From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
The Madrid peace conference was far from conciliatory with no country taking the high road in their remarks. Shamir launched into a lengthy history of Arab rejection of Israel, accusing the Arab states of passing resolutions that "perverted history, paraded fiction as fact, and made a travesty of the UN and its charter." He took credit for the conference saying it was "a result of a sustained American effort based on our own peace plan of May 1989" and labeled the conference "ceremonial" as it was merely an opening to direct, bilateral negotiations. He railed that in Israel there was a consensus to forge peace with differences only in the best way to achieve it while "In most Arab countries, the opposite seems to be true. The only differences are over the ways to push Israel into a defenseless position and, ultimately to destruction." Shamir further admonished the Arab participants: "Above all, we hope you finally realize that you could have been at this table long ago, soon after the Camp David Accords were first concluded, had you chosen dialogue instead of violence, coexistence instead of terrorism." In driving his point home, he made clear that "an examination of the conflict's long history makes clear, its nature is not territorial...the issue is not territory, but our existence. It will be regrettable if the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory. It is the quickest way to an impasse."[45
Syria's head of the delegation, Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar', began his remarks by demonstrating that Syria was a peace-loving nation; they were not warmongers or advocates of destruction. His ironic example: "At the height of the October war, His Excellency President Hafiz al-Asad said: 'we have no fondness for killing or destruction; we are only defending ourselves against killing and destruction.' We are not and have never been the aggressors."[46] On several occasions he explained that Syria's purpose was "to seek a just and honorable peace...a real peace," but demanded that "for peace to be permanent and stable, it must encompass all the parties to the conflict on all fronts," and that it "comprehensively covers all aspects and fronts of the Arab-Israeli conflict...not a peace that deals with one aspect of the conflict and creates new conflicts and tension in the region."[47]
Whereas Syria rejected UNSC resolution 242 in 1967 and denounced it as "a deception of the people, a recipe for failure"[48] and then accepted UNSC resolution 338 after the 1973 war,[49] Faruq al-Shar' explained that "these resolutions have failed to be implemented thanks to Israel's rejection and stubbornness...they [242/338] must be implemented fully and on all fronts...This means that every inch of Arab territory occupied by the Israelis through war and force - the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip - must revert to their rightful owners in full."[50]
This maximalist position was not a result of the public setting of the conference that lent itself to grandstanding by the speakers. During the private discussions later in the day on 31 October, Syria's chief negotiator, Muwaffaq Allaf told Israel's negotiating chief, Yossi Ben-Aharon, "We have come here for the purpose of implementing UNSC Resolution 242, the essence of which is 'territory for peace;' accordingly, we are ready to undertake to carry out our part of the equation as soon as we hear from you that Israel is ready to withdraw from all Arab territories you conquered in the June 1967 war."[51]
Shamir retorted in his closing remarks the next day: "Syria's representative wants us and the world to believe that his country is a model of freedom and protection of human rights...To this day, Syria is the home of a host of terrorist organizations that spread violence and death to all kinds of innocent targets...I could go on and recite a litany of facts that demonstrate the extent to which Syria merits the dubious honor of being one of the most oppressive, tyrannical regimes in the world, but this is not what we have come here for."[52]
Faruq al-Shar' provided another 'highpoint' the same day when he began by stating, "the head of the Israeli delegation, in his statement yesterday recognized that he will not return not one inch of land, particularly when he mentioned surface area." He discovered that, "The Arabs are the only people who have lived in Palestine for thousands of years, even when the Jews came from the south through Sinai [in the biblical story of the exodus], the Palestinians were there, in Palestine. And they have been there ever since." He continued: "I really wanted to focus on peace for which we have come. Before that I shall just show you if I may a photograph, an old photograph of Mr. Shamir at the age of thirty-two." With that, he brandished a 'Wanted' picture of Shamir, issued by the British mandatory authorities in the 1940s: "The information was widely distributed in Europe at the time. The caption says he is thirty-two years old, he is 165 centimeters tall. And then the other descriptions we all know...It was distributed because he was wanted. He himself recognized that he was a terrorist. That he practices terrorism...He kills peace mediators. And then he talks of Syria, Lebanon, and terrorism...He said that 1967, the war in '67 was a defensive war. The media tells us that the Arabs attacked Israel in 1967. They are really holding in contempt all historians, and history itself. Just the last word."[53]
