mind...[By the fifth day of the summit] Barak had still not authorized anyone on his team to accept June 4, no matter what the Syrians offered.[246]
Indeed, Barak's approach more than disappointed Clinton and his team.  Robert Malley explained, "it quickly became apparent that Barak had not come to conclude an agreement...Barak failed to offer reciprocal concessions."[247]  Malley also recalled that later, during the Israeli-Palestinian Camp David summit in July 2000, when Barak tried a similar delaying tactic, the president exploded at him:  "I went to Shepherdstown (for the Israeli-Syrian negotiations) and was told nothing by you for four days.  I went to Geneva (for the summit with Assad) and felt like a wooden Indian doing your bidding.  I will not let it happen here!"[248]  Ross concluded, "Barak at Shepherdstown held back for reasons that made sense to him, but he failed to address what the other side needed.  He hoped that we [the U.S. team] would fill in the gap he was not prepared to bridge.  He did not give us enough to work with, and we played what we had at the wrong time."[249]
 
Shlomo Ben-Ami later explained: "Barak, however, missed a unique opportunity to reach an agreement with Assad, admittedly on very difficult conditions.  For a very narrow window of time there were clear indications that the Syrian leader wanted an agreement...But instead of seizing the opportunity and assuming the inevitable price for peace, Barak risked losing a vital asset, Assad's trust, and avoided making the necessary commitment on the border.  He conveyed to the Americans and the Syrians a sense of urgency, but at the moment of truth and decision he got cold feet and engaged in tactical maneuvers with the hope of wresting a better deal from Asad."[250] 
 
Barak's chief negotiator, Uri Sagi, Shlomo Yannai, the chief of planning in the IDF, and Martin Indyk all believe that Barak got cold feet.[251]  Aaron Miller, also a member of the American peace team and critic of the "Syria-first" strategy, chose a different tact: "I, for one, do not fault Israel's position on territory, with respect to Syria.  Frankly, the Syrians did not deserve better.  Asad refused to allow his foreign minister to shake the hand of the prime minister of the State of Israel; Asad continued to run a proxy war against Israel in southern Lebanon - and for this, he was to be offered almost everything he wanted... Asad, crafty, clever, decisive leader that he was, was also the 'Frank Sinatra' of the peace process.  He chose to do the peace process 'his way,' and in doing it his own way during the last three years of his life, he priced himself out of the market."[252]
 
Barak later defended himself: 
At Shepherdstown, we found the Syrian leadership's basic approach unchanged from the time of the U.S.-sponsored negotiations during Rabin's term...An agreement was not reached because the Syrians had a fundamental condition, for any negotiations, that Israel makes a direct, documented and irrevocable political pledge to accept all the demands Syria will make in the negotiations.  Anyone who would even entertain accepting a condition of this kind, regardless of the guise under which it appears, would be well advised to steer clear of national leadership.  It is preposterous, but this is what the Syrians wanted.[253]
The fact remains, however, that the Shepherdstown meeting was exactly what Barak asked for and when al-Shar' and his delegation moved beyond the draft offered on 5 January, Barak balked, offered nothing, and then decided to protect his domestic pledge to withdraw from Lebanon by linking a commitment to the 1967 line to Lebanon's direct involvement in the peace process.  In fact, Barak offered less than Rabin, Peres, and Netanyahu when the three could not even see the contours of a final agreement.
 
The previous Israeli position - since Syria simply wants territory and will pay no price, Israel must not commit to a line to negotiate over - made no sense in the context of Shepherdstown.  The main difference between the 1923 international border and the line troops held on the eve of the 1967 war was 10 meters in the northeastern section of the Galilee, and roughly the same amount of space running north along the Jordan river.  In 1967, Syria had access to the sea.  When Syria's General Omar suggested 50 meters along the border to negotiate over and accepted 1967 as 10 meters off the Galilee, he already covered the difference between 1923 and 1967.  When al-Shar' stressed that Israel would have sovereignty over the sea and Syria on the land, Israel's main red line was not breached.  This meant that all Syria needed was an agreement that 1967 would form the basis for discussions on the border, while at the same time telling Barak that he can negotiate from the 1923 perspective.  50 meters covered 1967 and 1923.  This was the exact moment when Barak should have agreed to seriously discuss the border and then proceed to the endgame. 
 
