Engagement has been the centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s policy in the Middle East. In its broadest sense, it represents a new willingness to listen and cooperate, and take other countries into account when forming our foreign policy. This engagement is meant to convince our adversaries through diplomacy that there is an alternative path available to them in terms of their relationship with Washington if they change certain behaviors that are of critical concern to the United States.  President Obama articulated that our relationships abroad will be “based on mutual respect and mutual interests.”  It is the second part that I will concentrate on tonight.

The policy of diplomatic engagement for this administration sprung forth as a reaction to President Bush’s perceived “cowboy diplomacy.” This position holds that we not only antagonized our adversaries but our allies as well.  President Bush was accused of being confrontational, unilateralist, relying excessively on military force and on the instruments of hard power. It became seen as method to coerce rather than persuade our enemies to change directions. At the end of the day, it is argued that this approach was not effective at advancing America’s core interests in the Middle East.

As Bush was leaving office one could argue that the global situation had grown worse: Iran moved closer to getting nuclear weapons; North Korea tested a devise and expanded their existing nuclear arsenal; and Syria’s alliance with Iran remained strong as they continued to play a destabilizing role in the region vis-à-vis Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. And despite a final push towards a Palestinian-Israeli peace, Bush’s presidency concluded with an Israeli offensive against Hamas in Gaza – a response to unyielding Palestinian rocket attacks aimed solely at killing and maiming Israeli civilians. Regional peace looked no closer at the end of the Bush Administration than it did at the end of the Clinton Administration.

This widely held narrative of Bush’s abrasive diplomacy, whether accurate or not, led many to conclude the confrontational posture had been tried and failed. This clearly had a strong influence on how the Obama Administration conceived of and pursued engagement. It is not unfair to say that a working assumption emerged among some in the administration that felt the crux of the problem with America’s relations with these states and actors had as much to do with the misguided approach of President Bush as it did with the belligerent ideologies and hostile ambitions of states such as Iran and Syria themselves, and actors such as Hamas and Hizballah. It was thought that Russia and China were reluctant to join with the United States on a host of issues including Iran because of Bush’s style rather than any fundamental difference in interests and ideology and in their threat perceptions. 

President Obama set out to fashion a policy that was the anti-Bush approach. But this is nothing new. George Bush did the same after the Clinton administration. He saw the Olso peace process in tatters and the Syrian-Israeli process at a dead-end. In fact, the new second intifada was in full swing and Bush made the calculation that the parties to the conflict were not ready to make peace. So why put the presidency at stake with such a toxic issue after a contested American election?

The typical pattern in Washington is that when a new president comes to office from a different party, they want nothing to do with the policies before them and prefer to make their own mark. At the same time, there is always a learning curve when a new administration takes office.

And yet, much of what we are trying to do now in the Middle East is now considered new. This is being sold as ‘change’ and a ‘new direction’ – but in fact, these are many of the same approaches we saw from President Clinton – and in the Middle East, it is not unfair to say that they have been proven not to work effectively or advance America’s key interests in the region. So in effect, what is old and what has not worked is now being repackaged as new.

Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

When it comes to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – the assumed core conflict in the Middle East - Washington cannot manufacture the desire to create peace either in the Palestinian Authority or in the Israeli government. The Oslo peace process began as a secret Palestinian-Israeli initiative. The Camp David Accords were signed between Israel and Egypt after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Jerusalem and addressed the Knesset in 1977. He made the choice to make peace. Likewise, Jordan and Israel concluded a peace agreement in 1994 because both sides decided it was in their interest.  Unless a fundamental change occurs in either the Palestinian or Israeli red lines, peace will remain a far way off.

Here, the process and outcome are defined very differently in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Gaza City.

Look at the three central issues at the core of the conflict: territory, Jerusalem, and refugees. In September 2008, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert went further than any of his predecessors. He offered the Palestinians 93.6 percent of the disputed territories, along with a land swap of 5.8 percent and a safe-passage corridor from Gaza to the West Bank. And, Olmert made clear, while Israel would not formally recognize the Palestinian claim to a "right of return," it would accept the return of a defined and limited number of refugees as a humanitarian gesture. Olmert also threw in concessions regarding Jerusalem, agreeing to the historic step of joint administration by Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

Fatah's response spoke volumes. As Muhammad Dahlan, former Gaza strongman who serves as prominent member of Fatah's Revolutionary Council (now newly elected to Fatah's Central Committee), put it earlier this year, when asked about the major quarrel taking place in Palestinian politics: "[We] are not asking Hamas to recognize Israel's right to exist. Rather we are asking Hamas not to do so, because Fatah never recognized Israel's right to exist."

Dahlan's was hardly an isolated sentiment, but an accurate restatement of party dogma. Fatah's bylaws still declare that the "path of popular armed revolution is the only, and inevitable, way to liberate Palestine." Other sections call for strengthening ties with countries opposed to "the Zionists," rejecting UN resolutions, and eliminating Israel through the use of force.