Whereas according to al-Shar', "Our delegation has come equipped with an inexhaustible reserve of goodwill,"[54] their goodwill seemed exhausted before their arrival. Israel fared no better in America's eyes. James Baker admonished all in attendance during his address: "The key, however, is to get beyond the rhetoric and into the direct negotiations...You have launched a process of negotiations that can succeed. But you have failed to deal adequately with the human dimension of the conflict...Formulas, terms of reference and negotiations are not enough. Support for a negotiating process will not be sustainable unless the human dimension is addressed by all parties. A way must be found to send signals of peace and reconciliation that affect the peoples of the region."[55] Baker summarized the few concrete achievements of the conference as follows:
What the parties in fact said this week is that these core issues - land, peace, and security - are inseparable elements in the search for a comprehensive settlement. The parties have made clear that peace by itself is unachievable without a territorial solution and security; that a territorial solution by itself will not resolve the conflict without there also being peace and security; and that security by itself is impossible to achieve without a territorial solution and peace. The process on which we are embarked can work only if all issues are put on the table, and if all issues are satisfactorily resolved.[56]
Bilateral discussions with Syria were in jeopardy hours before they convened. During President Bush's speech to the conference, he spoke of the need for territorial compromise. Ironically, al-Shar' saw this as a statement directed against Syria rather than Israel and thought Bush meant Syria would have to compromise on their territorial aspirations. He threatened that since Bush had changed the rules of the game for the conference, their delegation would not sit with Israel in bilateral negotiations unless the statement was corrected. It required heavy American pressure and Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar and Egyptian President Mubarak's influence to bring Syria to the table. Within two months of the conference, America summoned the parties to Washington for bilateral talks after the Madrid conference.[57] Four more rounds of bilateral discussions were held in Washington after Madrid until Shamir's defeat in the 23 June 1992 elections.[58]
What Syria wanted at the conference and subsequent bilateral meetings was clear: a full return of the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza to the 4 June 1967 line (or how Syria understood that line) in exchange for peace - more aptly defined as a state of non-belligerency. In addition, they wanted to lead all Arab parties in a comprehensive strategy against Israel in the struggle for 'a peace of the brave'. Israel's chief negotiator, Yossi Ben-Aharon described the Syrian-Israeli discussions: Syria's definition of peace, however, remained evasive and unclear...Our interlocutors focused on the [242] phrases that referred to 'withdrawal from territories occupied' and argued that all other matters would fall in place once Israel agreed to carry out the withdrawal requirement. We countered that the resolution linked withdrawal to the establishment - by negotiation and agreement - of secure boundaries...We proposed for instance, that both states begin by recognizing each other's right to exist; that both sides refrain from engaging in, or supporting, military or violent activities against each other, at least during the negotiations; and that we discuss elementary confidence-building measures, such as establishing direct lines of communication and moving the talks to the region itself. The Syrian response was negative. Withdrawal was, and should be, the first item on the agenda. It would be a precondition to any progress, the key to any agreement, and there could be no bargaining on territory, which Syria considered theirs by right, to the very last inch. As for confidence-building measures, Allaf said these could be a result of the negotiations and not a precursor... From day one, the Syrians had incessantly pounded the phrase "territory for peace." You give us (our) territory, said Allaf, and we will give you peace. We rejected that equation right away, for precisely the same reason-lack of symmetry. We responded that peace was fluid, malleable, and reversible, while territory was concrete and irreversible. Furthermore, we insisted that peace was not for the Syrians to give. Peace should be the common objective of both Israel and Syria to the same extent. Territory, on the other hand, was one of the components in the package, alongside security arrangements, open borders, and normalization, including, for instance, joint projects.[59]
