From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
During the three years of Netanyahu's prime ministership, the peace process with Syria was publicly put on ice. Without the process, Asad was unable to pursue any possible benefits from a relationship with Washington. At the same time, he learned that no cost was attached to maintaining the status quo. With neither carrots nor sticks being offered by the West, Syria had more freedom to act in the region. The saber rattling between Syria and Israel, and Syria and Turkey in 1996 and 1998, also affected Syria's decision to look for another defensive axis aside from the largely symbolic Damascus Declaration states (Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). Syria enhanced their relations with Iran and began a slow path of rapprochement with Iraq. With the peace process stalled, Asad was able to exercise more influence in blocking the Arab world from enhancing their economic relations with Israel, thereby freezing the process of normalization.
New Points of Departure
Upon winning the election, Netanyahu told the American peace team that he would not endorse the Pocket and announced that he was not committed to any understanding reached between the two countries, except for written agreements. The Labor party endorsed this position because the Pocket was only a verbal understanding deposited with the Americans. The U.S. agreed that Netanyahu did not need to endorse it but were aware that it would make the Syrian track nearly impossible to continue. Thus, the U.S. developed the phrase that would be frequently repeated on all bilateral tracks: "Nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon."
Israel's change in tone and focus was clear and consistent. In a newspaper interview a few days after the election with Israel's daily, Yediot Aharonot, Netanyahu's political strategist and advisor, Dore Gold explained:
When we achieved peace with Egypt, it was done without gunfire or terrorism. Such was also the case with Jordan. What has happened with the Syrians? We negotiated, and they used Hizballah against IDF soldiers in the security zone. We became caught in a situation, like with the Palestinians, which required us to tolerate negotiations accompanied by terrorism, and Israel cannot accept such rules of the game... We must enter into negotiations with the Syrians without any pre-conditions... In addition, I believe that the optimal line for defense is the current one, the ridge line on the Golan Heights... One of the things that Netanyahu referred to was the need to put political pressure on Syria... we must make Assad choose: If you want a peace process and progress toward peace, then terrorism is not an option for you.[200]
Netanyahu reaffirmed his thinking on CNN's "Larry King Live:"
[Syria must] cease and desist the proxy war of terrorism that they're launching against us through Hezbollah and through Palestinian groups. I think that is something that has to end. You know, terrorism can't be used as a tool, or even violent attacks, military attacks. Suppose two countries are talking in peace negotiations and one uses military attacks or terrorist attacks against the other concurrent with the peace talks. Well something is wrong; it doesn't work that way. You really have to make a decision on which side of the line you're on... The first order is to achieve tranquility, to pacify the borders, to pacify or stop the inflammation of terrorism and terrorist attacks from the Syrian-controlled areas against us in Lebanon and elsewhere. And this is something that I think would be conducive to peace and to a building of trust between Israel and Syria. I think one of the things that we need to do is create trust where no trust exists. And the way you do that is by a gradual in fact a quick, a rapid cessation of hostilities. That usually precedes all successful negotiations.[201]
Netanyahu solidified his position during a joint press conference with Clinton a few days later:
I have said that I'm prepared to negotiate with President Assad of Syria on peace. And I can tell you that the first item on my agenda would be the cessation of all terrorist attacks from Syrian-controlled areas in Lebanon, via Hezbollah, or, for that matter, other terrorist attacks from groups based in Syria. And I think it's only right. I think that it's peculiar to have peace talks that are progressing while you have a terror campaign parallel to it. The cessation of hostilities usually precedes all peace negotiations. In fact, I'm hard-pressed to find exceptions in modern history. And if there are exceptions, we shouldn't follow the exception; we should follow the rule... But the important question for me is not whether we place preconditions but whether others try to place conditions, prior conditions on us, and that is something that has to be reciprocal, there has to be reciprocity here. We don't expect the other side to conform to our vision of a final settlement and they shouldn't ask us to be coerced to accept theirs. That's what the whole negotiation is for.[202]
Dore Gold also reflected Israel's decision to concentrate on security over normalization and pointed out what should have been obvious during Peres' prime ministership: "I have always said that the quality of peace between Israel and the Arab states will not transcend the quality of peace among the Arabs themselves."[203]
Netanyahu based his policy on the peace process on a working paper developed by Dore Gold and Avraham Tamir, in consultation with Arab academics. Netanyahu read the paper before the elections when it was to be a monograph published by the Center of Strategic Studies. When he won the elections and brought Gold to the Prime Minister's Office, it became the basis for the political process instead. Among the many changes in Israel's approach, it sought to remove the Lebanon card from Syria's pocket and develop a "Lebanon-first" strategy. According to Tamir, Netanyahu's offer to Syria would be the following:
- The IDF leaves Lebanon, with security arrangement guarantees by the Syrians. Israel withdraws from Lebanon militarily and politically, and tells Asad that Lebanon is his.
