From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
With two new administrations in Israel and Washington, the stage was set for progress. Rabin's vision of Israel's future included accommodation with Syria as one of his policy cornerstones. He also saw the rising threat of Islamic fundamentalists and knew that the trend needed to be reversed by engaging on the Palestinian issue. Rabin saw the Islamist threat as something that not only threatened Israel, but also the stability of the secular Arab regimes. His major policy thrust was therefore geared toward reconciliation with all of Israel's old foes in order to create a united front against their common fundamentalist enemy.[68] Regarding Israel's security and the idea of land-for peace, Rabin explained:
I am unwilling to give up a single inch of Israeli security, but I am willing to give up many inches of settlements and territory, as well as 1,700,000 Arab inhabitants, for the sake of peace. We seek a territorial compromise that will bring peace and security; a lot of security.[69]
Shortly after Rabin became prime minister, he replaced Yossi Ben-Aharon as the head of the Israeli delegation with Itamar Rabinovich. Rabin reversed Shamir's policy of offering Syria peace-for-peace and said that 242 did apply to the Golan. This contributed to a slight softening in Syria's stance during the sixth round of talks since Madrid - from 24 August through 2 September 1992. After Syria was unable to extract from Israel a more explicit statement regarding the depth of the withdrawal, they presented Israel with a "Draft Declaration of Principles" on 31 August.
The document was significant for several reasons. This was the first time that Syria explicitly stated that they were willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel. However, it also demonstrated Asad's vision of peace. It stated that: "A comprehensive solution in the region: the goal is the establishment of a just peace. This requires a settlement on all fronts." It also called for "Total Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights" which would thus lead to "Proclaiming an end to the state of war or the allegation of the existence of such a state."[70] The Syrians were again insisting on Israel's commitment to a full withdrawal without offering anything specific on security arrangements, normalization, or timetable for withdrawal. It rested on Syria's interpretation of 242 so that once Israel accepted this, only the "mechanism of implementation" was needed to facilitate Israel's withdrawal at which point the two states would no longer be at war. In essence, as Rabinovich recalled, "the Syrian delegation offered us glorified nonbelligerency in return for full withdrawal."[71]
In September 1992, Asad first spoke publicly about the new phase of negotiations brought on by the change of government in Israel. There he declared, "We want a peace of the brave."[72] With the deadlock in the negotiations, the Israeli delegation sought to persuade their Syrian counterparts of the need for Asad to engage in public diplomacy. Israel also stood firm on not committing the depth of their withdrawal without knowing what peace looked like to Syria. Asad, for his part, refused to commit to anything before Israel guaranteed their full withdrawal from the Golan. The impasse remained past the U.S. elections in November, when the Washington talks were suspended until the spring of 1993.
The Clinton administration lacked a strong orientation in Middle East policy. The main players on the American peace team were Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, Aaron Miller, Bruce Riedel, Robert Malley, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Both Indyk and Ross were in favor of the "Syria-first" strategy - which made sense in early 1993 given that the PLO was a designated terrorist group according to the State Department and Washington was thus prevented from any direct dialogue with the organization. According to Ross, the logic behind this strategy was that "The Palestinians could make life uncomfortable for Israelis, but not threaten their existence. Syria, with its conventional and unconventional forces, could. Jordan, not feeling threatened by Syria or its rejectionist clients, would follow Syria's lead, Lebanon too, and suddenly Israel would be at peace with all of its neighboring states...and provide great leverage over the Palestinians."[73]
Indyk explained:
"Believe it or not, for a good part of the eight years of the Clinton administration, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating track was a sideshow. In fact, the focus of our strategy was Syria. Damascus represented, in our view, the nexus between the two branches of our strategy ["dual containment" and "comprehensive peace"]. If we could succeed in bringing Syria into the circle of peace, Lebanon would quickly follow, we believed, and Israel would have peace with all of the Arab states on its borders." The Israeli-Palestinian conflict would thereby be made easier to solve. "In the process, Iraq, and Iran would be more thoroughly isolated and weakened, as other Arab countries joined the coalition for a new Middle East under the cover of a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement.[74]
Aaron Miller disagreed with the "Syria-first" approach,[75] however it reflected the Clinton administration's orientation at its inception. In Rabin's meeting in March at the White House, the administration was very explicit in their preference for a Syria-first approach. Rabin did not disagree but reminded his hosts that a breakthrough on any track would be welcome.[76]
While the United States changed administrations, the battle over the depth of the Israeli withdrawal versus the kind of relations Syria would accept continued. Language was of great importance to both sides. In early November 1992, Rabin coined what would become Israel's standard phrase to the Syrians: "The depth of withdrawal will reflect the depth of peace." It implied that a full withdrawal was possible but only if Syria matched Israel's definition of peace. Faruq al-Shar' countered with "Total withdrawal for total peace." Rabinovich believed this was a clever use of language because using the word "Total" as opposed to "Full" was another way of saying "Comprehensive" - which would mean Israel must withdraw from all territories captured in 1967, including the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem.[77] The stalemate persisted.
