From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000
Rabin's assassination on 4 November 1995 by a Jewish extremist opposed to the peace process dealt a heavy blow to the peace process. It was an obvious moment for Asad to reach out to the Israeli people, however, any gesture, no matter how small proved beyond his notion of making peace. Given Asad's policy and negotiating perspective, it was not surprising that no Syrian official attended the funeral in Israel. Nevertheless, Rabin's assassination and the implications for the peace process prompted a substantial number of Arab leaders to either send condolences or attend the funeral. Asad could not even bring himself to express a personal condolence to Yitzhak Rabin's wife, Leah, after several conversations with Warren Christopher. Asad's only reaction came in a phone call with the U.S. Secretary of State where he said that contrary to what some might think, "there will be no rejoicing in Syria."[139] Rabinovich thought, "Syria's direct response to Rabin's assassination was, at best, heartless."[140]
The Pocket was so secretive in 1995 that Peres was surprised to learn of Rabin's exercise. Rabinovich briefed Peres on the Syrian track and stressed that he should avoid using the term "commitment." He knew Clinton wanted to hear it. It was one thing to commit to continuing Rabin's policies, but quite another if Peres literally committed to withdraw from the Golan to the 4 June 1967 line without Israel's needs being satisfied.[141] When Clinton met Peres, the president assured the new prime minister that he intended to remain involved until July 1996. Clinton would then concentrate on his re-election campaign.
Peres' Focus: From Security to Normalization
Peres' priorities and approach to the process greatly differed from Rabin's. He wanted to secure a deal with Syria quickly and did not understand the obstacles. Mu'allim recalled, "Rabin was reluctant, suspicious, very cautious. He moved very slowly, inch by inch. When Peres became prime minister, he was in a hurry - he wanted to enter the elections [then scheduled for October 1996] with the Syrian-Israeli agreement in hand. He wanted to 'fly high and fast,' as he used to say."[142] Rabin's primary concern was security whereas Peres saw normalization as the key to peace. Assigning a major role to Israel's military establishment was not a key element in Peres' style of negotiating. He wanted any agreement implemented quickly and insisted on early engagement and economic cooperation. Peres also wanted a "Clinton-Plan" for regional economic growth and investment because signing a comprehensive peace would mitigate the need for a regional security organization and make economics the issue. Clinton was naturally cautious because formalizing a relationship with Israel that the Arab world already grudgingly accepted was sure to impede Washington's ability to facilitate the peace process or appear as an honest-broker.[143]
Peres wanted to transform the region. Uri Savir, who replaced Rabinovich as Israel's lead negotiator with Syria explained: "It was therefore our task to engage Syria in a new approach to bilateral peace, which, as Peres envisioned it, would lead to a regional system of cooperation and economic development. This peace 'construct' was to have a Palestinian foundation, a Syrian roof, and a new regional economy within its walls. Roads, energy, the supply of water, trade, and tourism would link the countries of the new Middle East, and as their economies grew, the appetite for conflict would diminish."[144]
Many in Israel's security establishment did not agree with Peres' economic vision described in his 1993 book, "The New Middle East."[145] Shlomo Ben-Ami thought it was "counter-productive" because Arab leaders saw it as an Israeli quest for economic hegemony and an attempt to drive wedges between the Gulf States who were trying to normalize their relations with Israel. He further argued that such cooperation would only be possible among countries with shared values and homogenous social structures like Europe.[146]
These sentiments were echoed in Damascus. Vice President Khaddam declared that the idea of a Middle East market was aimed to give Israel control of Arab resources and finish off the Arabs as a force. "The Arab's very existence and civilization is threatened by the illusion of a merger with the Middle East designed to drive the last nail into the coffin of Arab nationalism and Arab unity."[147] Asad explained in an interview, "I believe that they want a dark future for us...I believe that the long-term goal of the others is to cancel what is called the Arabs, what is called Arabism...I mean canceling our feelings as a nation, canceling Arab feelings, canceling pan-Arab identity."[148] Seale concurred: "Asad drew the line at joint ventures on the Golan. The Syrian public would see such ventures as an extension of the occupation, as a new form of Israeli hegemony, and he could not consider them."[149]
Peres did not understand that Asad wanted to contain Israel and that economic cooperation or any form of interdependence was not in Syria's interest. His focus on a fast agreement with Syria that would expand Israel's regional influence was far more threatening to Asad than either Rabin's approach or the hard-line approach adopted by Netanyahu from 1996-1999.[150]
In order to "fly high and fast" Peres wanted to meet with Asad in Damascus. Ross needed to explain to him that Asad would see this maneuver as a joke at best and a stunt at worst.[151] Seale explained that for Asad, "This was a card he was not prepared to play until real progress was visible, and so far there had been none."[152]
The Wye River Plantation in Maryland was chosen for the next round of intensive negotiations at the end of December 1995. While not a high-stakes summit, it was a new format in the negotiations - each side brought a team of negotiators consisting of military people, legal experts, and political negotiators. Asad approved the negotiating format provided that they were trilateral and announced publicly, reflecting his avoidance of any direct negotiation with Israel without an American presence and his desire to avoid the appearance of secret negotiations such as the Palestinian-Israeli process hatched in Oslo.
