From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
Little progress was achieved in the "ambassador's channel" in Maryland that began on 29 July. During these informal meetings away from the State Department and the media, Ambassadors Rabinovich and Mu'allim met together and separately with Ross, Indyk, and later Mark Parris. Syria agreed to allow Israel one year to withdraw - up from their previous demand of six months. In August, Rabin agreed that the timetable for withdrawal could be less than five years and took Barak's four categories of territory in relation to military force deployment off the table.
The two main issues discussed in the ambassador's channel in Maryland was the extent of normalization and security arrangements. If Israel received more assurances on the depth of normalization, they would require less in terms of security arrangements. Syria did not commit to the kind of relations that would have helped Rabin convince the Israeli public that withdrawing from the Golan would prove beneficial. Asad maintained that the security arrangement must be on "equal footing" with both sides mirroring the other in DMZs and force deployment. Mu'allim argued that Damascus was closer to the border than Tel Aviv and therefore, zones of limited deployment were far more threatening to Syria than to Israel. With the focus shifting to security arrangements, Rabinovich suggested meetings between the military leaders but Asad rejected this.
By October, the process again ground to a halt. It was decided that while Clinton was in the Middle East for the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement, he would meet with Rabin and then travel to Damascus to meet with Asad. Clinton hoped that seeing Asad in Damascus would enable him to press the Syrian leader for a move either on substance or procedure given his desire for closer relations with Washington.
Public Diplomacy Before the Asad-Clinton Meeting
In preparation for what was hoped to be new and significant progress, Rabin began to prepare the public for concessions. Syria reciprocated with an effort seen as revolutionary by Syrian standards and insignificant in the eyes of the Israeli public.
Rabin addressed the Knesset on 3 October 1994 and made several points:
We did not climb the Golan Heights and occupy it during the Six Day War so that these scenes [of Israeli suffering under Syrian shelling from the Golan] will return, and no power in the world will move us even a single centimeter on the Golan if no full and true peace - a peace with perfect security arrangements and, yes, a peace of the brave - is established between Israel and Syria...for 27 years we held our political and security views and did not change them because the world and the Arab states had not changed, but one would have to be an ostrich not to notice that the world, including some Arab states has changed in recent years... In recent weeks, we have observed several signs pointing to Syria's willingness to partake in the peace journey...we will not return to those days when the motto was that we had nobody to talk to...my statement to the Golan people today: I accompanied you for a whole generation...and was a loyal party to your path...my opinion today, is that many security risks are involved in any territorial concession to Syria...but we will not sign any peace agreement with Damascus if we are not convinced that security - the maximum achievable security is guaranteed us.... My supreme duty as Prime Minister, our duty as a government vis-à-vis the Israeli people, is to choose every option for peace...now, for the first time since establishment of the State of Israel, there is a chance for peace with Syria. Peace with Syria is, to a large extent, the key to peace in the region...If going for peace is a change in position, then I have changed my position.[113]
Rabin went on to explain America's role in the negotiations and detailed his vision of the four components or legs to an Israeli-Syrian peace: 1) Borders; 2) Timetable; 3) Normalization; and 4) Security. He also committed that "We will not sign a peace treaty with Syria before asking for the nation's opinion in a national referendum."
Asad demonstrated his vision of normalization and peace a few weeks earlier in his address to the newly elected Peoples' Assembly on 10 September. He reaffirmed that Syria had made the "strategic choice" for peace and that "although no real progress has been made since the process started, there is still hope for peace." Regarding normalization and security arrangements, he called on Israel "not to ascribe too much to the peace process, nor force into it what is outside its framework...Peace has its own particular demands, which are not outside [the process] and we will meet those particular demands to which it has agreed."[114] This was in reference to CBMs and the definition of peace.
On 19 September, Ross and Indyk returned to Damascus. There were wall posters throughout the city with messages such as "We have fought to achieve peace" and "Peace is a lofty aim." This was another step toward preparing the Syrian public for peace.[115] The Israeli press, however, was quick to point out that "Israel" was not mentioned in any of the posters.[116] Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' also made some gestures. In early September during a visit to Britain, he said that a meeting between Rabin and Asad was inevitable, but then hastened to add only after the peace process in concluded. He also said that Syria intended to establish a warm peace with Israel, but that it would be the people in the region and their perceptions of the peace that would determine the level of warmth, not the governments.[117]
It was significant that when al-Shar' was in Washington on 7 October he granted the first interview ever to an Israeli television correspondent. He again demanded complete Israeli withdrawal and said if it were met, the rest would follow.[118] His tone was flat and without conviction but the fact that the interview occurred at all should be seen as a small step forward. Israel, however, was accustomed to grand gestures such as Sadat's journey, and personal meetings such as those between Rabin and Arafat, and Rabin and King Husayn. The Israeli public was underwhelmed. Haaretz articles greeted the interview with the headlines: "The Interview that Missed Out" and "Poor Man's Anwar Sadat." [119] Syria stood in stark contrast to the moves others in the region were making such as the Gulf States announcing the lifting of the of the Secondary and Tertiary Economic Boycotts on 30 September and embarking on the path of normalization.