As the Fatah Congress eloquently confirmed, there has been no movement from the political positions held by the Palestinian leadership in 2000-01. Jerusalem and its environs are still considered solely Palestinian, and the future capital of their state; all Israeli settlements must be dismantled; and the right of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel remains sacred - and unlimited. And, despite signs of cosmetic political change, courtesy of the Fatah Congress, there are precious few signs of a rethinking of the PLO's basic narrative and red lines; the main issue today remains not whether the Palestinian leadership will recognize Israel as a Jewish state, but whether it recognizes Israel's right to exist in any form whatsoever.

So again, the core interests of Washington are defined very differently in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Gaza City.

There has also been a growing chorus in Washington that still lags behind the voices in Europe and the wider Middle East calling for a Palestinian unity government – that is joint rule between Hamas and the PA. This would be a huge mistake and doom U.S. efforts to make peace in the region while sending a powerful signal that terrorism not only pays but also is the preferred approach. Nothing more would weaken Palestinian moderates who have chosen negotiations over violence than rewarding Hamas.

It should also be understood that what we are dealing with is a fundamental clash of historic narratives. This divide will remain unbridgeable. You heard Youseff before me refer to the Naqba – the catastrophe – which is Israel’s independence and the Palestinian loss in the 1947-49 war. Here, there will be no meeting of the minds. There will always be outstanding claims for what was good for Israel was bad for Palestinians in the context of the war they launched.

There are two issues here: 1948 – which is Israel’s existence and the birth of the Palestinian refugee issue and; 1967 – territory and borders. If a settlement is to be reached, it can be done by solving the problem of 1967; it cannot be done, at least for the foreseeable future, based on 1948. Justice according to the Palestinian narrative is not justice from an Israeli perspective. This is something that all should bear in mind when pressing for immediate solutions to the conflict or searching for the non-existent magic bullet.

Syria

Regarding Syria, Bashar al-Asad was the first to reach out to then President-Elect Obama last November 7. He sent a telegram that "expressed hope for constructive dialogue so that the difficulties can be overcome which have hampered the advance of peace, stability and progress in the Middle East." 

The list of these "difficulties" is indeed long. The regime in Damascus supports terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, continues to destabilize Lebanon, strives to become a nuclear power, is politically and tactically wedded to Iran, and continues to serve as the main launching point for Iraqi insurgents who have killed hundreds of Americans and countless thousands of Iraqis - and this is just the tip of the iceberg.

This led to two approaches: The first holds that Syria has taken Iraq's place in the "axis of evil," and that the way to alter its behavior is continued isolation and stepped-up sanctions - this is the stick approach. The second argues that the US should engage with Damascus, support efforts to renew Syrian-Israeli dialogue, and attempt to pry Syria apart from its allies in Teheran with a basket of incentives - the carrot approach.

This gave rise to the false belief in Washington that it is possible to effectively flip Syria away from Iran and towards the West – again this belief is based on the view that the problem has been that we - the U.S. - have not sufficiently explained why it would be beneficial to them – Syria - to reorient themselves toward the West. But the Syrian regime has their own worldview and their own interests.

It is not in Syria’s interest to have a peace agreement with Israel that would inevitably increase American influence in the region, just as it is not in its interest for a separate Palestinian-Israeli peace to emerge that would forever rob the regime of its most valuable card: the Palestinian issue.  Syria’s importance in the region rests on its ability to cause mischief. Absent a compelling grievance, Syria would be reduced to a fourth-rate power, void of natural resources, and with little influence in the Arab world.

Here we must look at Syrian logic, which is a way of thinking, acting, and negotiating that is very different to the way we hold court here in the West. Damascus has said that if relations with Washington were to improve, the regime could use its influence with Hizballah and Hamas, help to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and secure an honorable exit of U.S. troops from Iraq. 

So, when you think about it Syria, in effect, is proposing to prevent itself from arming the terrorist groups that it already supports while offering the US a chance to end Syria's regional isolation. And in return, Asad wants "normalized" relations, a new US ambassador (recalled after Hariri's assassination in Lebanon in 2005), an end to the economic sanctions, American sponsorship of indirect peace talks with Israel, and compensation for the October 2008 air strike that killed Abu Ghadiyah – who had been operating in Syria for a number of years, smuggling money, weapons, and fighters into Iraq to help the insurgency. 

In other words, in return for agreeing to an increased regional role and an end to its isolation, the Asad regime would like to be offered an increased regional role, an end to their isolation - and a pile of cash to boot. This kind of circular reasoning might sound new and bizarre, but it is, in fact, the norm. Welcome to Syrian logic. 