American descriptions of al-Shar's attitude at the close of the talks speak are telling.  Al-Shar' told Clinton that "Shepherdstown was a failure, that Barak was not sincere, and that he would have to say as much to President Assad...[he] would go home emptyhanded."[254] With Albright on the last day, al-Shar' "compared the talks to a stalled car the Syrians and Americans were pushing because the Israelis hadn't turned on the ignition."[255]  In a concluding meeting with Ross on the same day, al-Shar' was equally clear: "Shepherdstown was a disaster; Syria had been flexible and exposed concessions and gotten nothing in return.  Barak was not serious and he would have to report to his President that he had failed."  In a meeting between Clinton, Albright, and Ross before the final dinner, Ross recalled: "Though President Clinton had exhibited much sympathy for Barak's position throughout Shepherdstown, now, as he was staring a breakdown in the face, he was angry.  Why had Barak put us in this position?  Didn't he know everything could fall apart, that Asad would feel betrayed and tell the world, especially the Arab world, that?... He [Clinton] asked how bad Shara's mood was, and Madeleine [Albright] said, 'It is very bad.  He is going to tell Asad this has failed'."[256]
 

The Draft Agreement Leaks and the Consequences

            It took less than three days from the close of the Shepherdstown talks for the draft peace agreement with the bracketed text to leak in Israel.  It was published in Haaretz on 13 January.[257]  Earlier during the meetings on 9 January, a version was leaked to Al-Hayat, prompting the U.S. State Department Spokesman James Rubin to explain that the report was not accurate.[258]  Another Syrian version was leaked to the Lebanese daily, Al-Safir on 15 January and was published again the next day in Al-Hayat, demonstrating that the peace would be little more than a non-belligerency agreement.[259]  Al-Shar' made a further retrenchment a few days later: "[Syria] does not intend to reach a new Camp David Agreement or a new Oslo Agreement nor a new Wadi Araba [Jordanian-Israeli Peace] Accord...and is not willing to accept these precedents as a model."[260]
           
While the content of the draft agreement was important in Israel and Syria's domestic political sphere, what it contained was less important as far as each side's positions.  Syria had already gone past the draft treaty in Shepherdstown by making no claim to the shoreline of the Sea of Galilee, by agreeing that the border could be negotiated within 50 meters of the 1967 line once demarcated, and by agreeing to an early warning station on Mount Hermon with an American presence.  What was more telling were the reactions in Syria and Israel.[261]
           
In Israel, the Golan settlers' committee began playing an increasing role in affecting public opinion against withdrawal from the moment Barak was elected.  They arranged mass demonstrations, one of which attracted over 100,000 protesters to Rabin Square in Tel Aviv on 10 January as Barak was returning from Shepherdstown.[262]  The rally attracted people from across the political spectrum, including many Barak voters.  An estimated one-third of those identified with the left opposed withdrawal.  One poll showed that more than 60 percent of Israelis opposed trading the Golan for peace with Syria.[263]  Even one of Israel's most famous authors, Amos Oz, who closely identified with the further left Meretz Party opposed withdrawal on the grounds that Asad had not done enough to prove his sincere desire for peace.[264]  Elsewhere, Oz wrote: "[The Syrians] think that we will give them the Golan and they will send us a receipt by fax.  That is not good enough for me.  If it continues like this it will be difficult to convince Israelis in a referendum - including me."[265]
 
Barak was far ahead of Israeli public opinion.  Since Netanyahu formalized a law in the Knesset (originally proposed by Rabin) that any Israeli concession on territory would require the support of a clear majority in a national referendum, if Barak and Asad worked out an agreement, it was far from certain that the Israeli public would support it.  Martin Indyk, one of America's chief proponents of the Syria-first approach shared this impression with Ross before he arrived in Israel on 2 February.  According to Ross, when he arrived he found that "if anything, Martin [Indyk's] message was understated.  Barak was completely isolated in his own cabinet on Syria."[266]  The pattern of Barak being out of step with his country continued through the March Geneva summit.  Another Israeli poll released in mid-March indicated that 55 per cent of the respondents would not trust a peace agreement signed with Asad.[267]
           
With Asad's declining health, domestic criticism of Asad's policies became sustained and systematic by late 1999.  On 18 December, just after the Washington meetings, 'Uqla 'Ursan, Ba'th Party member and chairman of the Arab Writers' Association in Damascus - whose members include the most outspoken domestic critics of Syria's "strategic choice" to make peace - published an article, "Without Shaking Hands" ("Bidun Musafaha"), where he wrote in reference to al-Shar's speech in the Rose Garden: "We reject and will continue to reject in the future, any possibility of recognizing the Zionist enemy.  We will continue to fight against any evidence of normalization with it, since we view this as a 'struggle for survival' and not 'a struggle for borders'."[268]
           
