From Madrid to Geneva: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-2000

           

Finding an agreeable framework to convene the conference proved to be a difficult task.  Secretary of State James A. Baker III spent months, including nine trips to the Middle East to find an amenable formula.  He pursued a two-track approach - the first was negotiations between Israel and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza; the second was negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.  America's goal was a regional meeting or conference cosponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union designed to comprehensively settle the Arab-Israeli dispute based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338.^[26]

 

On 8 March 1991, a week after the war ended, Baker's delegation arrived in Saudi Arabia and briefed King Fahd on America's two-track vision.  During these initial trips throughout the region, Baker was assured of Arab support, but during the spring and summer, it became clear that the two obstacles lay in Jerusalem and Damascus.  It was incumbent on the United States to convince Israel that sitting on the sidelines during the Gulf conflict, thereby abandoning their theory of 'strategic deterrent,' had actually led to a new atmosphere where a digestible peace was possible and making concessions was necessary.  It was equally important to persuade Hafiz al-Asad that his decision to participate in the American-led coalition would lead to a rapprochement with the West, and that joining the peace process was the only way to regain the Golan Heights.

 

Yitzhak Shamir saw the Middle East as a collection of Arab states with divergent interests.  As former Prime Minister Menachem Begin insisted ten years earlier, Shamir wanted to avoid a collective Arab-Israeli settlement and preferred to deal with each Arab state on a bilateral basis.  When Sadat and Begin forged a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace, it cemented the Arab state rather than the Arab collective as the negotiating partner in Israel's eyes.  The disintegration of any imagined 'pan-Arab unity' during the 1991 Gulf War^[28] reinforced Shamir's contention that a collective, pan-Arab negotiation was bound to fail.  Each Arab state or actor would pocket every Israeli concession and it would only require a single state to disagree with a bilateral formula and crush any comprehensive agreement.  Bilateral negotiations were in Israel's interest because it could remove the rhetorical argument of collective 'rights' and 'justice' from the Arab equation, and turn the argument into a debate between sovereign nations regarding strategic 'interests'. 

 

UNSC resolution 242, adopted on 22 November 1967 in the wake of the June war, called for the "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict..."  America agreed with Israel's interpretation of the resolution - in exchange for peace, Israel must withdraw from some territories, and not all territories.  This resolution was debated in detail before the UN voted and the authoritative, legally binding text was adopted according to the English language.  Arab states and parties interpret the resolution as meaning Israel should withdraw from all of the territories.^[29]  While Israel begrudgingly accepted the resolution in 1967, they wanted to move beyond the ambiguity of 242 into bilateral frameworks and agreements as long as the Palestinian issue was not included because 242 dealt with states and not Palestinians.

 

Shamir was against the idea of land-for-peace, preferring 'peace-for-peace' and thus accepted 242/338 as the basis "as agreed at Camp David," which provided less ambiguity as to the effects of 242/338.  This also allowed him to tell his constituency that he was not agreeing to anything new.^[30]  He could further argue that he had already fulfilled Israel's obligations on 242/338 since Israel already withdrew from all of the Sinai - accounting for over 80 percent of the territory Israel captured in 1967.  UNSC resolution 242 is far more problematic than it is useful.  Setting the semantic argument aside and moving towards bilateral negotiations and newer frameworks was in Israel's interest.

 

Diplomatic relations and recognition of Israel's right to exist were also key concerns.  While the Soviet Union originally recognized Israel on 17 May 1948, they severed diplomatic relations during the 1967 War.  Two weeks before the conference the Soviet Union reestablished diplomatic ties.

Syria's demand for the United Nations to sponsor the conference was another problem.  In November 1975, the General Assembly passed a resolution declaring, "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."  The resolution passed by a count of 72 to 35 with 35 abstentions.  It was not until the Soviet Union crumbled and after the Madrid Conference that on 16 December 1991, the General Assembly voted 111 to 12 with 13 abstentions to repeal the resolution.  In addition, the ease with which the United Nations Emergency Force complied with Egypt's demand (under Syrian pressure) to vacate the Sinai before June of 1967, and the UN presence on the Israeli-Lebanese border that failed to prevent any attack, rendered the UN's participation as destructive in Shamir's eyes.

 

Israel also sought to limit the participation of the European Community as they were seen as overly sympathetic to the PLO.  Neither Israel nor the United States had official diplomatic ties with the PLO at the time.

 

Hafiz al-Asad's conditions for attending a peace conference were diametrically opposed to Israel's.  Like Shamir, he also viewed bilateral negotiations as a zero-sum game.  His original vision was an international conference where the Arab parties, Israel, the United States, the USSR, and the European Community would participate, under the auspices of the UN.^[31]  Bilateral negotiations were to be kept to a minimum, if held at all.  Syria feared that direct negotiations with Israel by any Arab state or party would mean de facto recognition of Israel before Israel accepted the concept of trading land-for-peace and recognized Palestinian rights.  Recognizing Israel as a sovereign state without any preconditions would make them more reluctant to comply with the principle of land-for-peace.