In a negotiation process where progress is counted by inches rather than feet or yards, it was a significant first that Asad allowed a small level of normalization to take place between his negotiators and the Israeli team. He agreed to let them eat together, socialize together, and sleep under the same roof (in different wings) - however; he again felt this procedural measure deserved a substantive response from Israel.
The Wye River Talks
The Syrian-Israeli talks at the Wye River Plantation stretched from the end of December 1995 until 4 March 1996 and were based on the 1995 Aims and Principles non-paper. Enough early progress was made to elicit public statements by the three parties that a final agreement and deal could be reached during 1996.[153]
Depth of Israeli Withdrawal
The issue of withdrawal was not specifically discussed at Wye, although Savir recalled that anytime the Syrians mentioned it, it was in passing and with a clear conviction that it was the 4 June 1967 line as Syria defined it. Technically, Israel agreed to set up a working group at some future point to negotiate the line's demarcation.[154] Mu'allim suggested that they set up a number of working groups. One would deal with demarcating the border. During the third round at Wye, Savir told Mu'allim, "you understand we will have some real battles in it," and put him on notice that the 1967 line was vague and would require hard negotiations. Savir relayed this to Ross, who agreed that Mu'allim "acknowledged the bargaining over the location of the border would be difficult."[155]
The Nature of Peace, Timeline, and Comprehensiveness
During these meetings, Israel and Syria expanded upon the meaning of "normal and peaceful relations." It would include full diplomatic relations with embassies, trade, and tourism. They concentrated on practical areas of mutual interest, such as constructing a road between the two countries and singled out 12 (or 18) areas of normalization, divided into three categories: diplomatic relations/embassies; tourism; and trade. It included the termination of Arab boycotts, and establishing telephone, fax, postal, and railway links, etc.[156]
Discussions on the timeline were based on Israel's concerns that while their withdrawal was concrete and tangible, Syrian responses during these phases needed to be measurable and tied to specific junctures in the process. They began by creating Syrian obligations towards Israel based on four junctures:
- The period before an agreement
- The time when an agreement was reached
- The time when Israel's first withdrawal would occur
- The point when Israel's withdrawal was complete
- The period thereafter[157]
The focus on comprehensiveness was on an understanding that parallel agreements between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon would mark the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Savir, Mu'allim accepted that Syria would have an obligation to make their peace with Israel one that would change the region.[158]
Rabinovich's account differs from Savir's in that he saw that the Syrians were not willing to elaborate on how an Israeli agreement with Syria would affect the region in terms of normalization. Rabinovich recalled, "Our experience with Egypt had taught us that an impressive treaty and a panoply of annexes did not in themselves guarantee the degree of normalization desired by Israel. But the Syrian tendency to minimize normalization and treat it as a necessary evil did not augur well for the quest for an arrangement predicated on the quality and depth of peace."[159]
Economic Relations
Syria was not interested in discussing bilateral economic links with Israel. They remained fearful of Peres' vision of a new Middle East and his desire for economic integration. Asad was deeply concerned that Israel's stronger economy would cause severe domestic problems. In a 1997 interview, Dr. Aziz Shukri, dean of the law school at Damascus University explained:
Israel thinks it can press a button and produce a cordial peace, and move the Syrian people from a war footing to a peace footing. This is not logical, because there is not a family in Syria that has not lost a son on the battlefield. Israel has asked for open borders and an open economy, a request with implications for Syria's industry and economy. After all, we do not open our markets to other countries either. How can anyone expect us to open our economy, where per capita income is 900 dollars, to another [Israel's] whose per capita income is 15,000 dollars?[160]
On the practical level, Israel discussed mechanisms to cancel around $7 billion of Syrian debt to Western nations, an accelerated development of Syria's economy, and creating links with Israel through infrastructure such as energy, water and roads and the development of the Golan through international investment in tourism. Syria was keen to develop bilateral economic ties with the United States (primarily economic aid) but given Congress' long-standing animosity towards Syria, Clinton was unprepared to spell this out. Israel also proposed creating network of private-sector groups throughout the world and region.[161] Mu'allim suggested that Ross raise the idea of a trilateral project organized by the U.S. in which Israeli companies would participate during his upcoming meeting with Asad. Asad agreed to this, provided American, not Israeli companies took the lead.[162]
Part of Peres' plan for a new Middle East included extending NATO into the region. Savir presented Ross an informal paper entitled, "Economic Partnership in the Middle East" which described "a kind of economic NATO, in which development would play the key role in stabilizing the security of the region." It focused on economic projects, links between infrastructures of neighboring countries, and a plan for investment by the industrial powers in the new a peaceful Middle East. Open economic borders, as Savir and Peres saw it, was the best defense against military temptations.[163] Indeed, Peres' and Savir's vision for a new Middle East was very ambitious, impractical, and impossible.