The talks began again in the spring of 1993. On 27 April, in an interview with Asad's biographer, Patrick Seale, he demanded that peace had to be "full" (kamil), "comprehensive" (shamil), and "just" ('adil). He went on to explain that he was now prepared to offer "full peace for full withdrawal," but that in all the previous meetings, "The Syrian delegation at the talks was the only one that took an initiative. Israel offered nothing."[78] Asad had authorized Faruq al-Shar' and Muwaffaq Allaf to use the phrase "full peace for full withdrawal" earlier in the year. Asad considered this new Syrian formula to be a major advance on his part, to which Israel failed to adequately respond.[79] Indeed, Asad's move received a muted reception in Israel. Shimon Peres said, "Asad's full peace is not as full as it sounds,"[80] and Rabinovich published an article articulating Israeli doubts about what Syria meant by the phrase.[81]
Asad, most of the Israeli delegation, and all of the American team were unaware of the secret Oslo channel with the Palestinians launched in December 1992.[82] Rabin was now waiting to see which process held out more hope - the Syrian or Palestinian bilateral track. In July 1993, Syria again demonstrated that dialogue and confidence-building measures (CBMs) were not in Syria's vocabulary; Asad was content to combine diplomacy with militant pressure. This came in the form of a Hizballah attack in southern Lebanon that killed several Israeli soldiers in their self-proclaimed security zone. Israel's retaliation led to Hizballah's launching of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, resulting in Israel's Operation Accountability. The idea was that if Israeli citizens in the north could not live in peace, why should the Lebanese in the south? Apparently, Rabin and Ehud Barak (at the time Rabin's military chief of staff) hoped that triggering an exodus of Lebanese in the south towards Beirut would force the government to plead with Asad to stop Hizballah's rocket attacks.
This logic was flawed; Asad was not overly concerned with the welfare of the Lebanese in the south. Whether or not Hizballah's provocation was designed by Syria or Iran, it was clear that Asad could negotiate an end to the conflict. Christopher and Ross hammered out a cease-fire with Rabin and al-Shar'. Civilians in either country would not be targeted, however, Syria would not commit to stopping Hizballah attacks on Israeli soldiers in Israel's self-declared security zone because they had the right to resist occupation.
Asad did not mind using Lebanon to apply military pressure on Israel. Hizballah and violence was a card in his hand and one he would not relinquish as a CBM to Israel or the United States. Until Israel withdrew from all of the Golan Heights, this was Syrian leverage and part of their concept of negotiations.
The Pocket
Despite the flare-up in Lebanon and slow progress in the Oslo channel, Rabin preferred to work toward an agreement with Syria and felt that Israel could not simultaneously move forward on two bilateral peace tracks. In early August, Christopher and Ross met with Rabin and Rabinovich. Rabin asked Christopher to clarify a few points in his upcoming meeting with Asad:[83]
Based on the assumption that Syria would be satisfied with the depth of Israel's withdrawal on the Golan...