The 13 January leak in Haaretz damaged Asad and Faruq al-Shar' in the Syrian media.  Therefore, they leaked a doctored draft version to explain their position.  According to Seale, because of the Israeli leak, "an angry Asad broke of the talks.  Barak, he felt, was not serious.  He was playing games.  He demanded clarification from the Americans of the Israeli position."[269]  Indeed, Asad wanted more than a clarification; he demanded that the 1967 border be demarcated before agreeing to open any negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.[270]  This meant he was no longer looking for Israel to reaffirm the Pocket, or looking to launch the demarcation group; he wanted the border finalized as the price for resuming the Lebanon talks - another Syrian attempt to gain on substance in exchange for procedure.  During these presidential phone calls, it became even clearer to the U.S. team that Asad's health was rapidly deteriorated.  Ross recalled that "He found it difficult to express his thoughts; voices in the background prompted nearly all his answers."[271]
           
While the Clinton administration searched for a formula to continue, Faruq al-Shar' assumed the responsibility of addressing the Arab Writers' Association in Damascus on 27 January 2000.  This was normally Asad's domain but his deteriorating health prompted his choice of al-Shar' for the address.  The speech was for domestic consumption, designed to answer the critics of the regime's "strategic choice" for peace, however, the inconsistencies within served to demonstrate the Syrian paradox of having both legs on either side of the fence. 
 
According to al-Shar' the conflict with Israel was no longer an existential dispute but now transformed into a territorial dispute and thus a peaceful solution should be sought that would move the conflict from a military conflict to a political, cultural, and economic struggle.  At the same time he reaffirmed his adherence to Ba'th ideology, reviving the phased approach to Israel's destruction: "The Ba'th Party contends that the return of all of Palestine is a long-term strategic aim that will not be realized in one stage...there is a differentiation between the various stages of the struggle for the liberation of Palestine."  In one section he blasted Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians for their separate bilateral tracks, and in another he said that if Syria fails to make peace with Israel it would only be because the "racist expansionists want to impose their conditions" and that the Arab world will stand with Syria "So, in either case, we will not lose."  On one hand he explained that Syria was in a weaker position because of Western support for Israel and their collective "treachery," while on the other hand he claimed that Syria had the initiative and was in a stronger position.[272]
           
His version of the Shepherdstown talks reiterated Asad's conditions for resuming talks with Israel:  "The Israelis tried to leave the subject of withdrawal to the very end of the talks so as to extort the Syrian delegation and use withdrawal as a pressure card to obtain concessions on the other elements of peace.  We said: 'Never, we will never agree.'  We formed four committees, headed by the committee on the demarcation of the borders.  We said that the committee must demarcate the 4 June 1967 line.  Without that there will be no resumption of talks."[273]  While Israel and Syria remained entrenched in their political positions, the U.S. searched for a formula to reconvene the negotiations.
 

Red Lines and The Geneva Summit: 26 March 2000

With Barak's persistent request to push ahead, the U.S. decided in February that the only way forward was to find out Barak's red lines - especially on the border - and then have Clinton present Asad with a full package at a summit in Geneva on 26 March.  It was believed that only in this high-stakes meeting between the two leaders could the next step be taken.  Adding to the sense of drama was that this would be their first face-to-face meeting in over five years, since the disastrous joint press conference in Damascus in October 1994.  A positive response from Asad would move negotiations quickly into an endgame, while a negative response would essentially mean the end of the process and a change in Israeli focus to their unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon planned for July and the Palestinian track. 
           
The following is what Barak authorized Clinton to propose to Asad as his red lines complete with his vision of the border: 
 
Barak wanted 400 meters off the northeastern shoreline of the lake, although two days before the summit Amnon Shahak told Indyk that Barak could live with 100 meters.  The map presented to Asad was based on a 1967 photomap from the CIA and had three lines drawn.  The first was Barak's proposal; the second was an outside and independent interpretation of the 4 June 1967 line, called the "Hof Line"; the third was the 1923 international border (see Appendix, Map 5).  None of the lines depicted the measure of meters involved, however, given that the 1923 border was 10 meters east of the lake and Barak's line was east of the 1923 line, he was asking for more territory in that region.  At the same time, on the southeastern section of the lake, Barak's line was significantly west of both the 1923 and 1967 line, and gave al-Hamma to Syria.  The line running north from the lake along the Jordan River gave Israel a small strip of land parallel to the river until Lake Hula.  Israel would have full sovereignty over the lake and Jordan River.  In total, given the border adjustments envisioned by Barak, he was offering the same quantity of land taken by Israel in 1967, but not the same territory. 
           
