From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State
Bashar al-Asad’s most dramatic failings came in the foreign policy arena and were the result of Syria’s inability to adapt to three events:
- 11 September 2001
- The war in Iraq
- The crisis in Lebanon.
Since assuming power, Bashar has leapt from foreign policy disaster to fiasco, each one seemingly worse than the last. Through an inept foreign policy, he managed to undo most of father’s achievements in just a few years and rapidly transformed Syria from a strong to weak state – from an essential component for Middle Eastern peace to internationally and regionally isolated.
With the collapse of the Syrian-Israeli peace talks at Geneva on 24 March 2000 and Hafiz’s death in June, most Syria-watchers knew that it would take some time for Bashar to settle into his new position. There was a sense of hope attached to the new president as he could prove not to be so encumbered by all the negativity toward Israel that marked the 30 years of his father’s rule. These hopes quickly faded in October 2000 with the outbreak of the new Palestinian-Israeli war of attrition and Hizballah’s escalation in Lebanon.49 While it is doubtful that Syria initiated Hizballah’s initial actions, it reflected the new balance of power. Hafiz had used Hizballah as an effective pressure tool on Israel but kept them at a distance when it was necessary. Since Bashar took over the Lebanon portfolio in 1998, he formed a close relationship with Hizballah’s leader, Hasan Nasrallah, and was reported to be in awe of him. The elder Asad never met with Nasrallah, viewing him more as just one of several levers of power at his disposal.
Basher sought to capitalize on the new Palestinian-Israeli war and used the opportunity to entrench himself as the leader of the Arab rejectionist camp. His public comments were reminiscent of Hafiz’s comments when he first came to power in 1970. Bashar managed to walk back from progress his father made during the 1990s. He recognized Israel as an existing fact but rejected the legitimacy of its existence. While the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis Israel in 1991 forced Hafiz to seek a “peace of the brave” with Israel, Bashar felt that Arabs have the capacity to face down Israel’s superiority by carrying out a limited armed struggle against it such as the Palestinians and Hizballah were doing. Unlike his father, who gradually learned to moderate (if only slightly) his hateful rhetoric toward Israel, Bashar increased it and explained that the nature of Israeli society, which was racist, aggressive, and expansionist, was responsible for the regional failure to make peace.50
His statements reached a climax in May 2001 with his opening remarks when Pope John Paul II came to Damascus. He pointed to a direct link between the Jews’ betrayal of Jesus, their attempts to betray Muhammad, and their current treachery:
We see our brothers in Palestine being tortured and we see that justice is being violated… They try to obliterate all of the principles of the monotheistic religions with the same mentality by which they betrayed Jesus and tortured him, and in accordance with the same mentality that prompted them to betray the Prophet Muhammad… the meaning of the principle of love is to stop killing everyone who is an Arab out of a motivation of hatred and to begin to teach the young generation not to hate the other. The meaning of the principle of justice is also to cease falsifying the fact – the facts of our lives today as well as historical facts – and to stop laying claim to rights to a history that has no basis.51
The above sparked an international storm with the French and American governments promptly denouncing his remarks. Bashar, for his part, said his speech was misunderstood and he never mentioned the word, “Jew,” and that he had said nothing negative about Jews. Another example came at March 2002 Arab summit in Beirut to adopt the Saudi peace initiative. He alone, stood out as militant and sought to legitimize Palestinian suicide bombings.
On 11 September 2001, Bashar was celebrating his 36th birthday. The U.S. was quick to present the Middle East with an ultimatum: “Either you are with us or against us.” Bashar failed to understand just how much the world changed overnight and sought to have his cake and eat it too – like his father had done during the 1990s. Syria stood with and against the United States. There can be little doubt that besides Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria stood out as the country most affected by the events of 9/11.
Bashar chose to stand at the vanguard of the Arab camp opposed to the U.S.-led war topple Hussein in Iraq. Unlike his father who understood where the redlines were, Bashar repeatedly crossed them, nearly bringing them to direct military conflict with America. At the same time not only did he not sever his ties with what Bush termed, “The Axis of Evil,” but instead worked to promote his relations with Iran, Iraq, Hizballah, and North Korea. From the moment the war broke out, Syria’s hostility to America dramatically increased. Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar’, who while one of three main Sunnis of the old guard was seen as more moderate, declared: “We want Iraq’s victory.”52 A few weeks later during a joint press conference with French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepan, he likened the United States to the Third Reich and President Bush to Adolf Hitler.53
The American tanks rolling into Baghdad, Saddam Hussein’s capture in December 2003, the policy change from Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi, prompted no policy change in Syrian policy and served to heighten American pressure on Damascus. By late 2004, President Bush described Bashar as a weak and unreliable leader who like Arafat, he had no intention of dealing with.54 Syria proved incapable of understanding that the U.S. was now setting the rules of the game and that they had to respond to American demands immediately, without a waiting for a trade-off.
Bashar not only failed to read the region and international dimension of the post-9/11 world, but he even managed to unite two bitter opponents in the West – the United States and France – in the wake of the Rafiq al-Hariri assassination in Lebanon on 14 February 2005. Leading up to his assassination was the Damascus decision in September 2004 to force an extension of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s term in office, which led to UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. The outpouring of anger towards Syria in demonstrations in Martyrs’ Square in the so-called “Cedar Revolution” brought about more international pressure and by 26 April 2005, Syria was forced to remove their military from Lebanon. Lebanon had been one of Hafiz’s central accomplishments in Syria’s 29 years of military presence there. It took Bashar less than five years reverse it. Without the weakness of the Syrian state from a political, military, and economic standpoint; al-Hariri’s assassination; and American and French backing and encouragement of opposition groups in Lebanon, Syria’s demise in Lebanon would likely never have occurred.
49 The Lebanon-Israeli border and Hizballah remained militarily active since Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak withdrew Israel from their self-declared security zone in Southern Lebanon on 24 May 2000.
50 Zisser. Commanding Syria. pp. 150-56.
51 Radio Damascus 6 May 2001.
52 Syrian Arab News Agency 27 March 2003.
53 Reuters 12 April 2003.
54 Yediot Aharonot 20 December 2004.