- Would Syria be willing to sign a peace treaty with no linkage to any other bilateral track?
- Was Syria ready for a real peace including normalization, diplomatic relations, exchange of ambassadors, trade, tourism, etc?
- Was Syria prepared to offer elements of peace before Israel completes the withdrawal?
Rabin also stressed that an Israeli withdrawal would take five years to complete; that Israel's water needs must be safeguarded; and that the security arrangements were of utmost importance requiring American participation in the post-withdrawal security regime. He also insisted that should a settlement be reached, it would be subject to a referendum in Israel. Of paramount importance was that this hypothetical exercise be kept secret. What followed was to be a source of disagreement throughout the process until and after Hafiz al-Asad's death in June 2000 (see below).
Rabin was prepared for "a full withdrawal" but only if Syria satisfied Israel on all the above points. This was his new formulation to gauge whether a deal was possible with Syria. It was an attempt to move beyond the slogans - "the depth of the withdrawal will reflect the depth of peace," and "full peace for full withdrawal" - and see if they had the basis of a deal, at precisely the same moment in August when Rabin had to decide if he should make the Oslo channel official. It was a hypothetical exercise for Christopher and Ross to test with Asad. It was not an Israeli commitment to a "full withdrawal," but a "full withdrawal if..." This clarification of a full withdrawal was figuratively deposited in America's pocket and thus became known as the "pocket" or "deposit."
Rabin remained skeptical about the Oslo channel with the Palestinians in mid-August. Therefore, Asad's response would be a primary consideration in his decision to either embrace the Syrian or Palestinian track. He would not pursue both initially. The American delegation and Asad had no idea that there was an Oslo channel progressing apace. Contrary to Seale's account, Rabin's offer was not "tailored to engage Asad just enough to blunt his attack on Oslo while, at the same time, frightening the Palestinians into concessions."[84] Rabin wanted to test both parties and see which direction looked more promising.
After Christopher and Ross conveyed the Israeli message to Asad and al-Shar' in Damascus, Ross recorded that "Asad made no effort to belittle it. 'Very important,' he said, clearly aware that he was hearing an explicit commitment to full withdrawal for the first time."[85] Asad then qualified his answer. He didn't like the term "normalization" and preferred "normal peaceful relations;" he couldn't mandate trade or tourism but he wouldn't act to block it; security arrangements should be equal; water was important for both sides; a Syrian-Israeli deal would not depend on a final deal with the Palestinians but he expected Rabin to make a partial deal; he required a Lebanese-Israeli deal; there would be no Syrian CBMs or elements of normalization before Israel's full withdrawal; in the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, Israel withdrew in 22 days - they didn't need five years - six months was the limit.[86]
Whereas Christopher and Ross felt it was a historic breakthrough, Rabin was disappointed. Rabinovich explained Rabin's thinking and his decision to opt for the Oslo process rather than the Syrian track:
As Rabin saw it, the move he began was shifted to a wrong footing. He was not naïve and did not expect Asad to accept his offer without any attempt at bargaining. But he was not willing to enter into a long process of bargaining. Such a process could never work to Israel's advantage. If Asad's demands were a constant and that constant, we already knew, had actually been endorsed by the United States, then bargaining could only deal with Israel's demands. The issue of the time frame provided an excellent illustration. If Rabin spoke of five years and Asad offered six months, one could safely assume that with the United States as a go-between Asad would persistently seek to chop away at Israel's initial position and bring it down to two or at best just under three years. The same dynamic would apply to the other components of the Israeli package, which would thus be whittled down through a lengthy process of indirect bargaining. Given this prospect, Rabin decided to give Peres the green light to bring the Oslo negotiations to conclusion.[87]
During the talks at the end of August, it became apparent that Syria felt they had an Israeli commitment to a full withdrawal without satisfying Israel's needs on security, normalization, and timetable. Allaf was therefore only interested in gaining this commitment in writing. Rabinovich believed that his insistence on this "was based on a misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of Christopher's mission earlier in August."[88] Nevertheless, Allaf was not interested in discussing anything else. Little progress was made and Rabin thus decided to soft pedal on the Syrian track for several months as the agreement with the PLO was being implemented. Mu'allim suggested that if Asad could meet Clinton, he would accept the delay because only the American president would "make him feel at peace, and quiet his suspicions."[89] This led to the Asad-Clinton meeting in Geneva on 16 January 1994.