Water
Israel made it clear that without safeguarding the waters of the Sea of Galilee, on which two-thirds of Israel's water consumption depends, there would be no peace agreement. They reached a general understanding where both sides would have their water resources safeguarded. It required Syria to work on an arrangement with Turkey through the U.S. Mu'allim explained that in this process, Turkey would essentially become a partner in regional peace.[164] He also suggested that if Israel and the U.S. assisted Syria in resolving their water dispute with Turkey, there would be no water problem between Syria and Israel.[165] Ross agreed to hold talks with Turkey based on these ideas.
This plan would require that Syria, Turkey, and Iraq progress beyond their dormant 1987 protocol regarding the division of the Euphrates River. Given the strategic partnership between Israel and Turkey that came to light in February 1996 - which Asad saw as a direct threat to Syrian interests - and the deteriorating relationship between Syria and Turkey, this idea may have simply been wishful thinking.[166]
Security Arrangements
In a speech to the Knesset a few days before the Wye talks, Foreign Minister Barak laid out three goals of the security arrangements with Syria:
- To make a surprise attack impossible in practical terms.
- To reduce the incentive for an overall attack - militarily, physically, and through the fostering of cooperation.
- To create a reality that will prevent day-to-day incidents from deteriorating into an overall clash.
Barak continued: "The Syrians are afraid that we will maneuver them around the negotiating table; we are afraid that they will maneuver us. The cat and mouse game has been going on for two years [since Israel's Labor party defeated Likud]. Now we must see whether or not there is a real option for peace, in all aspects, which deserve examination."[167]
Negotiations on security arrangements began during the second round at Wye with the arrival of Generals Ibrahim al-'Ammar and Hassan Khalil from Syria, and Major-General Uzi Dayan and Brigadier-General Shlomo Brom from Israel. Syria refused the principle of transparency regarding the size and deployment of its military. In response to Israel's inquiries about Syrian support for Hizballah and other Palestinian rejectionist groups, they argued that once peace was achieved their activities would cease. Israel was unable to gain a Syrian commitment to rein in Hizballah during the negotiations with Syria during 1996.
Israel's chief concern was the deployment of Syrian troops - the further they would be stationed from Israel, the less Israel would need early warning stations on the Golan. For Syria, the main issue was the proximity of Damascus to Israel's border. They needed forces to protect the capital. To overcome this obstacle, Mu'allim explained that Israel's concern was not with the six divisions Uzi Dayan had previously mentioned but the three armored and mechanized divisions west of Damascus. He suggested making those three reserve rather than active divisions. Dayan responded by asking if Syria could move the ammunition and engineering equipment to other bases further from the three divisions and Mu'allim agreed.
Later during the second round Peres asked Uzi Dayan to return to Israel and assume the position of general officer commanding Central Command. He would be replaced by General Shaul Mofaz. Through the negotiations, Dayan built up a positive working relationship with his Syrian counterpart after a sour start. Dayan passionately addressed all assembled at Wye on the virtues of peace and his hopes for Israel and Syria's future before leaving for Israel. In a brief and spontaneous moment that was previously unthinkable, both Syrian Generals, Khalil and 'Ammar, rose from the table and embraced Dayan.[168]
The U.S. Role in Negotiations
The U.S. would remain in the role of host, mediator, and observer. Ross would continue to make summation points at the end of negotiating rounds, such as the 60-points of understanding drawn up at the close of the second round. According to Savir, the one weakness in America's position was their "exaggerated involvement as mediators." In his opinion, they "should have spent more energy defining its own broad strategic role in a peaceful Middle East."[169] However, in a U.S. election year that ultimately led to the Republicans taking over both houses of Congress, Clinton's task of drawing support for easing restrictions on Syria would have proved futile, if not costly.