- Israel accepts the formula that peace in Lebanon and comprehensive peace throughout the region is conditional upon comprehensive peace with Syria.
- Israel is prepared to discuss the future of the Golan at the Wye Plantation. The Golan is open to negotiation.
- Israel asks Syria to expand the basis of the Wye Plantation talks to include regional meetings, sub-committee working groups, and mechanisms to address everyone's immediate interests.[204]
Gold called for the creation of several working groups (security, communications, economic, water, energy, etc.). The security group would remain separate from any parallel discussions with Syria at the Wye Plantation. Therefore, any crisis that might develop in the talks would not lead to a deterioration into violence. The communications group would provide for advance notification of military maneuvers involving anything larger than a brigade. Once the system would be operational, they would discuss CBMs. The plan contained no signs of normalization, preferring instead to concentrate on security, reflecting a carrot-and-stick approach to Syria. It was based on the premise that Israel would eventually agree to a territorial compromise on the Golan Heights, without reaffirming the Pocket or accepting the formula of "full withdrawal for full peace." Netanyahu referred to it as a new prototype for dealing with the peace process: "Only one prototype was tried during the Rabin-Peres era: giving territory in return for normalization. And nothing came out of it." Now he would try a new prototype.[205]
Asad accepted none of the above and called for negotiations to begin where they were suspended. He further sought to remove the Israeli deposit from America's pocket and place it in his own. The first public manifestation of treating the Pocket as a direct Israeli commitment to Syria came in Asad's September interview with Rowland Evans on CNN:
Those talks were not easy. They involved great efforts by the Arab and Israeli parties and the United States. Great efforts were exerted, and then progress made and achievements accomplished which turned into commitments by the parties and rights for them. Within the framework of those commitments, agreement [(ittifaq)] was reached between Syria and Israel on the Israelis' withdrawal from the Golan up to the 4 June 1967 line... It goes without saying that the present Israeli government has to abide by an agreement reached by the former Israeli government, which was a legitimate government, and so according to our considerations, it represented Israel...the new Israeli prime minister appeared to be obliterating all those principles and eliminating all efforts, commitments, and rights. Thus, he canceled the peace process entirely. Therefore, talks can only be resumed once he makes up his mind on the peace strategy and responds to its requirements.[206]
The United States and Israel disagreed. Syria did not have an agreement or commitment from Israel on the 1967 line;[207] however, from this point forward Syria treated it as such in all subsequent negotiations and interviews at home and abroad. In response to Linda Butler's question whether Israel had agreed to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines as a formal commitment, Mu'allim responded, "It was. When you are in official talks, commitments are formal. When Prime Minister Rabin committed himself to withdrawal, he was representing Israel, not himself personally. After Rabin was assassinated, Peres informed us in November through the Americans that he wanted to continue the talks, and he repeated the commitment."[208] More sinister intentions were attributed to Rabin and Rabinovich in Patrick Seale's article, "Who is Telling the Truth?" Half of his 12-page article is devoted to making the Pocket a commitment. Under two subheadings, "The Commitment to Full Withdrawal," and "The Commitment to Withdraw to the 4 June Lines", he concluded that "Rabin confirmed his commitment to full withdrawal" but that it was only because he wanted "to engage Asad just enough to blunt his attack" on other bilateral peace tracks and that Israel would not offer Asad a deal that he could accept.[209]
Asad's decision to heavily invest in publicly changing the facts represented his desire to resume peace talks with an advantage and a need to explain domestically what he had accomplished in four years of negotiations. While having fed the Syrian public for years with stories of Sadat, Arafat, and King Husayn's failures, the unavoidable fact was that all three had produced results and gained land from Israel. Asad produced nothing in four years and may well have needed to show he had at least produced a "commitment" for all of his efforts. The stalemate that endured in the Syrian-Israeli track was a result of Syria's demand that talks must resume from the point at which they were left and Israel's requirement that talks commence without preconditions. The elections in the United States and Clinton's second term magnified the impact of the impasse.