The Asad-Clinton Meeting in Geneva
In the run up to the summit Rabin sought to get Clinton to commit in writing to "normal peaceful relations."[90] During the meeting, Asad expressed his concern over the unilateral agreement that Arafat reached with Israel:
To me, there is no difference between the Golan, South Lebanon and the occupied parts of Palestine or Jordan... It is all one Arab land as far as I am concerned, with no part of it more precious to me than another. What I demand for one part I demand for all, and that is only natural, because it is all one land for one nation. This fact reveals the secret behind the failure of unilateral settlements or unilateral peace agreements to end the historic conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs... Peace cannot be peace unless it is comprehensive. You have before you three experiments that did not make peace or end the conflict: Camp David in 1978 with Sadat's Egypt, May 17, 1983 with Amin Gemayel's Lebanon, and the Gaza-Jericho accord with Yaser Arafat on September 13, 1993. These are enough to indicate that unilateral solutions, even if they multiply, do not make peace.[91]
In the opening statement during the joint press conference, Asad stated:
Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategic choice that secures Arab rights, ends the Israeli occupation and enables our peoples in the region to live in peace, security and dignity. In honor we fought, in honor we negotiate, and in honor we shall make peace. We want an honorable peace for our people... we want the peace of the brave - a genuine peace which can survive and last - a peace which secures the interests of each side and renders all their rights... If the leaders of Israel have sufficient courage to respond to this kind of peace, the new era of security and stability in which normal, peaceful relations among all shall dawn anew.[92]
According to Clinton, his meeting with Asad produced two things he wanted: "Assad's first explicit statement that he was willing to make peace and establish normal relations with Israel, and his commitment to withdraw all forces from Lebanon and respect its independence once a comprehensive peace was reached."[93] However, Asad did not commit to "normal, peaceful relations" as the above statement (mistranslated from Arabic to English) suggests. Asad read his statement in Arabic and it was carried in the Syrian paper, Tishrin, where the actual translation would be "routine" or "regular" relations ('alaqat 'adiyya).[94] Asad avoided the customary Arabic term, "normal relations" (alaqat tabi'iyya), and avoided the phrase used in the Egyptian agreement, "normalization" (tatbi' al-'alaqat) or (tatbi'). Israel was thus unimpressed with the meeting of the two presidents.
As a part of Rabin's public diplomacy and in anticipation of serious negotiations, he began to prepare the Israeli public about his willingness to evacuate the Golan settlements - a domestically difficult decision given that the majority Golan settlers were Labor party supporters. In an article in Haaretz, he explained that Israel was different in the 1990s from the fledgling state of the 1940s, when every settlement mattered.[95] At this stage of negotiations - on all bilateral discussions - this was a far-reaching statement with implications for both the Syrians and Palestinians. Syria's Ba'th Party newspaper was so dismissive of Rabin's message that Christopher called al-Shar' to complain about the discrepancy between the Israeli and Syrian attitudes on public diplomacy.[96]
On 16 March, Rabin met with Clinton in Washington and developed a new proposal. Christopher and Ross presented it to Asad in May:
- Security Arrangements - Syria would be divided into four security zones, which would limit the range of the deployment of the Syrian military and stationing of armaments, and there would be mutual inspections.