The Asad-Clinton Damascus Meeting, Terrorism, and the Press Conference
Clinton's decision to visit Asad in Damascus was controversial in the United States and Israel. He wanted to assure Asad that he was still committed to a Syrian-Israeli peace based on 242 and reiterate that if an agreement was reached, he would work hard to improve their bilateral relationship. This was in keeping with Clinton's decision to meet Asad in Geneva earlier in the year which was largely in order to placate Asad over the Oslo process and to reassure him that the U.S. would continue to pressure Israel to engage with Syria - the cornerstone of Clinton's first-term Middle East peace agenda. Nevertheless, this meeting marked the first visit to Damascus by a sitting U.S. president since Nixon 20 years earlier after the 1974 disengagement was signed.
Aside from Clinton's peace team, most of his aids thought the trip was risky. Syria remained on the U.S. State Department's list of terrorist supporting states. Furthermore, this meeting was not to seal something or cash in a promise that he or the American delegation had received from Asad. It was providing Syria with a carrot while Asad continued to publicly attack the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement as "blasphemy."[120] Clinton recalled, "I took some heat for going to Syria because of its support for Hezbollah and other violent anti-Israeli groups, but I knew there would never be security and stability in the region unless Syria and Israel were reconciled."[121]
The political risk involved in the Damascus meeting increased eight days before the American delegation left for Israel. A suicide bomber struck a bus in Tel Aviv killing 22 Israelis, one Dutch citizen, and wounding 48. Ross and Indyk made sure Mu'allim understood that Clinton would not stand next to Asad in a press conference a week after the attack without Asad publicly condemning terrorism. The public payoff for Clinton's visit to Damascus was to be Asad's condemnation of terrorism against Israelis for the first time. Mu'allim and Ross developed the language Asad would use in the press conference after the presidential meeting: "I condemn the killing of civilians whether in Beirut, Ramallah, or Tel Aviv."[122] This was to be Asad's response when Rita Braver of CBS News posed a scripted question.
In the prepared statements read at the press conference, Asad said that he "stressed to President Clinton the readiness of Syria to commit itself to the objective requirements of peace through the establishment of peaceful, normal relations with Israel in return for Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan to the line of 4 June 1967 and from the south of Lebanon." Capitalizing on his public opportunity to woo the American people and strengthen his relationship with Clinton, Asad closed by saying, "Finally, I would like to convey greetings to the American people through President Clinton and to thank President Clinton for his personal efforts and the efforts of his aids."[123]
Clinton said during his statement, "The murderous acts of terror we have witnessed over the past few weeks have two targets: first, innocent people, who have been killed and wounded; and second, the very peace that President Asad supports. All who work for peace must condemn these terrorists' acts. President Asad and I agree that the peace process allows no place for the killing of innocent civilians." However, rather than condemning terrorism when the question from CBS was finally posed to Asad, he explained at length that Israel's policies were to blame, prompting Clinton to begin his following answer with, "Well, in light of those comments, let me make two points..."[124] Clinton went on to say that they both understood that terrorism was inconsistent with peace and served to undermine any agreement. In lieu of Asad's silence, he explained that the Syrian leader "repeatedly said to me in our meeting today that he thought that [terrorism] was wrong as well wherever it occurred, whether in the bus incident or in Hebron."[125]
Ross recalled:
This was a disaster. Here was the President of the United States standing next to the President of Syria one week after a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, and Asad was blaming Israel for acts of terror. There wasn't a new day; just a repetition of Arab hostility toward Israel... I was livid - and so was Secretary Christopher. What was the point of having an agreement, I asked [Faruq al-Shar'], if President Asad was free to ignore it?... Christopher urged Asad to make amends to President Clinton, but there was little prospect of that.[126]
Rabinovich thought, "It may have been a deliberate snub or it may have been a genuine misunderstanding, but Clinton left Damascus angry." The lesson he drew was that "whatever we wanted to achieve by way of public diplomacy and confidence-building measures, the Western media were the wrong arena for Asad and his entourage."[127]
Clinton conceded that his meeting with Asad before the press conference "produced no big breakthrough," although he could see that Asad was dedicated to making peace "but when I suggested that he ought to go to Israel, reach out to the Israeli citizens, and make his case in the Knesset as Anwar Sadat had done, I could tell I was beating a dead horse."[128] That Clinton thought such a move by Asad was possible reflected a serious miscalculation on his part over what Asad was prepared to do for peace. As far as substance, Asad only made two moves. He agreed to increase the timeframe for Israel's withdrawal from 12 to 16 months and agreed to some form of diplomatic recognition within three months of the completion of the withdrawal. It was a cheap prize given the stakes involved in the visit. As a result, more than five years passed before Clinton met with Asad again.