 

Asad's desire to lead the Arab world in the quest for comprehensive peace went beyond mere rhetoric.  Whereas his relationship with Yasir Arafat and the PLO could be described as icy at best, in mid-March 1991 he held out an olive branch, releasing hundreds of Arafat's followers from jail before Baker arrived in the region.  He then allowed the Syrian-backed Palestine National Salvation Front to reconcile their differences with Arafat, and hosted the PLO in May negotiations to find a modus vivendi.  Two weeks after releasing Palestinian prisoners, Asad hosted Jordan's King Hussein, then met Husni Mubarak in Cairo where the two devised a plan for an international conference with a major role for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.  He also coordinated policy with Iranian President Hashimi Rafsanjani, and sent Foreign Minister, Faruq al-Shar' to Moscow.^[32] According to al-Shar', the USSR and Syria saw eye to eye on the peace process, "especially regarding the structure of the international peace conference, the participation of the United Nations and the European Community, and the continuity of the conference."^[33]

 

Syria had long maintained that separate bilateral negotiations, such as the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, would undermine the Arab position in the negotiations with the Israelis.  Therefore, Syria wished to lead a collective Arab delegation in negotiations with Israel - a notion rejected by both the United States and Israel.  Damascus wanted an agreement that the conference would be convened on the basis of 242/338 and the principle of 'territories for peace.'  He wanted Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan Heights - this was to be the point of departure; the negotiations should merely focus on implementing that withdrawal.

 

According to Asad, "Had Syria thought of its own interests only...it would have achieved a unilateral solution...But it did not and will not do this.  The Golan was originally occupied in a battle waged for the sake of Palestine, and so was Sinai."^[34] Asad's goal had always been to attain 'strategic parity' (at-tawazun al-istratiji) with Israel in the military sphere.  This became impossible once the Soviet Union disintegrated.  The "unilateral solution" he was referring to was the military option (al-khiyar al-qitali al-musallah), to recover his conquered land (aradi maftuhah) - a negotiating card or tactic he never forswore or took off the table.

 

Syria's foreign minister, Faruq al-Shar' affirmed, "Syria would not sign a treaty with Israel, even if the whole Golan were returned, until the Palestinians accepted an interim self-government agreement."^[35]  Five months after the conference, Asad insisted that any peace accord with Israel should, "cover the interests of all Arab parties to the Middle East talks, and he said Syria had no intention of signing a separate treaty with Israel...a bilateral deal was out of the question.  Damascus would not abandon the goals of the Palestinians, Jordanians, and Lebanese."^[36]  It remains to note that Syria did not make their 1974 disengagement agreement conditional on any positive development with any other Middle East state or party.^[37]

 

America's peace team knew that the key to the conference lay in Damascus.  On 23 April 1991, Asad hosted Baker and Ross in Damascus and took a hard-line.  Syria called for the collective conference to have a permanent structure to which the parties could return in order to break impasses; for "a significant role" for the United Nations; and for Israel to commit in advance to abide by UN resolutions on land-for-peace.^[38]  Baker had to formulate a compromise between Shamir's hope of a one-time, symbolic meeting with no UN role and Asad's vision of a continuous conference under the auspices of the UN, but neither side compromised.^[39]  Baker proposed that the U.S. would guarantee the border between Israel and Syria in both directions after a peace agreement and assure that neither side would attack the other.  He would only bring this proposal to President Bush once Asad accepted America's compromise formula on UN participation, adding that this was Asad's only way to recover the Golan.  After Asad raised objections Baker retorted, telling him that he had not shown any flexibility in all their meetings.  Asad replied, "The land is important.  It connotes dignity and honor.  A man is not chosen to go to paradise unless he can do so in a dignified way.  We don't want anyone to say that we have given up what we have been talking about for twenty years.'  Baker told him you can keep saying that for another twenty years and you won't get the land back."^[40]  Finally, on 3 May America's ambassador to Syria, Edward Djerejian called to say he obtained a commitment from Asad on the UN compromise, provided Bush fulfilled Baker's promise on guaranteeing the border.

Once back in Damascus, the Baker delegation discovered that Asad had not only backpedaled from his commitment but that he had invented his own version of events.  This also marked the beginning of what would become a frequently employed Syrian negotiating tactic - trading procedure and expecting a return in substance.  Ross recalled:

Asad told Baker he had agreed to compromise based on Baker's "guarantee" that Israel would withdraw from the Golan Heights.  Baker was livid.  He had guaranteed no such thing.  Why would he guarantee Israeli withdrawal in exchange for two procedural concessions by Asad?  He promised to guarantee the border once agreed; that was all.  But Asad wouldn't budge...there was no misunderstanding, and Baker, on our flight from Damascus to Jerusalem, decided to vent his anger to the press traveling with us...he said that Asad was the impediment to progress and that we might consider pursuing the process without Syria.[41]

A compromise formula was agreed to during the summer.  Any agreement reached would be registered with the United Nations and endorsed by the Security Council and a representative of the Secretary-General would attend the conference as a silent observer.  The European Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council would attend as observers.

 

The Madrid peace process was scheduled in three phases.  The first was a ceremonial session in which each party would present their view on Middle East peace.  It was a prelude to the second phase of bilateral negotiations between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors.  The third phase would feature multilateral talks among the wider region that would concentrate on five regional issues: water, refugees, arms control and regional security, environment, and economic cooperation.  These multilateral talks enabled the states of the wider Middle East, as well as larger world powers to participate in the quest for a comprehensive peace.^[42]

 

The bitter arguments over the principles and terms of the conference were reflected in the letters of invitation and assurance given by the United States to the different participants.  The Syrian letter held America's commitment that "Security Council Resolution 242 and the land-for-peace principle are applicable to all fronts, including the Golan Heights,"^[43] however, the letter of assurance to Israel said, "Israel holds its own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242, alongside other interpretations...the U.S. reconfirms ex-president Gerald Ford's written commitment to ex-premier Yitzhak Rabin of September 1975 regarding the importance of the Golan Heights to Israel's security...The U.S. is committed to Israel's security and to the maintenance of Israel's qualitative edge."^[44] 

 

Without a prior Israeli agreement on territories-for-peace, a regional agreement that bilateral negotiations was the path to peace, or a universal understanding on what 242/338 meant, the conference was unlikely to produce concrete results other than breaking the taboo of Israeli and Arab 'peace' camps sharing the same room.