The U.S. was able to sustain several bilateral peace tracks in the Middle East with minimal investment and risk during Clinton's first term - especially when compared to the price of intervention in Somalia and Bosnia. The Middle East required a much heavier investment during Clinton's second term, not to secure fantastic achievements, but to prevent a collapse of the process and the dangers it would entail.
The U.S. Defense Department issued three criteria for determining whether a foreign danger affects vital U.S. interests:
- if it threatens the survival of the United States or its key allies
- if it threatens critical U.S. economic interests
- if it poses the danger of a future nuclear threat
The report concluded that "Nowhere are these criteria met more clearly than in the Middle East."[210]
Clinton's selection of Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State to replace Warren Christopher also reflected the new American focus in the region. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process took precedence over their previous Syria-first strategy during Netanyahu's prime ministership. As such, America's role went from mediator and facilitator, to broker during Clinton's second term.[211]
The Palestinian-Israeli Hebron Protocol and the promotion of the Palestinian effort at the expense of the Syrians also had immediate repercussions for Asad's actions in the region. Foreign Minister al-Shar' and Vice President Khaddam shuttled around the Gulf States and Egypt beginning on 2 February 1997 in order consolidate support for reviving the Syrian-Lebanese-Israeli peace process and rollback the process of normalization with Israel. This met with a high degree of success, at least on a rhetorical level. The Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership pushed Syria closer to Iran and Iraq and expedited their efforts to convince the Arab world that the Israeli alliance was the gravest threat facing the region. This effort led Seale to declare in 1997 that Syrian-Iranian relations were heading towards a "defense pact." With Syria's relations with Washington on the backburner, Asad made his first trip to Tehran since 1990, before the Madrid Conference.[212]
The Lauder-Roth-Nader Channel and its Implications
While very little publicly occurred on the Syrian-Israeli track, it later came to light that in August and September 1998, an intensive and unofficial back channel was established with Asad. It came at the behest of Netanyahu. His friend, Ron Lauder, a New York businessman, and former Reagan administration ambassador to Vienna and his aide Allen Roth forwarded Israeli ideas to Asad. George Nader, the publisher of the Washington-based Middle East Insight, presented Syria's views. The Israeli team included Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, Diplomatic Advisor Uzi Arad, and Cabinet Secretary Danny Naveh.[213] Syria was (un)officially represented by Faruq al-Shar' and Walid Mu'allim. Some reports include the foreign minister of Oman, Yusuf bin 'Alawi, and the European Union's Middle East envoy, Miguel Moratinos, as participants.[214] The U.S. government was unaware of these talks until the Netanyahu-Barak elections in 1999. Exactly what happened, what offers were made, what agreements were reached, and its authenticity was contested on all fronts, especially within the Israeli political establishment. Its implications, however, were important.
It wasn't until 13 April 2001 that Yediot Aharonot published a photograph of a complete draft called, "Treaty of Peace Between Israel and Syria."[215] It was a 10-point document with sections in English and Hebrew carried by Ronald Lauder from Netanyahu to Asad. It was dated 29 August 1998 and contained a handwritten note that it was given to President Clinton on 17 November 1998.