On security, Barak wanted seven Israelis to remain for five years at an early warning station on Mount Hermon and he accepted Syria's 10:5 ratio proposal from Shepherdstown on security zones, provided there was a passive monitoring system.  On normalization, Barak needed a clear signal that new day had dawned.  This included open borders and embassies after the first phase of implementation - in three to four months.  The full Israeli withdrawal would take place over 18 months - two and a half years.[274]
           
This full package, however, was never presented to Asad on 26 March in Geneva because he was no longer interested.  In fact, the summit's resounding failure was swift and took less than three hours.  Indyk recalled: "When Asad was ready to make the deal in January at Shepherdstown, Barak was not, and when Barak was ready in late March to have Clinton present a detailed map of the line of full Israeli withdrawal to Asad in Geneva, it turned out to be too late for Asad."[275]
 
Clinton began by saying that "Israel was prepared to withdraw to a commonly agreed border based on the 4 June 1967 line."  Although this is what Asad had asked for since negotiations began in 1991, he replied that the formulation was a problem because the border had to be "commonly agreed."  Therefore, there was no reason for any negotiations on the border in Asad's eyes.  Clinton continued, saying that Israel would need sovereignty over the lake and the Jordan River.  "Then it's over; they don't want peace," Asad countered.  Clinton explained that this was all agreed to in Shepherdstown.  Asad asked al-Shar' if this was the case, who switched focus to Syrian sovereignty on the land.  He was apparently surprised by Asad's response.  Clinton then asked Ross to present the map to illustrate the territory being discussed and Ross explained that given the three lines on the map and the territory exchanging hands, "In effect, you are getting more than 100 percent of the Golan Heights."  Asad then said that the lake had always been Syria's lake; there were never Jews east of the lake; and that he wanted Syrians to swim and fish, and share the lake and resources as they had before 1967.  Asad saw no point in continuing even as Clinton asked whether he would hear the rest of the presentation.  During a break in the meeting Albright and Ross privately briefed al-Shar' with the rest of the proposal, who then asked if Syria could have it all in writing.  The request was declined.[276] 
 
It was over.  In Geneva, it was not a matter of meters - Asad hardly looked at the map, which did not show whether Barak's line was 20 meters or 800 meters.  Asad reversed and contradicted all Syrian moves at Shepherdstown, refused to engage, and was uninterested in a deal. 
 
That evening, the White House Press Secretary, Joe Lockhart announced, "I think, as far as any resumption of talks, it's impossible to predict when those talks might resume.  Again, there are significant differences and I don't believe that from the position of the United States we believe that it would be productive for those to resume now...it is not worthwhile to have meetings for [the sake of having meetings] meetings' sake."[277]  Two days later, in Clinton's first public comment on Syria, Asad, and the process, he said "The ball is in his court now."[278]  On 28 March, Barak declared that Asad was not ready for peace,[279] and in an early surprise, he withdrew all Israeli troops from Lebanon on 24 May.  Hafiz al-Asad died shortly thereafter on 10 June 2000.
 
In looking back on the 1999-2000 window, Ambassador Martin Indyk recalled that it was the first time Asad ever said he wanted to move quickly but instead, Ross and others concentrated too heavily on procedures rather than sprinting for the finish line.  Arafat, who Indyk referred to as "the artful dodger," would never make the transition from revolutionary to statesman so focusing on the Palestinians after Geneva was a mistake.  He believes that too many in the Clinton administration and the peace team "were overly concerned with their legacy.  The real tragedy was that Clinton let Syria go after Geneva instead of pressing ahead and trying to solidify the deal.  It was truly a missed opportunity."[280] 
 