The Decision to Hold Early Israeli Elections
When Peres became prime minister, he agonized over whether to keep the original date for elections on 29 October 1996, or renew his mandate and call for early elections on 29 May. By the end of January, Peres was beginning to feel the domestic pressure to decide.[170] In August 1993, Rabin decided to make the Oslo channel with the Palestinians official once he recognized that progress with Syria was not possible. In January 1996, Peres based his decision to hold early elections on progress with Syria.
His advisors were split both on the question of whether to hold early elections and whether the Syrian movement at Wye was significant. There are several reasons for this, not least of which was Syria was perceived in Israel as being disingenuous in their quest for peace. Since Madrid, Israel had a process with the Palestinians, levels of normalizations with the Arab world (held back only by Syria's strenuous objections and Saudi Arabia's temporary agreement), and a peace treaty with Jordan. Indeed, far less was accomplished between Israel and Syria than any other actor. Moreover, Asad's decision to offer no CBM to Israel seemed at odds with his "strategic choice" to make peace. The result was that negotiations with Syria were a large political football not only between parties in Israel, but among them as well. Ehud Barak, also from the Labor Party, began to express his pessimism and critical views about Syria by January. These Israeli statements permeated the discussions at Wye during the second round.[171]
After the first round at Wye in January, Christopher went to the region to brief Peres and Asad on the progress. During the first round security issues were not on the agenda because Asad was still preventing his generals from attending. Peres needed to know what was possible on security and how far apart their positions were. He outlined for Christopher what he needed to know from Syria in order to decide upon the elections. For a comprehensive peace, he wanted at least 15 Arab states involved and two or three working sessions with Asad. He also reminded the secretary that given Israel's electoral system, he needed to decide on elections before 5 February. If he kept the election date in October and pressed ahead with the Syrian track, he could not afford a crisis in their negotiations during the summer or early fall. He also understood that keeping the date in October might provide Asad with a tactical advantage and he would use it to extract Israeli concessions during the election campaign.[172]
Asad told Christopher that he was aware that it would be necessary one day to meet with the Israeli prime minister but he could not commit himself to a date.[173] Mu'allim explained that Peres' request to have a summit with Asad was nothing new, as Rabin had also wanted one. However, these summit situations require careful preparation. "If a meeting at the summit level is a failure, all further opportunities will be closed." He went on to say that the gaps between the Israeli and Syrian positions were still too wide and therefore, Asad thought that attending a summit would be "premature."[174] He also would not commit to sending water and economic experts to Wye, which led Peres to conclude that Asad was not serious about making peace with any new sense of urgency.
Peres' decision had far-reaching implications in the Middle East. No Middle East actor was absent an opinion. Ross recalled his discussion with Clinton and Christopher:
When President Clinton asked me if I thought Peres should go for early elections, I was categorical in response: "It is a big mistake. Today, Peres is seen in Israel as a statesman. As soon as he declares for early elections, he will once again look like the politician seeking an advantage. What's worse, what happens if there are two terrorist bombs? He won't recover." The President told me I was probably right, but said it was very hard to tell Peres that he should not call for early elections, especially when the polls showed him with over a twenty-point lead and the prospect of gaining a mandate. Secretary Christopher agreed.[175]
The Israeli delegation was also able to read between the lines when listening to the Americans. Rabinovich recalled, "Careful as Christopher was, it was clear to us that he and the Clinton administration in general were hoping that Peres would decide to keep the original date of the elections and proceed with the accelerated Syrian negotiation."[176] Savir recalls that contrary to other advice Peres was receiving, "My own recommendation was different. I wanted the opportunity to help forge a peace settlement with Syria in 1996."[177]
According to Mu'allim, Asad's response could not have been the reason Peres chose to hold early elections, but that it was because Likud was fast gaining in the polls against Labor and therefore, it "was an excuse, a way of blaming the Syrians for not reaching an agreement."[178] However, according to Israeli polls both when Peres decided to call for early elections (towards the end of January) and when he announced his decision to the public on 11 February, Likud was not closing the gap in the polls and Peres still held a lead of over 20 points. Likud did not begin to gain on Peres until the rash of suicide bombings at the end of February.