- Phases for Implementation - Israel's withdrawal would occur in three phases: The first phase would be a limited withdrawal nine months after the signing affecting no Israeli settlements but the Druze village Majdal Shams; the second phase would take place after 18-24 months; the third phase would be to a line agreed upon. The total withdrawal would take place over five years.
- Normal, Peaceful Relations - The process of normalization would begin in the first phase and increase in subsequent phases.[97]
According to Seale, "Amazingly, Asad did not reject Rabin's whole proposal as a bad joke."[98] Asad responded that the security zones must be small and on "equal footing" and "on both sides" (14 kilometers total - seven on each side); constraints on Syrian forces must be minimal; no early warning stations; Majdal Shams first was too reminiscent of Arafat's Gaza-Jericho First plan; the phases would be marked by "the end of the state of war" once an agreement was signed and the tertiary boycott would be lifted; diplomatic ties would be established after Israel had completely withdrawn from the Golan - which should take place in six months, not five years - and only after peace agreements were reached with Jordan and Lebanon.
The problem, as the American and Israeli delegations were about to discover, was that all of this would be conditioned on Israel's "full withdrawal" to the 4 June 1967 lines.[99] This was the first time in the negotiations that Syria officially referred to the 1967 lines as opposed to simply a "full withdrawal." Rabin had assumed that a "full withdrawal" would be to the 1923 international border and was incensed.
The Border Issue
According to Walid Mu'allim: "The difference between the international border and the 4 June border is very slight on the ground, actually. The land has no strategic importance, but the issue is sovereignty. Every inch of our land in sacred to us."[100] He is correct that the difference is very small on the ground - 66 square kilometers to be exact - however he is incorrect in calling the 4 June 1967 line a border. Not only was it never a border, it is a line that exists on no official map - it was simply where the Israeli and Syrian forces were positioned on the eve of the 1967 June War. It was a situation, not a border. Furthermore, the difference was strategically important because of a 10-meter strip along the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee/Lake Tiberias, which would give Syria access to the sea that provided for nearly half of Israel's water consumption. In 1923, Britain and France drew the border so that all the Sea of Galilee would be within the Palestine mandate (see Appendix, Map 4).
The 1948 war ended with Syria in control of some areas west of the international border. In the 1949 Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement, these territories were to be turned into three small demilitarized zones (DMZs), belonging to neither country and Syria initially withdrew from these areas. Between 1949 and 1967, Israel would cultivate in the DMZs arguing that it was their territory; Syria saw things differently. There were frequent exchanges of fire on both sides and in the 1960s, a continuous and escalating level of Syrian shelling. By 1967, Israel was in control of two-thirds of the DMZ with Syria in control of the rest.[101]
During the negotiations in 1994, the al-Hamma enclave where the Israeli, Syrian, and Jordanian borders met also became important because Syria had taken control of the area before the war in 1967. Israel had since developed the thermal springs in al-Hamma into a major tourist site. Walid Mu'allim explained Syria's position: "If you take the 1949 Armistice lines between Syria and Israel and look at the DMZs, you see that all these DMZs were captured by the Israelis between 1949 and 1967 except for one tiny bit, al-Himmeh - this is the tiny territory where our troops were located on 4 June 1967."[102] Mu'allim neglected to mention that the "tiny bit" of "territory" amounted to one third of the DMZs.