 
[220] ---. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 241; Rabinovich. Waging Peace. p. 126.
[221] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 521.
[222] Haberman, Clyde. "Dennis Ross's Exit Interview." The New York Times 25 March 2001.
[223] Albright, Madeleine Korbel. Madam Secretary. New York: Miramax Books, 2003. p. 602.
[224] Seale, Patrick. "Assad and Barak Prepare to Negotiate." Mideast Mirror 23 June 1999, Vol. 12, No. 118 ed., sec. Syria, Israel.;  Al-Hayat 23 June 1999.
[225] Indyk. "Camp David in the Context of U.S. Mideast Peace Strategy." p. 25.
[226] Baker, and DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy. p. 454.
[227] Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 604; Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 536-37.
[228] Indyk. "Camp David in the Context of U.S. Mideast Peace Strategy."  p. 25.
[229] "Press Conference by the President." Dean Acheson Auditorium, The State Department, Washington D.C.: The White House:  Office of the Press Secretary, 8 December 1999.  Available at: http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/12/1999-12-08-press-conference-by-the-
president.html Accessed on: 31 October 2007.
[230] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 572.
[231] ---. The Missing Peace. pp. 538-40; Clinton. My Life. p. 885; For Barak's precarious domestic situation, See: Orme Jr., William A. "Israel Lawmakers Closely Approve Talks with Syria." The New York Times 14 December 1999.
[232] "Remarks by President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak of Israel and Foreign Minister Al-Shara of Syria." The Rose Garden: The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 15 December 1999. Available at: http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/12/1999-12-15-remarks-by-president-
pm-barak-and-foreign-minister-al-shara.html Accessed on: 31 October 2007; Clinton, Bill, Ehud Barak, and Faruq al-Shara'. "Documents and Source Material: Opening Statements at Israeli-Syrian Peace Negotiations, Washington, 15 December 1999." Journal of Palestine Studies 29.3 (2000): 141-43.
[233] Clinton. My Life. p. 885; Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 542-43; Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 605; Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 242.
[234] Clinton. My Life. p. 885; Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 542-43; Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 605.
[235] Clinton. My Life. p. 884; Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 532-34; Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 604.
[236] Barak's domestic concerns were roughly the same but more pronounced when the Camp David summit in July 2000 convened with Clinton, Arafat, and Barak, pointing to the proverbial phrase: "Be careful what you wish for" if you're wishing for a summit.
[237] A Gallup poll revealed a 46-46 per cent split over "complete withdrawal" with 8 per cent undecided, See: Ma'ariv 10 December 1999.; The fact that in the 7 December 1999 meeting between the U.S. peace team and Asad in Damascus resulted in talks beginning without an Israeli pledge for a full withdrawal was doubted by the majority of Israelis in a Geocartographia poll where 62.5 per cent of Israelis didn't believe Israel promised additional territorial concessions in order to begin negotiations, See: Hazofe 16 December 1999.; An estimated 75 per cent of settlers on the Golan opposed withdrawal - and the majority of settlers were not religious or right-wing ideologues but the Labor party faithful. 
[238] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 539.
[239] Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 244.
[240] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 553-54.
[241] ---. The Missing Peace. pp. 554-55.
[242] Haaretz 6 January 2000.
[243] Clinton. My Life. p. 886-87; Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 560-61.
[244] Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 608.
[245] Rubin, James P. "Press Briefing, Israel-Syria Talks." Shepherd College, Shepherdstown, West Virginia: Department of State, 10 January 2000. Available at: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/000110asb_va_peace.html Accessed on: 31 October 2007.
[246] Clinton. My Life. pp. 886-87.
[247] Malley, Robert. Middle East Endgame 3: Israel, Syria, and Lebanon - How Comprehensive Peace Settlements Would Look. Amman/Washington/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 16 July 2002. p. 4.
[248] Agha, Hussein, and Robert Malley. "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors." The New York Review of Books 48.13 (2001).
[249] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 562.
[250] Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 243.
[251] Rabinovich. Waging Peace. p. 133; Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 561.
[252] Miller, Aaron David. "The Effects of the 'Syria First' Strategy."  The Camp David Summit - What Went Wrong?: Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians Analyze the Failure of the Boldest Attempt Ever to Resolve the Palestinian-Israeli Question. Eds. Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. 93-99.  p. 95; Miller, Aaron David. "The Pursuit of Arab-Israeli Peace 1993-2000: Where Did the U.S. Go Wrong?" Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2004.
