Estimates vary on how long it will take Iran to develop nuclear weapons. They seem to center on the belief that it could be within one to three years. While the world and the United Nations stand united in rhetoric alone, nothing effective is being done to curtail the Iranian nuclear program. Even in the United States, there is a great disagreement on the proper path forward with no agreement on the facts and their interpretation.
In order to create and implement an effective policy and plan for contingencies, we must first dispel the myths, focus attention on uncomfortable truths, and finally, devise a strategy and coherent policy.
In order to create and implement an effective policy and plan for contingencies, we must first dispel the myths, focus attention on uncomfortable truths, and finally, devise a strategy and coherent policy.
Myth-conceptions
Myth #1: Iran is not actually using nuclear technology to make weapons.
Reality: For civilian use of nuclear energy, uranium needs to be enriched up to 10%. Iran is enriching uranium up to 90% - a percentage necessary for weaponizing uranium. Russia offered to help with the enrichment process at civilian levels but Iran rejected this. If Iran was not intending to use the fissile material for weapons systems, this enrichment beyond 10% would be a fantastic waste of time and money, not to mention a bizarre strategy to break away from their international isolation.
Reality: For civilian use of nuclear energy, uranium needs to be enriched up to 10%. Iran is enriching uranium up to 90% - a percentage necessary for weaponizing uranium. Russia offered to help with the enrichment process at civilian levels but Iran rejected this. If Iran was not intending to use the fissile material for weapons systems, this enrichment beyond 10% would be a fantastic waste of time and money, not to mention a bizarre strategy to break away from their international isolation.
Myth #2: The United States’ National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) said that we have no proof that Iran is trying to weaponize uranium and therefore, there is nothing to worry about.
Reality: There can be no doubt that the NIE from 2007 is harmful to U.S. and European diplomatic efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear project, but it is more harmful not because of what it says, but because of how the media and certain political figures have focused on selective aspects and dumped the rest.
One example: I met with freshman Congressman Kieth Ellison's (MN-D) chief of staff in Washington, D.C. in March 2008. Whereas before Ellison was supporting tougher U.S. sanctions on Iran, the NIE provided his excuse to join the small handful in the House to vote against stronger measures. He misquoted the NIE.
Firstly, the NIE report states: "We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU [Highly Enriched Uranium] for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame."
The NIE report in 2007 (as opposed to their last one in 2005) chooses far too narrow a definition of what is considered a "nuclear weapons program." The NIE focuses only on Iran’s work on nuclear weapons design and covert uranium enrichment. However, the international community’s greatest concern has consistently been Iran’s overt enrichment program, by far the greatest technical hurdle on the path to a nuclear weapons capability.
- The process of uranium enrichment - This is technically difficult and takes a long time and is the hardest of the 3 components.
- Creating or obtaining the missile delivery systems - While this is difficult, Iran has been working on inter-contenential missiles and has the Shihab-3 missile, which is capable of reaching many European destinations.
- Weaponizing the uranium - This is the easiest of the 3 components. It is simply marrying nuclear material with missile warheads.
Take the U.S. for example: No one had ever split the atom before the U.S. began working on an atomic weapon during World War II. It took years of research to create the process and enrich enough plutonium. But less than two months after enough plutonium was enriched, the U.S. weaponized it and dropped two bombs over Japan. The weaponizing isn't the problem or a stop-gap measure; the enrichment is the problem as is the level of enrichment.
Myth #3: International sanctions are having an affect on Iran.
Reality: UN sanctions are feckless and ineffective and are having the opposite effect on the Iranian regime. In Tehran, the leaders joke in their media that the sanctions have no effect.
It wasn't until October 2006 that the UN finally took up the topic of Iran's nuclear program, which they had illegally concealed as a signatory to the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The three UN Security Council resolutions passed - #1737, #1747, and #1803 - have failed to alter Iran's behavior.
Myth #4: A high-level meeting between the U.S. and Iran, perhaps even at the American presidential level will help solve the problem and alter Iranian behavior.
Reality: There is no problem of a misunderstanding; it is one of disagreement - namely, Iran wants nuclear weapons and the U.S. does not want Iran to have them.
It sometimes appears as though certain American politicians are deaf. Al-Qaida and Hizballah declare both often and openly that they want "Death to America." This isn't because the West has failed to explain the virtues of a Disney culture but rather because they despise the American way of life. Much the same, one of Iran's four pillars of their 1979 revolution was their hatred of the United States. This is non-negotiable. They say this openly and act accordingly.
It is tempting to say: "We should talk about our problems with our enemies." This is not so simple. The U.S. is not Norway; it is a superpower and in the world of diplomacy, meeting with enemies bestows a level of legitimacy that can be used against the U.S.. If an American president wants to get a message across to Iran, there are many countries that can carry that message for us.
Because America is a strong country, their diplomatic recognition is sought by many. Meeting enemies pledged to our destruction legitimizes them and provides a platform for their hate-speech. Meeting our enemies without preconditions guarantees failure.
One example: Nixon was the last American president to meet the Syrian leader, Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus on the heals of the disengagement agreement in 1974. Due to the salty relations between the two countries, the next presidential visit to Damscus took 20 years when Clinton met Asad in 1994. This was during the peace process and such a visit was seen in Damascus as a victory - something they desired. The result of the press conference was disastrous and made Clinton and the U.S. look foolish. That was the last presidential visit to Damascus.
Meeting our enemies should be carefully considered against the likelihood that they will use the opportunity to restate the same positions we disagree with to begin with.
Iran supports terrorism, opposes the Middle East peace process, undermines U.S. efforts in Iraq, and is determined to pursue nuclear weapons. Their president denies the occurance of one Holocaust while preparing for the next by "wiping Israel off of the map." Iran should not be treated to summits with kid-gloves and appeasing behavior; they should be treated like the regional pariah and rogue state that they are.
Myth #5: It doesn't matter if Iran attains nuclear weapons - it's just one country.
Reality: The wider, Arab world is fearful of Iran. A Shi'a Iran with nuclear weapons would lead Saudi Arabia and Egypt to pursue nuclear weapons as well. This will set off an arms race in the Middle East. Nothing could be worse or more dangerous than a nuclear armed Middle East headed by unstable regimes.
Read Part II: Confronting the Iranian Threat: The Uncomfortable Truth of Failed UN Sanctions