While the negotiations proceeded in 1994, Muwaffaq Allaf referred to al-Hamma as Syrian territory. Rabinovich reminded him that this was a double-edged sword: "I told him that he should not be raising the issue for his own good reasons. After all, Syria relied heavily on Security Council Resolution 242 and particularly on the 'inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force.' By making a claim to al-Hamma, a piece of mandatory Palestine taken over by the Syrian army, they were undermining that very principle."[103] Rabinovich's Likud predecessor, Yossi Ben-Aharon (who seldom agreed with Rabin or Rabinovich) opined: "In Syrian eyes, it was inadmissible for Israel to claim, (no less acquire) territory in a defensive war, but it was entirely legitimate for Syria to demand territory it had conquered in an unprovoked attack in 1948."[104]
Both the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement signed in March 1979 and the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement sealed in July 1994 provided for a withdrawal to the international borders between Mandatory Palestine and Egypt, and between the western side of Mandatory Palestine and Transjordan, respectively. Therefore, as a result of Syria's policy of "tactical rejectionism" vis-à-vis Israel in the 1980s,[105] and after Syria waited two decades after the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations before embarking on a peace process with Israel, they were asking for more than Egypt and Jordan had achieved while offering substantially less.[106]
It wasn't until 2000 that Asad argued that Syria must have access to the northeastern shoreline and the lake as they had enjoyed from 1949 until 1967. However, by 1993 (and more so by 2000), the Sea of Galilee had receded by several hundred meters due to a persistent drought. Therefore, Asad's demand for access to the lake was literally asking for Israeli territory beyond any interpretation of the 1967 line. Even a full Israeli withdrawal to a demarcated 1967 line would put the border a few hundred meters east of the lake with an additional 10 meters being the difference between 1923 and 1967. By 2000, neither the 1967 line nor the 1923 border would give Syria access to the Sea of Galilee.
The Problematic Pocket - Redux
The confusion surrounding what would comprise a full withdrawal and what constituted an Israeli commitment was the result of the 3 August 1993 meeting between Christopher, Ross, and Rabin and their subsequent meeting with Asad. Ross recorded the exchange with Asad:
We were getting ready to leave when Asad said, "You may think this is a strange question, but does Israel have any claim on the territory?" Secretary Christopher said, "No, the Prime Minister spoke only of full withdrawal." Not wanting any possible misunderstanding, I asked, "When you refer to claims are you referring to claims anywhere? The Israelis do make claims in the West Bank." Asad quickly responded, saying he was only asking about "claims on Syrian territory or on the Syrian front." I shook my head no, saying, "There are no claims that we are aware of." I added "that we are aware of" to protect us in case Rabin did, in fact, have some claims he had not mentioned. With that very much in mind, I drew special attention to our exchange on this point when I subsequently briefed Itamar [Rabinovich] back in Washington on the meeting. He listened and did not correct our responses to Asad. I was able to tell Christopher after this briefing that Itamar had raised no objections to what we had told Asad and that it was safe to assume now that there were, in fact, no Israeli claims. Unfortunately, as we were to find out later [in May 1994], there may not have been claims, but there were different definitions of what full withdrawal meant.[107]
Asad frequently spoke of the 4 June lines in the Syrian media but during negotiations always spoke of "full withdrawal." Given Ross' account above, it is puzzling that Asad did not simply tell Christopher that he was demanding the 4 June 1967 line. Seale's account appears to attribute elements of the 19 July 1994 meeting between Christopher, Ross, and Asad (see below), and their meeting on 4 August 1993:
...after receiving Prime Minister Rabin's commitment to full withdrawal from the Golan, conveyed to him by Secretary Christopher on 4 August 1993, Asad sought further clarification. He asked Christopher two questions: "When Rabin speaks of full withdrawal, does he mean withdrawal to the positions Israel was occupying in 1967?" Christopher replied, "I have a commitment to full withdrawal, but without definition of the line." "Does Israel have any territorial claim to any territory occupied on the Syrian front in June 1967?" Asad then asked. Christopher answered, "Not to my knowledge."[108]
If Seale's account is correct then there is no doubt that Christopher offered more than he was authorized to. Rabinovich explained how the word "commitment" was introduced into the negotiations:
Asad and the Clinton administration had a different idea. Asad chose to ignore the distinction between a hypothetical deposition with an honest broker and an actual commitment made in the course of a negotiation. His position was reinforced by Christopher's view - a promising start unnecessarily nipped in the bud - and his determination to go ahead with Israeli-Syrian talks once the accords were signed. The Americans invested considerable efforts in placating Asad, persuading him not to agitate against Oslo and in fact to send his ambassador in Washington to the signing ceremony. They also promised Asad to resume the work begun in August, and indeed they obtained Rabin's commitment to cooperate in new talks in four months. This is how the term "commitment" was introduced into the vocabulary of the Israeli- Syrian negotiation."[109]
The distinction was important for both Rabin and Asad, but Secretary Christopher seemed ambivalent. Furthermore, Syria's insistence that the agreement also cover Jordan and Lebanon was a complete retreat from Asad's position nine months earlier. Christopher expected Israel to engage on a tit-for-tat negotiation on each of Syria's points while Rabin saw the Syrian response as a non-starter. Rabinovich recalled: "This was a classic instance of the stark difference between the perspective of a small state holding on to every square inch of land and any iota of dignity and that of a vast superpower seeking compromise and agreement and treating the petty concerns of the local parties with a mixture of impatience and condescension."[110]
Christopher returned to the region for the 25 July Jordanian-Israeli Washington Declaration, and he was anxious to move forward on the Syrian-Israeli track. Foremost in the Secretary's mind was to find out if Rabin would commit to the 1967 line. Rabinovich suggested using the same formula they used on 3 August 1993, where Israel would put in Christopher's pocket a "clarification," not a "commitment" that if Israel were satisfied on all other issues, it would be his "impression" that Israel would withdraw to the 4 June border. This also became known as the "they get their one sentence and we get our two pages" approach, where Syria would get a simple clarification while Israel would get qualifiers that the border would not constitute a threat to Israel's security or water requirements. This was also Israel's initial way of saying that they would agree to the general term, "4 June 1967" while preserving the right to negotiate later where exactly that line would be. According to Rabin and Barak, Christopher conveyed to Asad more than he was supposed to. Ross, ever the meticulous note taker, kept a record of the two conversations:
CHRISTOPHER: I talked about this with Itamar at lunch. He said they want their one sentence of clarity. They get it, but then we get our two pages. That's fine. But it is essential to give him the one sentence of clarity that he expects at the end of the line, assuming you reach agreement on all other subjects; it's not a commitment, this is the nature of withdrawal if all other things are met.
RABIN: You can say you have all the reasons to believe this is the result, but Israel will not spell this out before knowing that our needs will be fulfilled.
CHRISTOPHER: That's all I need.
RABIN: You can tell him you understand this, and that he will not get the commitment without fulfilling our needs.
CHRISTOPHER: It's not on the table, it is in my pocket. It will take some time.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHRISTOPHER: I have just come from Israel and I can tell you that at the end of the day and as part of a package in which Israel's needs would have to be met, the United States understands that your needs would be met, and that therefore the meaning of full withdrawal, in these circumstances, would be to June 4, 1967. This only has meaning if you come to an agreement on everything. If you don't come to an agreement on everything, it has no meaning. In any case, this is in our pocket, not yours. It is our understanding, and you will not hear it from them until their needs have been met.
ASAD: This is clear.[111] The problem with this ambiguous exchange was that Rabin believed if Israel's needs were satisfied, the 4 June line itself would be debated and defined. Asad had a fixed definition of that line and thought Israel's needs on security and water would be addressed through assurances as opposed to territorial adjustments in the negotiations. In effect, this exercise meant that the difficult negotiations on what the 1967 line meant would be set aside for a while. Indeed, Syria did take this as an Israeli commitment to the 4 June line as they saw it. Mu'allim later explained: "We negotiated the details of the withdrawal element for almost a year, until July 1994, when we finalized the agreement on full withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 line."[112]
[68] Horovitz, David Phillip. Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier of Peace. London: Peter Halban, 1996. p. 134.
[69] Rabin, Yitzhak. "Pragmatism and Compromise." Jerusalem Post 1 June 1992.
[70] "Syrian Document: Statement of Principles." Middle East Contemporary Survey XVI (1992): 147-48.