Terrorism, Lebanon, and Syrian Conduct
Despite Peres' decision to opt for early elections, the groups agreed to meet for a third round at Wye. It began under a cloud on 28 February because three days earlier, Palestinian suicide bombers blew up a bus in Jerusalem and a bus stop in Ashkelon, killing 25, and wounding close to 100. The same day, Radio Damascus broadcasted a commentary justifying the attack. Rabinovich said, "It argued along lines familiar to us by now that this was the action of desperate people. The real terrorist, it argued, was the occupier and not the occupied."[179] Under pressure from the Clinton administration, a 'softer' editorial was released in the Syria Times, a paper addressed to foreigners and hardly read by Syrians: "Although the incidents are condemned, these bombings and acts of violence and the ensuing closure of the occupied territory must be a lesson from which everybody should know that real peace is the only way to end tension and violence."[180]
Savir discovered that one of those killed was the son of one of his good friends and when he told Mu'allim, "he mumbled that is regrettable, but, like his fellow Syrians, he could not bring himself to forthrightly denounce violence against Israelis...Their response to the events of those days drove a wedge between us and was, I believe, self-defeating from a Syrian point of view."[181]
One week later another suicide bombing tore through another bus in Jerusalem on the same line, killing 20. Mu'allim expressed his private condolences but when Ross and Savir asked if he could express this sentiment in public, he again declined. The next day another suicide bomber struck in Jerusalem, killing eight. Ross again reminded Mu'allim that if ever there was an appropriate time to reach out to the Israeli public, now was the time. He agreed to check with Asad.[182]
Savir recalls its effect on the Israeli delegation:
In our Washington hotel, where we stayed on the weekends, we watched the horror on television. The familiar streets of Jerusalem covered with blood and debris were a nightmare. We were anxious to return home, to our families. When we asked for permission to do so, we were told that we would receive an answer within a few hours. It came in the form of another bomb blast, this time in heart of Tel Aviv.[183]
This suicide bombing happened outside Dizengoff Center, a large shopping mall in the center of the city during the holiday of Purim. The bomber struck in the midst of families and children dressed up in costumes to celebrate the holiday, killing 14 and wounding 130. Moreover, this time Islamic Jihad, headquartered in Damascus claimed responsibility. Ross had had enough:
I called Walid [Mu'allim] and said it was now or never: Syria must condemn these bombings now and no longer permit Islamic Jihad to operate out of Damascus. Again, he said he would see what he could do. When I called him later, he told me that there would be no statement; when he tried to explain, I cut him off: "This is bullshit. How do you expect the Israeli public to believe they have partners for peace when something as human as expressing outrage or even sadness over the killing of innocents is not possible?"[184]
These acts combined to end the peace process as it had been known for over four years. Asad not only refused to condemn these acts, but instead blamed Israel for them. Instead of preventing terrorists from operating out of Damascus, he saw to Hizballah's escalation in the south of Lebanon, including the breaking of the 1993 agreement when Hizballah again began launching Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. The Israeli delegation returned home on 4 March and Peres turned his attention to combating terrorism, the crisis in Lebanon, and saving any chance for reelection. Mu'allim explained that "this was a one-sided decision because they believed their public opinion would not agree to continue talks with Syria...they then changed their priority from the peace process to combating so-called terrorism."[185]
With the peace process in jeopardy, President Clinton organized the "Summit of the Peacemakers," hosted by Mubarak in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt on 13 March. A few days earlier, King Husayn of Jordan flew to Washington to condemn the attacks and assured the president that he would work to rally the Arab world to the cause of peace. The two flew to the summit together on Air Force One, in what must be seen as a stark reminder of the differences in approach and resulting relations with Washington between Husayn of Jordan and Asad of Syria. Altogether, 29 world leaders, half of them from the Middle East, came to the summit. Clinton described its significance: "For the first time, the Arab world stood with Israel in condemning terror and promising to work against it."[186] The summit's declaration at the end condemned, "all acts of terror in all its abhorrent form...including recent terrorist attacks in Israel."
