From Father to Son: Ruling the Syrian State

     The Syrian public’s doubts about Bashar’s ability to fill his father’s shoes gave rise to voices demanding greater freedom and political reform. In 2000, Mundhir al-Muwassali became one of the first to test the limits of the regime’s tolerance. Riyad Sayf, a businessman and People’s Assembly member followed suite and began holding weekly meetings in his Damascus home, calling them “The Forum for National Dialogue” (Muntada al-Hiwar al-Watani). He sought to transform the forum into “The Friends of Civil Society” (Ansar al-Mujtama’ ‘al-Madani) and announced the creation of a new political party, “The Social Peace Party” (Hizb al-Salam al-Ijtima’i). Convening such meetings were illegal according to Ba’th Party law – indeed any meeting of more than five people required an advance permit. Nevertheless, in 2000, these meetings evoked no response from the authorities and similar groups began springing up around the country.

    In September 2000, 99 prominent intellectuals in Syria signed a petition and published it in a Beirut newspaper where they demanded the release of all political prisoners and demanded political, social, and economic reform. This was followed by the Statement of 1,000, a loftier follow up that went far beyond the Statement of 99 and called for the elimination of the one-party rule with a multiparty democracy to take its place. It was leaked to the Lebanese press on 9 January 2001 before all the would-be signatories could agree on the final language.

    If for six months there was “Spring in Damascus” when it came to social reform, the wave of openness presented the senior members of the regime with a problem and fast led to the “Damascus Winter.” When the decisive moment came, the old guard understood the danger to its status. After Bashar’s 8 February 2001 interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat where he admonished the reformers, other senior members of the regime mounted an all-out campaign against the reformers and began imprisoning intellectuals and public figures who headed the camp.

    In an interview with al-Hayat in October 1997, Bashar described his internet skills yet at the same time he warned about the dangers of uncensored surfing on the World Wide Web.⁴⁶ In 1997, Syria was not hooked up to the internet. A decade later, with more of the country online, the regime blocked the popular social website, Facebook.com citing Israeli infiltration – again demonstrating the inibility of the country to allow open debate and a global exchange of ideas.⁴⁷ This also marks the continuation of Hafiz’s policy where as early as 1994, Muhammad Salman, Syria’s minister of information warned against the danger posed by uncencored news and the damage it could cause to their “morale, faith, and adherence to ideological principles.”⁴⁸

    The unavoidable exposure to the West in the new era of globalization led many Syrians to call for greater socio-economic liberalization. This is not a demand for upheaval but mainly, an improvement in the average Syrian citizen’s standard of living. However, much like Hafiz’s policies, Bashar’s have continued to reflect no dramatic transformation in the style of government, division of power, or new desire for greater social freedom.