From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology

 

            The luxury provided by a failed peace endeavor is that there is no shortage of mistakes available upon which to pin one's blame.  If an agreement were reached in 2000-01, there would be many accounts explaining the success - but not nearly as many as there are now given the decisive failure.  Carter, Begin, and Sadat are remembered as heroes in the West - the revisionists spoke softly and the orthodox could still claim that they achieved their objectives at the end of the first Camp David summit.  That same summit could easily have turned out differently.  A collection of books celebrating Camp David's success would turn into a library of accounts with accusing fingers extended.  No matter the topic, what went wrong remains a more appealing discussion than what went right.  After all, who would care about the Titanic if its maiden voyage ended safely at harbor in New York?

 

            The eclectic accounts are very precise.  They are like the survivors of the Titanic who can describe in vivid detail what happened as the ship went down - they know the ship struck the iceberg at exactly 11:40:21 PM and sank at 2:20:06 AM; there were 16 lifeboats on deck, the first was lowered one hour and seven minutes after impact, and it took an average of ten minutes and twelve seconds to lower each lifeboat thereafter.  The revisionist account is correct in that they present indisputable facts - there was a panic on the deck of the Titanic, not enough safety vests, cold water below, a tired captain, over-confidence on the part of the crew, and a lack of adequate lifeboats - however, their account replaces the central role of the iceberg with other details.  The orthodox account is fundamentally correct - they hit an iceberg and that's why the ship went down - case closed.  Accordingly, anything that happened afterward was the result of the iceberg and of secondary importance. 

            Without the orthodox camp, there would be no revisionists, for it is the orthodox camp they seek to contradict with a selective focus.  Likewise, there would be no orthodox narrative without the deterministic camp, who correctly explain: Yes, many horrific things went wrong on deck (revisionist); yes, the ship sank because they hit an iceberg named Arafat (orthodox); yes, the last song played on deck by the eight-piece band led by Wallace Hartley was "Nearer, My God, to Thee," (eclectic)  - but the ship was not sea-worthy to begin with and should not have left the harbor (deterministic).

            The revisionists cite a host of tactical errors to explain the causes of failure from 2000-01.  Most revolve around Barak and the American delegation.  For Barak, these include his Syria-first strategy; the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon on 24 May 2000; his push to hold a high-stakes summit in the first place; his hijacking of American foreign policy; his decision not to discuss Jerusalem in-depth (internally or externally) prior to the summit; and his cold manner and negotiating style - something Barak refers to as the "Barak didn't serve the baklava with his right hand but with his left" argument.^[93]  Others argue it was Barak's failure to fulfill the third redeployment before the summit and transfer three Palestinian villages; the expansion of Israeli settlements; the decision not to release Palestinian prisoners; and his lack of preparedness for the summit.^[94]

            The revisionists claim that the American delegation was unprepared at Camp David - that they "lacked a sense of direction coming in, a coherent plan once there, and a fall back position coming out," resulting in "bumper car diplomacy."[95]  They further accuse the Americans of not being an "honest broker" or taking account of Palestinian positions - as if America should not have their own foreign policy, interests and world view, and should simply ignore their own historical narrative regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute.  The view that America was or is capable of being an honest broker is naïve at best. 

            On the technical side the revisionists argue that Albright lost control of the summit when Clinton left to attend the G-8 summit for a few days in Okinawa; the Americans put out a premature press release saying the summit was over while the talks were in fact continuing; and Clinton bolstered Barak at Arafat's expense after the summit.  Additionally, they claim that the summit was held too early in July; Arafat felt trapped into attending; and the summit should have been held a few months later (while conveniently ignoring that Arafat said he would unilaterally declare statehood on 13 September regardless of the negotiating outcome).  While most of the above revisionist line is true, it is irrelevant.

            Too much is made over the depth of the Israeli proposals - did they offer cantons or contiguous territory; what territory percentage was offered; how long would it take to complete Israel's withdrawal; the number of early-warning stations; what nations would be included in the multi-national force; who would control the electromagnetic sphere over the West Bank?  Even if one could sift through every single account, there would be no universal agreement on what precisely was offered and when.  Furthermore, while answers to the above questions would provide more detail, they would utterly fail to explain why the Palestinians and Israelis did not resolve the conflict from 2000-01.  They failed to reach peace for much larger and fundamental reasons. 

            The Palestinians were not ripe to resolve the conflict in 2000, and with the war of attrition they were not yet ready for a de-escalation.  Once Ariel Sharon won the Israeli elections on 6 February 2001, the time was not even ripe for negotiations - the time was only ripe for war.  Even if the Palestinians were ready to resolve the conflict and offer minimal concessions, the Israeli insistence on an end-of-claims agreement brought the clash of historical and religious narratives to the forefront.  This in turn precluded the possibility of reaching any partial agreement based on a rational balance of interests, such as territory, borders, and security.  The clash of historical narratives led to a Palestinian retrenchment behind their most maximal positions.  As a result, the disparity between Israel's greatest concession and the Palestinian sense of justice and national rights was not bridgeable.  Instead, the process became a battle over narratives, justice, red lines, and mythology.

            If the positions the Palestinians unveiled from Camp David to Taba are their red lines and should be taken as a sign of their intentions, then one is left with the conclusion that Arafat and most Palestinians did not accept Israel's right to exist.  It was not, as Malley and Agha claim, that the Palestinians did not accept Israel's moral legitimacy; it was that they did not accept Israel's right to exist at all. 

            This is not to say that the Camp David summit and what followed was a waste of time, which is a different argument from premature.  This is also not to say that the process from 2000-01 did not result in an awakening, discernable over time.  After all, no crystal ball was available to the protagonists in 2000 and therefore what happened was not geared toward learning lessons but solving the issues before them.

            Given narratives, justice, red lines, and mythology, it is as clear now as it should have been then:  Israelis and Palestinians remain years away from ending the conflict.  Unless there is a change in either side's fundamental principles, the conflict will remain unsolvable.  One can only hope that given the collective autopsy performed on the patient named, "Oslo," each side will emerge with a better understanding of the other and apply those lessons in the future.  Only time will tell.