Syria and the Inter-Arab System, 1990-2000

            Syria's relations with Turkey had always been filled with tension, suspicion, and hostility.  Four issues continued to strain their relations in the 1990s:  1) The issue of the Euphrates River; 2) Syrian support for the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) who were outlawed by the Turkish government; 3) The issue of northern Iraq where Syria feared Turkish intentions to gain control of the oil-rich region; and 4) The issue of Alexandretta which was a Syrian district annexed to Turkey in 1939, prior to Syria's independence.

            In 1987, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq signed a protocol regulating the division of the Euphrates River.  Given Syria's population boom, Damascus was far from satisfied with the level of water released to their country.  Further tension came in 1990 when Turkey temporarily shut off the flow of water to Syria claiming it was due to several dam construction projects.  One consequence of this renewed tension was Syria's aiding and encouraging the Kurdish PKK organization.  Indeed, their leader, Abdallah Ocalan had been living in Damascus until 1988 and the organization used training bases in the Syrian-held Biqa Valley in Lebanon.  Turkey demanded that the PKK cease all activity before holding bilateral negotiations with Syria on the water issue.

            In early 1996, the development of Turkish-Israeli military ties was seen as a direct threat to Syria.  This sent Damascus looking for another regional counter-alliance.  However, the conflicting interests between Iraq and Iran, the animosity leftover from the Iran-Iraq war, Syrian-Iraqi competition, and Jordan's quiet but tacit approval of the Turkish-Israeli alliance, left Asad unable to create an anti-Turkish military partnership.^[43]

            Tensions peaked when in February 1996, Turkey and Israel signed a military agreement providing for joint maneuvers and the transfer of weapons.  Worse still from Syria's perception was that it provided for Israeli flight training over Turkish air space.^[44]  During the first half of 1996, Syrian-Turkish relations deteriorated sharply, nearly to the point of military conflict.  In May, a series of explosions throughout Syria was apparently perpetrated by the Turkish intelligence services although according to the official version issued by Damascus, Israeli Mossad agents were behind the attack.^[45]  In turn, the PKK stepped up attacks in southern Turkey.  The situation was only temporarily defused with the change of leadership in Turkey and the rise of the Islamic movement headed by Erbakan.  However, his government fell in late 1997 and the tension again began to spiral out of control.

            By October 1998 the two countries were again posed at the brink of war after Turkey's new prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz, issued Syria an ultimatum:  Syria must stop aiding PKK activity or Turkey would strike militarily.  There was a strong desire in the region to avoid an armed conflict.  Egypt negotiated with Syria and offered to guarantee to Turkey their pledges to cease support for the PKK, but Turkey was not interested.  In the end, the crisis was only averted when Syria conceded to Turkey's main demands.^[46]

            There can be no doubt that exacerbating Syrian-Turkish tensions was the Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership.  This military alliance was negotiated by Rabin in 1994-95 but implemented during the Netanyahu years - when the peace process was at a standstill.  They provided for joint air and naval exercises, access to port facilities and the opportunity for the Israeli air force to train in Turkey.  The joint Israeli-Turkish maritime maneuvers ("Reliant Mermaid") in the Mediterranean in January 1998 was supported by America and further added to Arab-Turkish tensions.  This was despite the presence of a high-ranking Jordanian naval officer overseeing the maneuvers.  Clearly, Syria did not take kindly to any Jordanian involvement.  The Turkish-Israeli partnership - or the non-Arab alliance - strengthened the ties between the Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.  Syria, fearing encirclement by non-friendly states worked to rally the Arab world against the threat they perceive from this alliance.^[47]

            Both Israel and Turkey share similar concerns about Syria.  Asad viewed Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz's comments in August 1997 that Turkish-Israeli cooperation "is necessary to the balance of power" in the region as a threat to Syria.^[48]  Israeli air planes with access to Turkish air and ground space pushed Syria closer to Iran and Iraq.  Syria viewed this alliance as "directed against the Arab nation and its interests, as well as against anti-Israel Islamic states"^[49] and blamed their own capitulation to Turkey in October 1998 as a result of the two non-Arab countries.^[50]