[71] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 62.
[72] "Al Asad Meets with Golan Heights Delegation." Foreign Broadcast Information Service 9 September 1992: 41.
[73] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 99.
[74] Indyk. "Camp David in the Context of U.S. Mideast Peace Strategy." p. 24. For more on the American peace team's original strategy See: Indyk, Martin. "Dual Containment." Washington Institute lecture 18 May 1993.; Rubin, Barry. "The United States and the Middle East." Middle East Contemporary Survey XVIII (1994).; Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. pp. 85-92.
[75] Miller, Aaron David. "The Effects of the 'Syria First' Strategy." In Ibid. pp. 93-99.
[76] Rabinovich, Itamar. Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948-2003. Updated and rev ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. p. 51.
[77] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 83.
[78] al-Asad, Hafiz, and Patrick Seale. "Interview with Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad." Journal of Palestine Studies 22.4 (1993): 111-21. p. 115.
[79] Gera, Gideon. "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process." Middle East Contemporary Survey XVII (1993). p. 43.
[80] Jerusalem Post 7 April 1993.
[81] Rabinovich, Itamar. "Smile When You Say Peace." The New York Times 19 May 1993.
[82] Agha, Hussein, et al. "The Oslo Talks." Track-Ii Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East. B.C.S.I.A. Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003. 29-56. p. 29; Savir. The Process. pp. 3-89; Peres told Rabinovich of the secret channel in March 1993, See: Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 98; Ross became aware of the Oslo channel in a meeting with Rabin in July where he was instructed to only tell Clinton and Christopher, See: Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 108.
[83] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. pp. 104-105; Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 111.
[84] Seale. "Who Is Telling the Truth?" p. 68.
[85] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 111.
[86] Ibid. p. 113.
[87] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 107.
[88] Ibid. p. 113.
[89] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 139.
[90] Horovitz. Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier of Peace. p. 133.
[91] "What Assad Told Clinton: A Report by a Member of the Syrian Delegation to Geneva." Mideast Mirror 8.11 (11 January 1994).
[92] "Assad and Clinton Speak: New Commitment to Peace." The New York Times 17 January 1994: A6.; State, U.S. Department of. "U.S. And Syria Pledge Cooperation on Middle East Peace Negotiations." Department of State Dispatch 5.1 (1994).
[93] Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Random House, 2005. p. 575; Hinnebusch. "Does Syria Want Peace?" p. 53.
[94] Tishrin 17 January 1994.
[95] "For the Sake of Peace It Is Permissible to Dismantle Settlements in the Golan." Haaretz 22 April 1994: A1.
[96] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 138.
[97] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 145; Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 140-41.
[98] Seale. "Who Is Telling the Truth?" p. 67.
[99] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 146; Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 143-44.
[100] al-Moualem, Walid. "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations. An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem." Journal of Palestine Studies 26.2 (1997): 81-94. p. 85.
[101] For a revisionist account of the border conflict between Israel and Syria from 1949-1967, See: Neff, Donald. "Israel-Syria: Conflict at the Jordan River, 1949-1967." Journal of Palestine Studies 23.4 (1994): 26-40. In this article released at the same time the defining the 1967 line became important, he writes: "One must conclude that the issue of the Golan Heights as a security concern for Israel seems largely aimed at justifying their retention...these are advantages only for a nation preparing for war, not one embarked on the road to peace."
[102] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 90.
[103] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. pp. 141-42.
[104] Ben-Aharon. "Negotiating with Syria: A First-Hand Account."
[105] Hinnebusch, and Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. pp. 154-155.
[106] Zisser, Eyal. "The Israel-Syria Negotiations - What Went Wrong?" Orient 42.2 (2001): 225-51. p. 228.
[107] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 113-14.
[108] Seale. "Who Is Telling the Truth?" p. 69.
[109] Rabinovich. Waging Peace. pp. 56-57.
[110] ---. The Brink of Peace. p. 144.
[111] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 148.
[112] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 84.