Syria and Lebanon were invited to attend but Asad declined to even send a low level representative. This left Syria grouped with those who were not invited - Iraq, Iran, and Libya - all rejectionist states under American sanctions. Asad explained their absence by saying that the summit lacked proper preparation and would only serve Israel's interests. After the summit, Al-Thawra wrote that the most important absentee was peace itself.[187] Tishrin commented that "peace was the biggest loser at it, that the Arab cause has suffered, and the only winner was extremist Zionism which rejects peace and justice."[188] Seale recorded that Asad dismissed the invitation as "a blatant piece of U.S. electioneering on Peres's behalf."[189]
Asad saw himself cornered in a position Syria was familiar with during the 1980s - Israel and the West aligned against Iran and Damascus, working to organize the region without and to some extent against Syria. Asad's response was quickly delivered. As soon as Air Force One left the region, Hizballah broke their August 1993 agreement after Operation Accountability, escalated their attacks in southern Lebanon, and sent Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. Rabinovich explained that it was "a reflection of a Syrian decision to teach both the United States and Israel a lesson."[190]
The cycle of Hizballah rocket attacks followed by Israeli responses culminated in Peres' decision to launch Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon on 2 April. Peres spent the previous two weeks trying to convince the American delegation to have Syria rein in Hizballah. With Peres' poll numbers beginning to decline and many in Israel starting to question the basic reasons for a peace process with either the Palestinians or Syrians, Peres decided that he must act. He could ill-afford to be further accused by the Israeli public of being soft on security with Election Day fast approaching. Grapes of Wrath had the same objective as Operation Accountability - and both ultimately failed to remove or reduce Hizballah's presence.
For Asad, it looked like Syria was facing "a new threatening axis made up of Israel, Turkey, Jordan, and the United States." Some "pro-Israeli writers in the United States" and in the Western press began to talk of America's new "triple containment" strategy - adding Syria to the list alongside Iraq and Iran. Most disturbing was America's unflinching support for Israel's actions during Grapes of Wrath, which "To Asad, all these developments were, in one way or another, designed to destabilize him and reduce his regional influence, if not bring him down...Not without reason, Asad saw Grapes of Wrath as directed primarily against him." Asad fought to make sure this did not happen because "a wedge would have been driven not only between Syria and Lebanese, but between Syria and Iran as well."[191]
On 16 April, an Israeli artillery position came under rocket fire. As permitted by the August 1993 understanding, Israel returned fire on Hizballah forces from where they originated. Israel fired five 155-millimeter howitzer shells but instead of hitting the Hizballah gunners, they landed near the UN building in Qana, killing around a hundred Lebanese civilians who had fled there for shelter. While the UN spokesman in Lebanon publicly blamed Hizballah for using the UN site for cover while firing at Israeli troops, the world's attention and outrage focused on Israel. This played perfectly into Asad's hand. Whereas a month earlier the region was moving forward without Syria, now Christopher, and the foreign ministers from France and Russia were coming to Damascus to ask for Asad's help to stop the conflict.
Arriving at roughly the same ceasefire as in 1993 proved to be more challenging this time for the American mediators because neither Syria nor Israel were in a hurry. The more the world focused on Lebanon, the more they traced a solution back to Damascus. The longer Israel engaged, the longer Peres could claim that terrorists were not dictating Israeli actions and he could demonstrate that he could be counted on bring security with peace. Peres figured that the best way to isolate Syria and spare Israeli soldiers was to withdraw from Lebanon without dealing with Syria in the aftermath of any new agreement - which he understood would only be temporarily honored.
Asad was anxious to avoid an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon because it was their last card of Arab unity after Egypt, the Palestinians, and Jordan broke ranks. Asad did not want the Americans to declare that Syria was blocking Israel's withdrawal in order to preserve their "special relationship" in Lebanon. Once again, Asad was able to convince those involved that his power to prevent peace was stronger than his ability to provide peace.
It was difficult for Ross to gain Asad's agreement on preventing Hizballah from firing from civilian areas. The 1993 understanding allowed Israel to return fire at the source of the attack, even if it was a civilian area. Ross told Asad that if he could not agree to language that prevented Hizballah from using civilian areas as "staging grounds," then Israel would be allowed to target those areas. "Staging grounds" meant where the rockets were stored, prepared, and made ready before being brought to the "launching ground" where they were then fired. The U.S. decision to gain an immediate ceasefire in the wake of the Qana incident led them to adopt weaker language. They settled on the following phrase, "...and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks."[192] The vague language adopted in 1996 provided Hizballah with more room to maneuver, not less.