In December, Ross was able to convince Asad of the necessity of sending a senior military officer to meet with IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak (later replaced by Amnon Shahak). Security was the main issue on the agenda and Asad responded by sending his military chief of staff, Hikmat Shihabi. This represented Syria's most significant procedural step since the start of the Madrid process. Shihabi was part of the elite inner-circle in Damascus and was well trusted by Asad. He was also a key negotiator two decades earlier during the 1974 disengagement of forces agreement. While Asad knew that the United States saw this step as an indication that he was serious about negotiating, during the subsequent rounds it became apparent that Syria again wanted Israel to concede on substance in return for the procedural decision to send Shihabi.
Rabin and Asad had different expectations for the chief's of staff meetings. Shihabi only wanted to discuss the border and secure Israel's commitment to the 4 June 1967 line. Barak was unaware of the Pocket so he didn't engage on the issue. He presented a security package but Shihabi was uninterested without a border commitment. The meetings produced three areas of potential flexibility in Syria's security position. Shihabi spoke of a potential voluntary redeployment and agreed to transparency such as mutual notification of large-scale military exercises, and he alluded to a trade-off where Syria would agree to asymmetrical demilitarization if Israel agreed to a Golan warning station manned by the U.S. instead of the Israelis.
Shahak replaced Barak on 1 January 1995 when he left the military to pursue politics. Rabin did not want Shahak to leave the country for talks in the U.S. immediately after assuming the command of the Israeli military. When Asad read the minutes from the meetings, he told Ross that agreeing to Israel's concept of security arrangements "would leave me worse off than I am today."[129] Israel wanted to reduce the size of Syria's active military and demilitarize more Syrian territory. This violated Syria's territorial integrity and national honor so Asad rejected the proposal and saw no point in continuing to negotiate between chiefs of staff without an agreement on the border.[130] Instead, he pressed for an agreement on the core security principles and made sure the U.S. and Israel understood his dissatisfaction when he recalled Mu'allim to Damascus and left the U.S. without a Syrian ambassador for two months.[131]
The Aims and Principles Non-paper on Security
Despite scant progress during the first half of 1995, a series of meetings among Rabinovich, Mu'allim, and Ross, later resulted in a non-paper on the aims and principles of the security regime. Syria continued to demand that the security plan must be equal (mutasawiyya), reciprocal (mutakafiyya), and mutual (mutakabila). Israel wanted the demilitarized zone to extend beyond the Golan, deeper in into Syria. In the peace agreement with Egypt, the Sinai was demilitarized offering a zone of 250 kilometers while only a three-kilometer strip was demilitarized in Israel. Egypt agreed to this asymmetrical principle because they recognized that Israel lacked strategic depth as a much smaller country. Israel wanted the same principle to apply to Syria because the Golan Heights is barely one-tenth the width of Sinai.[132]
Helena Cobban quoted the principles in the non-paper as follows:
- "The legitimate need of each of the parties is that the security of one party or the guarantees thereof should not be achieved at the expense of the other..."
- "The security arrangements will be equal, mutual, and reciprocal on both sides...[and] if in the course of the negotiations, in transpires that the implementation of equality, from the geographic dimension, proves impossible with regard to specific arrangements, then experts from both sides will discuss the problematic aspects of the specific arrangement and solve them - whether through modification (including additions or subtractions) or through some other agreed upon and acceptable solution with a single variable..."