The most significant turn in the Obama administration’s public attitude to Syria came on June 24, 2009, when Washington announced its decision to send an ambassador back to Damascus – although this has yet to occur. This was followed by the administration’s near silence in the wake of the August 19 truck bombing outside Iraq’s ministries of foreign affairs and finance, where Iraqi president Maliki blamed Syria and lodged a formal request with the United Nations for an international investigation of the bombing and other terrorist attacks.  

Throughout 2009, there has been a host of U.S. delegations visiting Damascus. These contacts have led to a loosening of some trade restrictions. But whether or not President Obama’s carrot approach to Damascus will lead to substantial and strategic changes Syria’s behavior remains to be seen. As of today, we can so far say no.

Iran

The differences in approach between the Bush administration and the Obama administration are probably best seen in how we deal with Iran.

With respect to Iran, instead of the closed fists approach, we have the open hand. Instead of threats of isolation, punitive action, and threats of military force, we have sent at least two letters to Iran’s leadership re-assuring them that we seek direct negotiations. Whereas Bush’s New Year’s message was to the people of Iran and against the regime, now messages to the leaders of the Iranian regime have no mention of human rights and they speak of our desire to have the “Islamic Republic of Iran” assume its rightful place among the community of nations.

Back in March, the President’s view of engagement was that even if there was only a 10% chance of a successful negotiation with Iran on the nuclear issue, he wanted 100% of U.S. actions to be directed towards demonstrating to Iran and the rest of the world America’s commitment to finding a peaceful and diplomatic solution.  In doing so, the President quite consciously rejected the alternative of a harder edged approach to engagement that would have combined the offer to negotiate as well as a generous incentives package, with a simultaneous effort to increase diplomatic, economic, and military pressure if Iran’s leaders continued down the nuclear path.

A good example of Obama’s initial approach to Iran and his perception of interests came in his statement in May after meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.  He said: “We are engaged in a process to reach out to Iran and persuade them that it is not in their interest to pursue a nuclear weapon and that they should change course.” Of course, he found his words falling on deaf ears precisely because nuclear possession is, in fact, in the regime’s interest.  The nuclear option presents Iran’s rulers with the assurance that the West will not act against them, no matter how rogue their behavior.  One need look no further than the feckless international response to North Korea’s recent saber rattling to appreciate the logic of this assumption.

The result of all of this is that for at least the first six months of this administration, we saw an engagement policy predicated almost entirely on our effort to reassure the Iranian regime of America’s benign intentions. I think it is also fair to say that that approach has produced virtually nothing from Iran – with the exception of a fairly continuous string of insults towards President Obama, claims of Iran’s great victory over the United States, repeated missile launches, the satellite launch, the opening of a new nuclear installation, and a stolen election and a brutal crackdown on peaceful protestors. And of course and perhaps most importantly, the ongoing progress in spinning centrifuges and enriching uranium.

For six months, our policy was to reassure the Iranian regime that we had benign intentions. This idea began to crumble after the June 12 election and the protests that followed. One administration official said that the June election led to the deflation of the optimism that a successful resolution to the nuclear problem could be reached. In other words, the so-called green movement of protests in Iran was initially seen by the administration as a complication to the engagement strategy as opposed to a strategic opportunity for the United States to advance its broader interests in Iran or the Middle East.

So by mid-Summer there appeared to be a realization by some in the administration that the softer approach to Tehran was not producing and it combined with acute sense of urgency, particularly on the part of the Israelis, that time was running out on the diplomatic clock.

I think beginning with the G8 summit in July, we begin to see the adoption of elements of a slightly harder form of engagement. It’s what the administration calls the “dual track strategy” of offering diplomacy on one hand with the greater threat of sanctions on the other. At the G8 summit we saw the President provide a soft deadline of the end of September for negotiations, less expressions of the Administration’s eagerness to engage, and more warnings that the ball was firmly in Iran’s court. 

At the G20 Summit in September came the revelation of Iran’s new nuclear installation in Qom and the strong statements of warning towards Iran – particularly on the part of British Prime Minister Brown and French President Sarkozy. And just this past weekend, Iran rejected the UN-backed plan to ship much of their enriched uranium abroad for further enrichment.

It is my hope that the lessons learned in these first ten months of engagement with Iran show that pressure must be applied in conjunction with negotiations. It is the only hope of changing Iran’s behavior on the nuclear issue. The pressure we assert should demonstrate in a very concrete way that the regime’s very survival may hang in the balance if it doesn’t change its ways.

Conclusion

So, ten months in to the Obama Administration, reality has begun to temper ambitions in the Middle East. There have been missteps in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the careful weighing of options regarding Syria, and hardly a word on Lebanon. In Iran, it is safe to say that if a reset button exists, it exists only within the mind of the Obama Administration.  

One thing is for certain: Iran is America’s biggest challenge in the Middle East. And so, it is difficult to gauge how well Obama’s engagement tactic is working. This all depends on how the situation unfolds. But I’m sure we will all be watching.