[253] Barak, Ehud. "The Myths Spread About Camp David Are Baseless."  The Camp David Summit - What Went Wrong?: Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians Analyze the Failure of the Boldest Attempt Ever to Resolve the Palestinian-Israeli Question. Eds. Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. 117-47.  pp. 132-33.
[254] Clinton. My Life. p. 887.
[255] Albright. Madam Secretary. p. 608.
[256] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 564.
[257] Eldar, Akiva. "The Draft Peace Treaty Presented by the Clinton Administration to Jerusalem and Damascus." Haaretz 13 January 2000.  Available at: http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%
20the%20Peace%20Process/Ha-aretz%20Daily%20publishes%20US
%20Document-%20A%20Framework Accessed on: 29 October 2007; Also See: "Documents and Source Material: 'Clinton Administration, a Framework for Peace between Israel and Syria, Washington, 7 January 2000'." Journal of Palestine Studies 29.3 (2000): 157-60.
[258] Rubin. "Press Briefing, Israel-Syria Talks." Available at: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/000110asb_va_peace.html Accessed on: 31 October 2007.
[259] Al-Safir 15 January 2000.; Al-Hayat 16 January 2000.
[260] Zisser. "The Israel-Syria Negotiations - What Went Wrong?"
[261] For an in-depth analysis of the draft leaked to Haaretz, including a comparison to previous Israeli agreements with Egypt and Jordan, See: Satloff, Robert, and Patrick Clawson. "The U.S. Draft Treaty for Syria-Israeli Peace: A Textual Analysis." PeaceWatch No. 242. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 14 January 2000. Available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1933 Accessed on: 2 November 2007;  For an analysis of the leaked draft in Al-Safir, See: Satloff, Robert. "Syria's Critique of the U.S. Draft Treaty: A Textual Analysis." PeaceWatch No. 243. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 January 2000. Available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1934 Accessed on: 2 November 2007.
[262] Sontag, Deborah. "Barak Says Talks with Syria Have Reached Critical Juncture." The New York Times 12 January 2000.
[263] Hockstader, Lee. "Golan Residents Enlisting Allies." The Washington Post 11 January 2000, sec. A: 1.
[264] Zisser. "The Israel-Syria Negotiations - What Went Wrong?" p. 244.; Oz, Amos. Haaretz 17 March 2000.
[265] Oz, Amos. "It's Assad's Move." Jerusalem Post 14 January 2000: A1.
[266] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 571.
[267] Perlez, Jane. "Clinton's Effort Fails to Get Syria to Resume Talks." The New York Times 27 March 2000, sec. A: 1.
[268] 'Ursan, 'Uqla. "Bidun Musafaha (without Shaking Hands)." Al-Usbu' al-Adabi 18 December 1999.; Rabinovich. Waging Peace. pp. 135-36; Zisser. "The Israel-Syria Negotiations - What Went Wrong?" p. 245.
[269] Seale, Patrick. "Documents and Source Material. 'Obituary of the Syrian Track'." Journal of Palestine Studies 29.4 (2000): 153-56. p. 155; Zacharia, Janine, and Danna Harman. "Syria Puts Talks on Hold." Jerusalem Post 18 January 2000, Daily ed., sec. News: 1.
[270] Clinton. My Life. p. 887.
[271] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 567-68.
[272] "Daily Report: Near East & South Asia." Foreign Broadcast Information Service 12 February 2000, sec. NES-2000-0216.; For the Arabic version of the speech, See: Al-Usbu' al-Adabi 12 February 2000. Available at: http://www.awu-dam.com; For a deeper analysis of al-Shar's speech, See: Rubin, Barry. "Understanding Syrian Policy: An Analysis of Foreign Minister Faruq Al-Shara's Explanation." Middle East Review of International Affairs 4.2 (2000): 14-37.; Rabinovich. Waging Peace. pp. 135-38; Zisser. "The Israel-Syria Negotiations - What Went Wrong?" pp. 245-47.; Rabinovich, Itamar. Haartez 18 February 2000.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 572-87; Malley. Middle East Endgame 3: Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. p. 5; Clinton. My Life. p. 903; Seale. "Obituary of the Syrian Track." p. 155.
[275] Indyk. "Camp David in the Context of U.S. Mideast Peace Strategy." p. 26.
[276] Clinton. My Life. pp. 903-04; Albright. Madam Secretary. pp. 611-12; Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 583-87; Malley. Middle East Endgame 3: Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. p. 5; Seale. "Obituary of the Syrian Track." p. 155.
[277] Lockhart, Joel. "Press Briefing Following President Clinton and President Assad Meeting." President Wilson Hotel, Geneva, Switzerland: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 26 March 2000.; Perlez. "Clinton's Effort Fails to Get Syria to Resume Talks."
[278] Perlez, Jane. "Clinton Says Next Move for Peace Is Assad's." The New York Times 29 March 2000.
[279] "Barak: Assad Not Ready for Peace." Jerusalem Post 28 March 2000.
[280] Brodsky, Matthew RJ. "Author's Interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk." Washington D.C., 7 September 2007.