Asad's coup de grâce was keeping Christopher waiting for hours in Damascus while he was there to negotiate the ceasefire. According to Ross, the real reason for the secretary's trip was to fly by helicopter to Beirut as a part of American shuttle diplomacy, and that it was U.S. commanders in Europe who turned down the flight citing security concerns. Since Madrid, all previous diplomatic travel to Lebanon had been carried out through Damascus by convoy. This time America had a need for secrecy and no meeting was scheduled that day with Asad. Once stuck in Damascus, Christopher sought an audience with Asad, who was "unavailable." Ross explained that leaving Damascus just to make a point would have been pointless because they would be back again to secure the ceasefire with Asad.[193]
The fact, however, remained that Christopher was cooling his heels in Damascus for the third time while Asad had 'others' to attend to. This was at the end of Christopher's total of 23 visits to Syria in his four years as secretary of state. Asad was busy with the French, Russians, Italians, and the State dinner planned for Pakistan's primer minister.[194] Asad had exactly what he wanted - the world at his door and a silent message to the U.S. that essentially said, 'we are who you need; we are important; if you don't realize this then others do.' Thomas Friedman, in discussing the winners and losers of this episode realized the following:
But let's be clear about what happened here. What Mr. Christopher did was prevent a disaster from being the final result of his last three years of Mideast diplomacy and 20-odd trips to Syria - trips that were supposed to be forging a final peace treaty between Syria and Israel, not another cease-fire in Lebanon. He negotiated this same basic cease-fire three years ago. If he treats this new one as some big success, then he will be a failure. But if he takes it as an indication that he must rethink his Syria strategy - and the toughness and intensity that will be required of him to actually move Syria into a peace treaty with Israel - then he can be a winner... Hafez al-Assad: Loser. Yes, I know, the conventional wisdom is that the Syrian President, that wily ol' fox, once again got the better of everybody. He had the foreign ministers of France, Iran, Russia, Italy and the U.S. all jostling for his attention. But you only win in international affairs if you translate your tactical gains into some strategic objective, and Mr. Assad's problem is that he is all tactics and no strategy.[195]
When Asad made a "strategic choice" to pursue the peace process, he never foreswore his military option. While one can debate whether Iran or Syria had more control in determining a Hizballah escalation, one thing remains clear: When the fighting needed to stop, Damascus was the destination.
Peres' loss to Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu in the 29 May elections led the three protagonists to different conclusions regarding the possibility of achieving peace in 1996. According to Mu'allim, during the Wye talks, "We set a deadline for ourselves, agreeing to close the remaining gaps and finalize all the elements of an agreement by June 1996...The expectation was that by September 1996 the final document would be ready."[196] Dennis Ross was convinced that if Peres was reelected in May, "we would have been able to conclude a Syrian deal within a year's time."[197] According to Savir, "peace was within reach"[198] in 1996. Rabinovich disagrees in what was the most realistic assessment: "At no time during this period (August 1992 - March 1996) were Israel and Syria on the verge of a breakthrough."[199]
Before the elections, Asad claimed that there would be no difference between Peres and Netanyahu - Labor or Likud, and reminded the country that it was under Begin's Likud party that Israel made peace with Egypt. Therefore, Asad did not view the election results as an Israeli referendum on the peace process itself or a vote over who could provide the most security and concede the least.
[139] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 211.
[140] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 208.
[141] Ibid. p. 199.
[142] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S."
[143] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. pp. 203-09.
[144] Savir. The Process. p. 268.
[145] Peres, Shimon. The New Middle East. Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element, 1993.
[146] Ben-Ami. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. pp. 226-27.
[147] Hinnebusch. "Does Syria Want Peace?" p. 51.
[148] "Radio on Al-Assad's Al-Ahram Interview."; "Interview with President Asad in Al-Ahram."
[149] Seale. "Who Is Telling the Truth?" p. 76.
[150] Astorino-Courtois, Allison, and Brittani Trusty. "Degrees of Difficulty: The Effect of Israeli Policy Shifts on Syrian Peace Decisions." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44.3 (2000): 359-77.
[151] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 226-27.
[152] Seale. "Who Is Telling the Truth?" p. 76.
[153] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 81.
[154] Savir. The Process. p. 278.
[155] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 243-44.
[156] Savir. The Process. pp. 273-74. Ross recorded 18 areas of normalization with the same three categories from Israel's lawyer, Yoel Singer: Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 239; Rabinovich recalls that Singer and his Syrian counterpart "managed to fit twelve out of eighteen issues into the three categories that Asad originally authorized. But six issues still remained outside the scope of the Syrian concept of 'normal peaceful relations'." See: Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 219.
[157] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 239.
[158] ---. The Missing Peace. p. 239.
[159] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 219.
