The Revisionists and New Historians
The Birth Revisited is nearly twice as long as the original and had the additional benefit of new documents made available in the Israel Defense Forces Archives. Like his first book, The Birth Revisited lays out an impressive indictment against Israel and once again, in the conclusions, one wonders if they were guided by the preceding hundreds of pages of evidence he offered.
In the introduction to The Birth, Morris clearly states: "It cannot be stressed too strongly that, while this is not a military history, the events it describes - cumulatively amounting to the Palestinian Arab exodus - occurred in wartime and were a product, direct and indirect, of that war."[14] From that point forward, the book concentrates on Israeli actions, loses the context of war, and proceeds to quote and misquote Ben Gurion enough to give the reader the belief that Ben Gurion was a cold-hearted, deliberate, and life-long planner of ethnic cleansing.[15] In his conclusions, he begins by restating that the refugee problem was a product of war and not by design. However, there are some subtle and important differences between the two sets of conclusions. The following are the two opening paragraphs:
The Birth (p. 286):
The Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a byproduct of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterised the first Israeli-Arab war; in smaller part, it was the deliberate creation of Jewish and Arab military commanders and politicians.
The Birth Revisited (p. 588):
The first Arab-Israeli war, of 1948, was launched by the Palestinian Arabs, who rejected the UN partition resolution and embarked on hostilities aimed at preventing the birth of Israel. That war and not design, Jewish or Arab, gave birth to the Palestinian refugee problem.[16]
In The Birth Revisited, one finally sees what "that war" is - it's the war launched by the Palestinians who rejected the UN partition plan. A realistic context begins to take shape. In the original conclusions, Morris wrote that the refugee problem was inevitable given Arab-Jewish hostility, geography, and Arab fear of Jewish rule. He failed to indicate that the war launched by the Palestinians was the catalyst. In the later edition, the "Israeli-Arab war" became the "Arab-Israeli war." In the original, he explained that each exodus in each village and city resulted from a different situation. Yet, in The Birth Revisited he clearly writes on the first page of the conclusions (p. 588):
But there was no pre-war Zionist plan to expel 'the Arabs' from Palestine or the areas of the emergent Jewish State; and the Yishuv did not enter the war with a plan or policy of expulsion. Nor was the pre-war 'transfer' thinking ever translated, in the course of the war, into an agreed, systematic policy of expulsion.
More context is given to the reader in 2004 than was attempted in 1987. Consider the following:
The Birth (p. 288):
The Haganah adopted a forceful retaliatory strategy against suspected bases of Arab irregular bands which triggered a certain amount of flight. But it was not a strategy designed to precipitate civilian flight.
The Birth Revisited (p. 592):
To be sure, the Haganah's adoption and implementation during December 1947 - March 1948 of a retaliatory strategy against Arab militia bases - meaning villages and urban neighbourhoods - resulted in civilian flight. But the strategy, to judge from the documentation, was designed to punish, harm and deter militiamen, not to precipitate an exodus.
By 2004, "Arab irregular bands" changed into "Arab militiamen," the passive voice is chosen, and the adjective "forceful" is no longer used to modify Israel's "retaliatory strategy." Even more enlightening is the realization that the bases where the Palestinian militias operated were Palestinian villages and urban neighborhoods. In 2004, the reader can understand that Israel was actually engaged in war - not of their choice - and that the people shooting at them were based in Palestinian population centers. Furthermore, all of the documentation that Morris read led him to write that that Israel's strategy was designed to deter the militiamen. Once again, there is a new context of war, a deeper appreciation for Israel's position, and one can see that the Haganah had military objectives.
Another example of wider context is what proceeds and follows this sentence (The Birth p. 292; The Birth Revisited p. 596): "But from July onwards, there was a growing readiness in the IDF units to expel." In The Birth Revisited, Morris prefaces the above sentence by stating, "the main July-November offensives that resulted in displacement - did not include expulsory clauses." Moreover, the focus shifts when comparing the following sentences:
The Birth (p. 292):
There were also powerful vengeful urges at play - revenge for Jewish losses and punishment for having forced upon the Yishuv and its able-bodied young men the protracted, bitter battle.
The Birth Revisited (p. 596):
There were also powerful vengeful urges at play - revenge for the Palestinian onslaught on the Yishuv during May-June, and the massive Jewish losses. In short, the Palestinians were being punished for having forced upon the Yishuv the protracted, bitter war that had resulted in the death of one, and the maiming of two, in every 100 in the Jewish population.
Morris' original presentation focused on Jewish revenge, carried out by superior or "able-bodied young men," because they were forced into battle. He leaves the impression that like the Romans 2,000 years earlier, the Yishuv was bothered by the annoying and inferior gnat buzzing about their faces and they simply set out to teach them a durable lesson because they had had enough. Their victory was assured, despite the bitterness of battle.
In the revised edition, the revenge is against "the Palestinian onslaught" that caused "massive" Jewish losses. New to Morris' presentation is the reality of war, its effect on the Yishuv, and the acceptance that the Palestinians were not only a party to the conflict, but the ones who initiated the war.
Even more telling is the sentence that follows in The Birth Revisited, which is absent in the original: "The Arabs had rejected partition and unleashed the dogs of war. In consequence, quite understandably, the Yishuv's leadership - left, centre and right - came to believe that leaving in place a large hostile Arab minority (or an Arab majority) inside the State would be suicidal." After Morris had expanded at length on Jewish atrocities by doubling the size of his updated book, he justifies the Yishuv's decision and finally reveals that the war's outcome was not sure from May-June 1948.
[14] Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949. Cambridge Middle East Library. Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. p. 3.
[15] Karsh. "Benny Morris and the Reign of Error."
[16] Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge Middle East Studies ; 018. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 588.