Neither side was prepared to move. Syria offered nothing in return for territory except their word that all would be fine once Israel left the Golan. Since neither side thought there was any chance of success in the Washington talks, what they said in their discussions was designed for public consumption. Indeed, both delegations tape-recorded the sessions creating an atmosphere where even if either side wanted to compromise, neither side would offer any formula for fear of departing from the official government line. A setting different from the public spectacle of the opening conference, conducive to a give-and-take negotiation, failed to materialize in Washington.[60]
During the fifth and final round before the Israeli elections, the Israeli delegation wrote a non-paper[61] in an attempt to define the minimal basis of their relationship moving forward. The Israeli delegation wanted to determine if they agreed on anything. The document posed the following questions to Syria: Does Syria accept the legitimacy and right of Israel to exist? Does Syria believe Article 2 of the UN Charter is applicable to Israel, which makes it incumbent on members of the UN to accept each other's sovereign equality, the legitimacy of their statehood and their basic rights as nation-states to be members of the United Nations? Ben-Aharon recalled the irony of being involved in negotiations where Syria constantly emphasized they would never bargain over territory but expected Israel to bargain over Israel's legitimacy and right to exist. By the end of the round on 30 April, Muwaffaq Allaf agreed to take the paper back to Damascus and promised a Syrian response.[62]
Meanwhile, Israel and Syria did not want to be perceived as giving up their struggle. On 15 February 1992, Israel assassinated Hizballah's leader in Lebanon, Abbas al-Musawi via an air strike.[63] It was followed by Katyusha rocket reprisals against Kiryat Shemona in northern Israel resulting in an Israeli operation in three Shi'a villages in southern Lebanon during 18-19 February. The exchange of rocket fire continued periodically between Hizballah and Israel until 25 May.[64]
From the end of April until August, the Israeli-Syrian bilateral negotiations were suspended due to the Israeli elections and the changes that ensued. On 23 June, Rabin's Labor party defeated Shamir's Likud, gaining 44 Knesset seats to Likud's 32. On 10 July, Rabin presented his coalition to the Knesset and won the vote of confidence. Meanwhile, Bush was in trouble in his re-election bid in America's November elections. While Washington was certainly pleased with Rabin's victory over Shamir, they knew he would have to take the time to form a government and assess the negotiations. This process would likely continue until autumn - too close to the American elections for heavy U.S. participation in the negotiations. Given Bush's sagging poll numbers, Baker knew that by August he would be tasked with heading up the reelection campaign and moved from the State Department. Dennis Ross sought to reinvigorate the already stale bilateral track and prevent Baker's departure.
The "Hail Mary" was to invite President Asad, King Fahd, King Hussein, and President Mubarak to Washington for a summit with President Bush and Prime Minister Rabin. Baker and Ross understood that if Asad would not attend, there would be no summit. It was seen as a long shot but worth the chance. In the late summer, during a meeting with Asad, Baker urged him to attend. He agreed to consider it and respond. In September, three weeks after Baker's transfer from the State Department to Chief of Staff of the White House, Asad rejected the offer.[65]
Given the positions of both delegations, Shlomo Ben-Ami, member of Israel's Madrid delegation, described the bilateral talks in Washington as "a sheer waste of time, and the gap between the parties was simply unbridgeable."[66] Itamar Rabinovich explained: "Neither Ben-Aharon nor Allaf came to Washington to look for the middle ground on which a deal was to be made."[67] The talks led nowhere with significant changes coming only after Shamir's defeat to Yitzhak Rabin in Israel's 23 June 1992 elections, and George Bush's defeat to Bill Clinton later in November.
[44] Jerusalem Post 16 October 1991.; "The Madrid Peace Conference in J.P.S." p. 120.
[45] "F.B.I.S. 31 October 1991."; "The Madrid Peace Conference in J.P.S." pp. 129-131.