[160] "Al-Wasat." 3 February 1997. Quoted in: Zisser, Eyal. Asad's Legacy: Syria in Transition. London: C. Hurst, 2000. p. 118.
[161] Savir. The Process. pp. 274-75.
[162] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 240.
[163] Savir. The Process. p. 280-81.
[164] Ibid. p. 279-280.
[165] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 219.
[166] Inbar, Efraim. "Regional Implications of the Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership." Middle East Review of International Affairs 5.2 (2001): 48-65.; Gresh, Alain. "Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and Their Impact on the Middle East." The Middle East Journal 52.2 (1998): 188-203.; Zisser, Eyal. "Syria." Middle East Contemporary Survey XX (1996). p. 663. The strategic relationship between Turkey and Israel provided for joint military exercises, giving Israel access to Turkish airspace. Asad saw this as a direct threat aimed at Syria. Mu'allim's comments on the water issue may also have been designed to secure an Israeli interest or American participation in preventing the deteriorating Syrian-Turkish relationship.
[167] This speech was Barak's reply to a no-confidence motion on negotiating with Syria. See: Barak, Ehud. "Foreign Minister Ehud Barak: Reply to No-Confidence Motion on the Negotiations with Syria at the Knesset." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (25 December 1995). This also created added pressure on Peres to call for early elections.
[168] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 241-42. According to Rabinovich who was present in the Wye talks in a diminished role, both Uzi Dayan and Danny Yatom were dispatched by Peres. Yatom was inherited from Rabin while Dayan was Peres' pick. In Mu'allim's eyes, Yatom represented Rabin's excessive concentration on security, while Dayan represented a softer Israeli general "who would facilitate Israel's acceptance of a much more modest security regime." See: Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 218.
[169] Savir. The Process. p. 279.
[170] In the wake of Rabin's assassination and from November through mid-February, Peres' poll numbers were 21 points higher than Netanyahu's, prompting some of his advisors to suggest he hold early elections and renew his mandate at a time when he was in the clear lead and many Israelis were drawing parallels between Likud and Jewish extremism.
[171] Savir. The Process. p. 279;
[172] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. pp. 216-17.
[173] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 243.
[174] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 82.
[175] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 242-43.
[176] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 217.
[177] Savir. The Process. p. 281.
[178] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 82.
[179] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 227.
[180] "Syria: Bombings in Israel 'Condemned:' Seen as Lesson for Peace." Foreign Broadcast Information Service 29 February 1996: 46.
[181] Savir. The Process. p. 284.
[182] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 244.
[183] Savir. The Process. p. 284.
[184] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 244.
[185] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 82.
[186] Clinton. My Life. p. 702. While this opening summit was rhetorically impressive and symbolically helpful to Peres, the follow-up conference in Washington was less so and the effort soon floundered all together as the Arab states limited their involvement on the grounds that peace with Israel needed to come first.
[187] Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. "Inter-Arab Relations." Middle East Contemporary Survey XX (1996). pp. 67-68.
[188] "Daily Report." U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service 13 March 1996, sec. Near East and South Asia.
[189] Seale, and Butler. "Asad's Regional Strategy and the Challenge from Netanyahu." p. 28.
[190] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 226. While Asad may not have directly ordered the escalation, there is no doubt he did nothing to stop it and he continued to fan the flames in Syria and Lebanon's media. The order probably came from Iran, who opposed all aspects of the peace process and whose relations with Syria were strained over their participation.
[191] Seale, and Butler. "Asad's Regional Strategy and the Challenge from Netanyahu." pp. 28-29. It is interesting to note that Seale, Asad's biographer's uses the phrase, "between Syria and Lebanese, but between Syria and Iran..." It is no accident that the state of Lebanon is referred to as the "Lebanese" much like the "Palestinians." Syria does not recognize Lebanon's independence and has no embassy there.
[192] "Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding, 26 April 1996." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Lebanon+Ceasefire+Understanding.htm Accessed on: 26 April 2007.
[193] Ross. The Missing Peace. pp. 253-54.
[194] Erlanger, Steven. "Christopher Gets Snub from Assad in Mideast Talks." The New York Times 24 April 1996.
[195] Friedman, Thomas L. "The Envelope, Please." The New York Times 28 April 1996, sec. Foreign Affairs.
[196] al-Moualem. "An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, in J.P.S." p. 81.
[197] Ross. The Missing Peace. p. 244.
[198] Savir. The Process. p. 283.
[199] Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. p. 235.