The document said Israel would withdraw from Syrian lands taken in 1967, in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 "to a commonly agreed border based on the international line of 1923." The withdrawal would occur in three stages over a period 16-24 months. It called for simultaneous settlements with Syria and Lebanon. In the security section, it stated that the (soon-to-be ) agreed security arrangements would be mutual and reciprocal but "taking into account geographic differences." Moreover, "observation and warning stations will remain on the Golan. In accordance with the development of relations between the Parties, Israeli presence will be integrated into a multi-national observation center, with observers from Syria, France, and the U.S.A...The peace will include full normalization of relations, mutual recognition, the opening of embassies and economic relations..."[216]
A few things are striking. First, the document called for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights consistent with 242 and recognized the land-for-peace formula, however the border was to be based on the international border of 1923 - which put the Sea of Galilee outside of Syria's grasp, pending border adjustments. This meant Netanyahu agreed to a full withdrawal as it applied to Egypt. The second significant point was that Israel would be a part of an early warning station, with Syria, France, and the U.S. that would remain on the Golan atop the 9,000-foot Mount Hermon.
In the ensuing debate, before it became public, Asad turned down any Israeli presence at the station on Mount Hermon but agreed to a French and American presence. He also did not agree to a border based on 1923 instead of 1967. The Israeli press reported that when Asad asked Netanyahu to demarcate the border as he saw it, Netanyahu balked. His defense minister, Mordechai and later Sharon were opposed to demarcating the border because it would create a commitment in writing with a starting point that Rabin and Peres left as a hazy proposition to be determined later based on 1967. Therefore, Netanyahu was not too different from his predecessors when it came to trading the Golan. The exception was that he succeeded in establishing a back channel to Asad. When this episode came to light, Netanyahu was quick to deny most; Asad denied everything; and Mordechai who ran for Israeli elections in another party made sure that all knew his versions of events, which was that Netanyahu was willing to sellout Israeli security needs in an agreement with Syria.
While this episode may seem trivial, it affected Barak's thinking after he defeated Netanyahu in the May 1999 elections. Upon Barak's victory, the United States again sought to gain his commitment to the American Pocket, but Barak declined because he had received convincing information that Asad would settle for less than the 1967 line. That information turned out to be Lauder's 10-points, which Lauder insisted was mostly agreed to by Asad. In fact, Lauder claimed that the only problem Asad had was an Israeli presence in an early warning station on Mount Hermon. Barak called Clinton and asked him to validate it with Asad, who acknowledged having met with Lauder a number of times but claimed to know nothing about the 10-point paper. Asad said the channel had been unsuccessful and therefore he ended it.[217]
After a negotiating stalemate in September 1999, Ross brought out Lauder's 10-point plan and showed it to Riad Daoudi, the Syrian lawyer who was also present at the Wye discussions. Ross hoped they could negotiate over the document in lieu of Barak's hesitation to endorse the Pocket. Ross recalled: "Daoudi looked over the Lauder points, clearly impressed with the President's notes in the margin. But he said, 'Dennis [Ross], I have seen these points; we spent thirteen hours going over them and drafting comments, and they don't reflect any of our comments. This is the first draft given to us, not the final version' - in which he knew they [the Syrians] had insisted on the June 4 lines replacing the 1923 lines." Later in September, Lauder sent Clinton "a clarifying letter." It had eight points rather than 10 and Lauder claimed it represented the final points agreed upon. The reference to the 1923 borderline was gone, replaced by "withdrawal to a commonly agreed border based on the 4 June 1967 lines; the section where Syria assumed responsibility for preventing attack from Lebanon was gone; gone were the references to different zones of armaments on the Syrian side replaced by more general phases; gone was any mention of an Israeli presence in an early warning station.[218] Faruq al-Shar' was shown the 8-point document and confirmed that it was acceptable to Syria - but this new plan was unacceptable to Barak.
