From Camp David to Taba, 2000-01: Narratives, Red Lines, Justice, and Mythology
Even if the conflict had been ripe for resolution, the July summit was not going to produce an agreement because neither side knew their bottom line. Armed with this lack of knowledge, the United States was denied negotiating leverage and the ability to apply pressure on the appropriate party during the summit. Malley and Agha are correct when they argue that each Israeli offer was presented to the Americans as their red line. In turn, America would reiterate the offer to the Palestinians - a flat "no" was the usual Palestinian reply. The Americans would then return with a new and inevitably movable Israeli bottom line and thus, the cycle continued. This helps to explain why throughout the summit the Palestinians perceived American and Israeli offers as the same and why the Palestinians felt that, "the American and Israeli delegations were melting into one."[29] A Barak-led Israeli approach to determine the minimum offer they could get away with should have remained separate from an honest and in-depth assessment of what they could eventually live with.
Protagonists had the responsibility - the duty to examine in detail how much they were willing to concede before the summit regardless of whether their opponent was engaged in a congruent internal debate. That the Palestinian delegation didn't budge beyond quickly retracted offers, an unmoving rhetorical banner, and red lines that essentially remained constant, did not absolve Israel of this responsibility.
Arafat gave no indication that he would grapple with mythology. The lack of Palestinian movement should have solidified an American objection to hosting a summit. Ross' argument that, "Leaders don't give away their bottom lines-indeed, might not even know their bottom lines before a summit-type situation. And to insist that they must give us their definitive positions on Jerusalem or else there is no summit is to guarantee no summit,"[30] - should have (contrary to the eventual decision) guaranteed no summit.
The American decision to host a summit at Barak's persistent request came from a few meetings with the negotiators in mid-June. Ross hosted the front channel negotiators, Oded Eran and Saeb Erekat for dinner. During a private moment with Erekat, who was pushing for two summits in order to handle all the big issues, Ross explained, "Saeb, there won't be even one summit if we don't see the makings of a deal. Today, I can't tell the President in good conscience that I see one."[31] Ross recalls Erekat's response and his own thoughts on the process:
Saeb was eloquent and to the point: "Dennis, it is possible. And we cannot miss the opportunity. We will never have an Israeli government like this one. If we cannot do it with an Israeli government that includes Yossi Beilin, Yossi Sarid, Amnon Shahak, Shlomo Ben-Ami, and Haim Ramon, we will never do it." So, I asked, tell me what the deal looks like. Again, he was to the point: on the land, 92 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinian state, with the Israelis swapping an equivalent amount of land next to Gaza-more than doubling the size of Gaza; on refugees, "let them deposit a number" they can admit to Israel and "give us the principle of [UN General Assembly resolution] 194 or right of return"; on Jerusalem, the Israelis have eight large neighborhoods, counting Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev, Pisgat Ze'ev, and Gilo in East Jerusalem; "those become a part of Israel. The Arab neighborhoods become part of Palestine, and one municipality will deal with transportation, water, electricity, and sewage." On each of Saeb's points, I had outlined likely Israeli reservations, noting that as a whole I was not sure Barak could go as far as he was suggesting. As Oded [Eran] and Debbie joined us for dessert, Saeb said, "Dennis, we can do this." For the first time, I was beginning to agree.[32]
According to Ben-Ami, the Israelis didn't officially offer more territory than the 88-12% formulation that had been worked out in the back channel, Stockholm talks before the summit. However, he concedes that in one-on-one conversations he spoke of 8-10 percent of the West Bank remaining in Israeli hands, thus signaling a deal based on 90-92 percent of the West Bank. "Abu Ala mentioned 4 percent to me. To the best of my knowledge, ahead of Camp David (U.S. President Bill) Clinton received from the Palestinians a pledge of 2 percent. So it could be assumed that we would go beyond 90 percent and the Palestinians would go beyond 4 percent and we would meet at some point in the middle."[33] There were significant indications that progress could be made if Camp David was only to tackle the issue of territory.
Sandy Berger demanded that the Americans authenticate these positions before opting for a summit. In the end, these positions were not authenticated as Arafat was in "full-scale retreat."[34] Israel presented far less as an opening Camp David position and Erekat's vision was strikingly similar to the rejected Clinton Parameters. Palestinians presented nothing approaching Erekat's vision in July. Unfortunately, Clinton struck a bargain with Barak's timetable for hosting a summit.
If America understood that Barak's plan was to sign an EOC agreement at the summit's conclusion, then they should have known that they were hosting a summit to solve 1948 - not Israel's 1967 occupation. Therefore, Israeli and Palestinian red lines on Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees should have been the crux of the matter. Instead, America used 1967 rationale to host a summit designed to solve 1948.
[29] Hanieh, "The Camp David Papers." p. 22; Also See: Agha, and Malley. "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors." The fact that there were many Jews on the American peace team did not help the Palestinian perspective.
[30] Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 637.
[31] Ibid. p. 635.
[32]Ibid. p. 635.
[33] Interview with Shlomo Ben-Ami in Haaretz Magazine.
[34] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 643