- "Security arrangements must coincide with each party's sovereignty and territorial integrity...the arrangements will be confined to the relevant areas on both sides of the border."[133]
This was an achievement because it constituted the first written understanding on the peace process. Ultimately, it paved the way for another round of meetings between the chiefs of staff in June after a six-month recess. According to Donald Neff, the parties agreed on the need to discuss four basic subjects: "a demilitarized zone separating Israeli and Syrian troops on the Golan Heights; a 'limited forces' zone behind the militarized zone; an early warning system; and confidence building measures such as joint patrols, exchanges of military delegations and a special communications network."[134]
During these meetings, Israel offered Syria an early warning station in Safed in return for an early warning station on the Golan. Syria rejected it because Israel's presence on Mount Hermon had "long been a source of anger and humiliation to the Syrians."[135] Shihabi argued that satellite and aerial reconnaissance should replace the need for ground stations, however he abandoned the principle of equality and suggested applying a 10-to-6 ratio on Syrian-Israeli demilitarized areas. Shahak remained skeptical of the formula because there was no agreement on force deployment. He wondered why 80 percent of Syria's military would remain deployed along their smallest border with Israel after a peace agreement.[136]
Asad invented new Israeli commitments during a meeting with the U.S. delegation in Damascus in July, resulting in another halt to the process. He argued that Israel withdrew from a pledge to give up on ground stations altogether and refused to continue the negotiations between the chiefs of staff. This changed the negotiating sequence that took months to agree upon. Ross recalled:
When I finally saw Shihabi later that night, he presented the new party line with no emotion. When I recounted the actual facts - not the fiction of the day - he made no effort to argue or contradict me. He had too much self-respect...For unknown reasons Asad retreated...he was back to the strategy of insisting on his substance in return for a procedural move on his part. Only in this case he was selling the same procedural move twice. And Rabin was not buying...Enough was enough. Asad had to learn that the process would stop - no negotiations, not with ambassadors or anyone else until Asad abided by the sequence he had accepted.[137]
According to Asad, there was never an agreement on the negotiating sequence and the chiefs of staff met based on an Israeli acceptance that there would be no early warning stations. In an interview with Al-Ahram, he blamed Ross for the impasse: "This was the basis on which we agreed that the chiefs of staff would meet, and they really met. The fact is that our chief of staff [Shihabi] returned with the impression that an agreement was reached on security arrangements.[138] The Syrian-Israeli peace process did not resume until Peres' prime ministership.
[113] For a full text of Rabin's speech, See: "Daily Report: Near East & South Asia." Foreign Broadcast Information Service 4 October 1994, sec. NES-94-192: 55.
[114] Mideast Mirror 12 September 1994, sec. Syria: vol. 8, no. 175.
[115] Zisser, Eyal. "Syria." Middle East Contemporary Survey XVIII (1994). p. 644.
[116] Haaretz 22 September 1994.
[117] "Daily Report." U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service 8 September 1994, sec. Near East and South Asia. A meeting between an Israeli delegation member or prime minister and Asad was an Israeli and American goal throughout the decade in order to make forward progress. However, Asad saw meeting any Jewish Israeli as a concession and something that would be the result of peace rather than a means to achieve peace.
[118] Arutz 1/Channel 1 News - Israeli T.V. 7 October 1994.
[119] "The Interview That Missed Out." Haaretz 9 October 1994.; "Poor Man's Anwar Sadat." Haaretz 9 October 1994.
[120] "Syrian Leader Condemns Israel-Jordan Accord as Blasphemy." The New York Times 19 October 1994.
[121] Clinton. My Life. p. 626.
[122] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 150-51.
[123] "Remarks at Press Conference by President Clinton and President Asad." Great Hall, Presidential Palace, Damascus, Syria: The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 27 October 1994.
[124] Ibid.
[125] "Assad and Clinton Speak: Shared Quest for Peace." The New York Times 28 October 1994, sec. Clinton in the Middle East.
[126] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 150-51.
[127] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 161.
[128] Clinton. My Life. p. 626.
[129] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 152-53.
[130] Al-Sharq al-Awsat 17 December 1994.
[131] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 92.
[132] For detailed analyses of possible Syrian-Israeli security arrangements and Israel's security concerns, See: Shalev, Aryeh. "Israel-Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan." Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.24 (1994).; Schiff, Zeev. Peace with Security: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with Syria. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993.; Alpher, Joseph. "Israel's Security Concerns in the Peace Process." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 70.2 (1994): 229-41.
[133] Cobban, Helena. The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-96 and Beyond. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. pp. 68-69. For similar language, See: Seale. "Who Is Telling the Truth?" p. 73.
[134] Neff, Donald. "Barren Barley." Middle East International.504 (1995). p. 9.
[135] Seale. "Who Is Telling the Truth?" p. 72.
[136] Ross. The Missing Peace. p.160; Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 184.
[137] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp.161-63
[138] "Radio on Al-Assad's Al-Ahram Interview." Foreign Broadcast Information Service 12 October 1995: 50-61.; "Interview with President Asad." Al-Ahram 11 October 1995: 1.