Several things are interesting in this story. Firstly, it would appear that Netanyahu wanted to maintain his plausible deniability and called his friend, Lauder and asked him only to present the original Israeli draft to Barak and Clinton. Therefore, Barak's starting point for negotiations with Asad and the basis for what he thought was achievable turned out to be faulty. In the words of his foreign minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, Barak "embarked on his Syrian voyage armed with wrong assumptions."[219] Secondly, despite Netanyahu's previous bravado during his prime ministership of being unwilling to concede all or most of the Golan, he actually not only secretly endorsed the Pocket but also had his back channel put it in writing - a first in the negotiations. Indeed, the contents of the 8-points demonstrate that Netanyahu was willing to concede more than any of his predecessors. Conversely, Barak, by not endorsing the Pocket from the outset and not endorsing the 8-point plan was offering Asad less than he was already offered. Thirdly, throughout the previous negotiations, Asad had refused to create a back channel to Israel to test ideas and he continued to deride Netanyahu in his media and call for the resumption of the negotiations from the point they left off with Israel's "commitment" to the 4 June lines. Nevertheless, by 1998 he decided that he wanted to continue the process and worked with a back channel, which at the same time provided him with no benefit from the U.S. because the channel was kept secret from the American peace team. Fourth, no matter how bizarre, confused, and controversial the Lauder episode was, it remains as close to an agreement as any other effort.
[200] Peri, Semadar. "Dr. Dore Gold, Netanyahu Political Advisor: 'There Will Be a Joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Solution in Judea and Samaria." Yediot Aharonot 4 June 1996: 2-4.
[201] "Interview with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu." CNN Larry King Live 3 July 1996.
[202] "President Clinton News Conference with Prime Minister Netanyahu." The White House: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 July 1996.
[203] Peri. "Interview with Dore Gold in Yediot Aharonot."
[204] Levitzky, Naomi. "Netanyahu's Syrian Paper." Yediot Aharonot 16 August 1996, sec. Weekend Supplement: 6-7.
[205] Levitzky. "Netanyahu's Syrian Paper."
[206] al-Asad, Evans, and Novak. "Documents and Source Material: Hafiz Al-Asad Interview on C.N.N.'S Evans & Novak 25 September 1996 ".; Also See: Tishrin 29 September 1996.; Zisser. "Syria in M.E.C.S. 1996." p. 666; "Syrian Leader Claims Accord Reached on Golan Heights: Assad Talks to C.N.N. In Rare U.S. Media Appearance." CNN 26 September 1996, sec. World News Story Page. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9609/26/assad.interview/index.html Accessed on: 28 October 2007.
[207] Clinton. My Life. p. 883.
[208] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 82.
[209] Seale. "Who Is Telling the Truth?"
[210] "United States Security Strategy for the Middle East." Department of Defense: Office of International Security Affairs, May 1995. p. 5.
[211] Freedman, Robert O. "U.S. Policy Towards the Middle East in Clinton's Second Term." Middle East Review of International Affairs 3.1 (1999): 55-79.; Lieber, Robert J. "U.S. Middle East Policy in the Clinton Second Term." Middle East Review of International Affairs 1.1 (1997).; Rubin, Barry. "The Politics of the New Middle East." Middle East Review of International Affairs 1.3 (1997).; Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. pp. 258-62.
[212] Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. "Inter-Arab Relations." Middle East Contemporary Survey XXI (1997). pp. 114-27.
[213] Pipes, Daniel. "The Road to Damascus: What Netanyahu Almost Gave Away." New Republic 5 July 1999. Available at: http://www.danielpipes.org/pf.php?id=311 Accessed on: 28 October 2007.
[214] Zisser. "The Israel-Syria Negotiations - What Went Wrong?" p. 230.
[215] "Treaty of Peace between Israel and Syria." Yediot Aharonot 13 April 2001. For a full English version See: "Netanyahu's Proposed Israel-Syria Peace Treaty." Independent Media Review Analysis 14 April 2001. Available at: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=6061 Accessed on: 28 October 2007.
[216] "Treaty of Peace between Israel and Syria."; "Netanyahu's Proposed Israel-Syria Peace Treaty."; Pipes. "What Netanyahu Almost Gave Away."; Rabinovich. Waging Peace. p. 128.
[217] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 510-15.
[218] ---. The Missing Peace. pp. 519-528.
[219] Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 242.