[46] Syria and Egypt launched the 1973 October War catching Israel unprepared on the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur).
[47] FBIS 1 November 1991.
[48] Al-Ba'th 30 November 1967.; Also see: Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War : June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. 1st Presidio Press ed. New York: Ballantine Books, 2003. p. 326.
[49] Syria accepted the cease-fire and UNSC Resolution 338 on 23 October 1973. The resolution called for the concerned parties to immediately implement 242 "in all of its parts" and for negotiations to immediately begin "between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East." The Syrian letter of their acceptance was conditioned on their understanding that it was based on "The complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories which were occupied in June 1967...The Syrian Government acceptance of the Resolution is conditional upon the other party's undertaking to implement the Resolution." See: Khaddam, Abdul Halim (Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs), and Dr. Mohammad Zakaria Ismail (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs). "The Situation in the Middle East: Letter Dated 23 October 1973 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic Addressed to the Secretary-General." United Nations, 1973. Vol. A/9250, S/11040, Agenda Item 22.
[50] FBIS 1 November 1991.; "The Madrid Peace Conference in J.P.S." pp. 139-140.
[51] Ben-Aharon, Yossi. "Negotiating with Syria: A First-Hand Account." Middle East Review of International Affairs 4.2 (2000).
[52] FBIS 1 November 1991.; "The Madrid Peace Conference in J.P.S." pp. 143-144.
[53] Cowell, Alan. "Syria Offers Old Photo to Fill an Empty Chair: Syria and Israel Square Off, Each Making Charges of Terrorism." The New York Times 2 November 1991, sec. A (International Pages): 4.; "The Madrid Peace Conference in J.P.S." pp. 146-147.; Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 80.; Friedman, Thomas L. From Beirut to Jerusalem. 2nd ed. London: HarperCollins, 1998. p. 537.; Friedman, Thomas L. "Mideast Session Adjourns, with Prospects Uncertain for Second Phase of Talks: Sour Note Sounded; Palestinians Appear to Split with Syria over Next Round." The New York Times 2 November 1991, sec. A (Middle East Peace Talks): 1.
[54] "The Madrid Peace Conference in J.P.S." p. 140.
[55] "The Madrid Peace Conference in J.P.S." p. 142. Baker's "signals of peace and reconciliation" could only be referring to CBMs.
[56]Ibid. p. 142.
[57] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 81. The short delay in convening the Washington talks was a result of the Soviet Union's demise and the transition from Gorbachev to Boris Yeltzin as well as Israel's 27 November proposal to postpone the next round until 9 December 1991.
[58] The following were the bilateral rounds under Shamir's government:
First round: (Madrid) 31 October - 3 November, 1991
Second round: (Washington, D.C.) 4-17 December 1991
Third round: (Washington, D.C.) 13-16 January 1992
Fourth round: (Washington, D.C.) 24 February - 4 March 1992
Fifth round: (Washington, D.C) 27-30 April 1992
[59] Ben-Aharon. "Negotiating with Syria: A First-Hand Account."
[60] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 56.
[61] A non-paper is a diplomatic term for a non-legally binding frame of reference or agreement.
[62] Ben-Aharon. "Negotiating with Syria: A First-Hand Account." The Syrian response was finally delivered in August 1992 after the Israeli elections, and after Itamar Rabinovich replaced Yossi Ben-Aharon as Israel's chief negotiator with Syria. See: Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. pp. 58-62.; Al-Manar 21 September 1992: 7.
[63] 265 Interview with Defense Minister Arens on Israel Television, 16 February 1992: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1992. Vol. 11-12: 1988-1992.
[64] For more on Hizballah's ideology in Lebanon, See: Zisser, Eyal. "Hizballah in Lebanon - at the Crossroads." Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East. Eds. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar. London: Frank Cass & Co, 1997. 90-110.
[65] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 86-87.
[66] Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. p. 199.
[67] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 40.